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SUMMARY
Technology transfer is a topic that has received wide attention 
in recent years, especially with regard to Soviet attempts to 
obtain technologies from the West that are considered to be 
sensitive in terms of western security. The effects such 
transfers have, however, are not always those that would be 
expected and in many cases have not resulted in the ends that the 
Soviets hoped to achieve. This paper seeks to examine the true 
nature and effect of technology transfers between the West and 
the Soviet Union in the area of computers, especially duing the 
period from 1985 to the present. It is argued that while such
transfers have not been effective in the past, changes in the
Soviet Union’s approach to the acquisition and integration of 
foreign technology, under the program of economic reform now 
taking place, will increase the effectiveness of these efforts in
the future. Based on the results of this case study, it is
concluded that the current western approach to export control 
needs to be re-evaluated in light of these new circumstances, if 
the policy of restricting such transfers is to remain viable.
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A NOTE TO THE READER
Doing a study of this type has been an enlightening experience, 
not only in terms of the subject matter, but that being a native 
American working at a British University several differences of 
interpretation have been noted in what would normally be 
considered the common usage of various terms. To assist the 
reader, a few of these are outlined below.
The term 'West' or 'western' is considered to include Japan, 
both because of its level of development and the fact that it is a 
member of CoCom, the export control regime that is designed to 
monitor the transfer of western technology to the Soviet Union.
The term 'Soviets' is used as an adjectival noun referring to 
the Soviet people, similar to the use of the term 'Americans', as 
opposed to its more restrictive meaning as an elected council.
The term 'data', while denoting a plural state, is treated 
grammatically as a singular, an 'Americanism' grudgingly forgiven 
by The Oxford Dictionary of Current English.
Spellings used throughout reflect the American, as opposed to 
the British, tradition.
I would like to thank both the patience of those who have 
helped in reviewing the text as well as the reader for allowing 
me these idiosyncrasies, brought about, in the words of George 
Bernard Shaw, "by two peoples divided by a common language."
dlb
(v)
" (The Capitalists) will supply us with the materials and the 
technology which ... we need for our future victorious attacks 
upon our suppliers." 1
V. I. Lenin
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, EXPORT CONTROL, AND ECONOMIC 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE SOVIET UNION
THE CASE OF SOVIET COMPUTERS
Introduction
The issue of technology transfer has come to the forefront of 
debate in the last several years, in government circles, the press 
and the general public. The United States and its allies 
traditionally have relied on technological superiority to offset the 
quantitative military superiority of the Soviet Union during the 
years of the cold war. To maintain this technological advantage, 
the governments of the West imposed a regime of export controls 
to prohibit the transfer of high technology items; failure to
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maintain this superiority, it was felt, represented a severe threat 
to the security of the West. With the end of the cold war and the 
changes that have occurred in the East, however, many in both 
political and economic circles in the West are now calling for a 
lessening of these controls and increased trade with the Soviet 
Union, not only as a means of lessening tensions between East and 
West, but in response to the demands of the market system that is 
the basis of the West's economic strength. 2 This presents a 
dilemma for decision makers whose job it is to determine policy 
in this area, for while the world has applauded the events that 
have taken place in the USSR and Eastern Europe to date, there are 
no guarantees that these changes are permanent, or that events 
may not take yet another unexpected turn. What would happen in 
the case of such a turn of events? What happens should the West 
once again be required to maintain a technological edge to insure 
its security? And what happens when the current export controls 
no longer prove to be effective?
Within the broad realm of items that are covered in the general 
category of advanced technology and affected by export controls, 
computers form a significant and fascinating subset. Perhaps no 
other technology better represents the technological revolution 
that the world has undergone than the microprocessor. There are
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few areas of modern society that are not affected in some way by 
computers; the significance of computers in defense issues alone 
needs hardly be amplified. In the past, the importance of 
computers led the Soviet Union to engage in a major effort at 
obtaining western technology in this area, an effort that directly 
challenged western efforts to limit the transfer of technology, 
but whose success to date appears to be limited at best. Now, 
however, in light of the current attempts at economic 
restructuring ongoing in the Soviet Union and the policies that 
accompany these attempts, this situation may be changing. Using 
computers as a case study, it should be possible to evaluate 
whether current western export controls are still effective in 
restricting the transfer of technology in this vital area, or 
whether the new Soviet initiatives require the West to reexamine 
its export control policies.
The purpose of this study, is to help clarify the debate on 
technology transfer by examining the significance of western 
technology to the Soviet Union in the area of computers. 
Throughout, technology will be treated simply as "knowledge 
relevant to industrial capability," 3 and technological skill defined 
as "the mastery of the applications of advances in science to
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manufacturing techniques." 4 Technology transfer, for the 
purposes of this study, is the transfer of technology from one 
group or country to another, such that it increases the 
technological skill of those receiving the technology. Further, 
technology transfer can be considered as being comprised of two 
key elements or components. The first is the transfer of the 
ability to use a new technology or skill; the second is the ability 
to duplicate or improve on the transferred technology, so that 
eventually an independent capability in this area is achieved. To 
be considered a successful transfer of technology, both of these 
conditions must be satisfied.
The goal of this paper is to outline the ways in which western 
technology is transferred to and incorporated in the Soviet 
economic system. Using the Soviet computer industry as one 
example of this phenomenon, the case study will examine the 
effectiveness of western efforts to limit the flow of computer 
related technology from West to East. The results of this 
examination, in turn, will be used to determine the general 
effectiveness of western efforts to limit such transfers of 
technology, and whether current export control policies need to be 
revised. The key questions here, are whether the Soviet Union can 
effectively use the material it obtains to close the existing
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technological gap between East and West, and whether this 
represents a threat to western security. If the answers to these 
questions are yes, then as former U.S. Commerce Secretary 
Lawrence Brady has said, modifying a statement attributed to 
Lenin, "We may be selling (the Russians) the rope with which we 
will eventually be hung." 5 if not, then there is no need to modify 
the current procedures, and in fact there may be little reason to 
continue any policies on controlling technology transfers, 
especially if such policies are detrimental to the West's economic 
interests, while having little of the intended effect upon others.
The Gorbachev Initiatives
It would be something more than an understatement to say that 
major changes have taken place in the Soviet Union under Mikhail 
Gorbachev and his efforts at economic restructuring. Before 
Gorbachev, Soviet attempts at increasing their industrial 
capabilities through inputs of western technologies, both in the 
computer field and in general, had met limited success. 6 One of 
the reasons for this was that Soviet efforts at gaining technology 
tended to focus on the acquisition of hardware, which then had to 
be reverse engineered before it could be reproduced or otherwise 
integrated into the Soviet system. Not only was this process slow,
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but such transfers by their very nature are inefficient. 7 Transfers 
of hardware are also among the easiest to monitor in terms of 
export controls, thus western efforts have been deemed reasonably 
effective in limiting those transfers of materials that were felt to 
be of special concern. Even when hardware was transferred and 
exploited, problems with Soviet technological skills relating to 
manufacturing, as well as information dissemination, limited the 
impact of such transfers. Thus, the overall loss of technology 
appeared minimal at best, and represented little threat to 
continued western dominance in this area.
All this is changing under Gorbachev. One of the first goals 
that he set for the Soviet Union was raising the country's 
technological level, especially in the area of computers. 8 Part of 
this campaign included a change in attitude toward relations with 
the West, along with new emphasis on policies that openly 
encouraged seeking out western assistance in computers and 
other areas. Joint production ventures were proposed, where both 
production capability and manufacturing know-how could be 
gained. 9 Freer access to western personnel and materials 
relating to various technologies are being sought; where five 
years earlier Soviet scientists had been denied access to their
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western colleagues, now they are encouraged to establish and 
exploit such relationships, as well as the information that can be 
obtained through such contacts. Domestically, liberalization of 
the restrictions on internal dissemination of information has 
increased the value of such information for raising the overall 
level of Soviet development. Simply stated, the Gorbachev 
initiatives have brought with them a whole new series of means 
for obtaining and exploiting western technology, means that until 
recently were either discounted or completely ignored by the 
West in terms of export control.
Soviet attempts at obtaining western technology, in order to 
make up for the deficiencies of the Soviet economy, are nothing 
new. What is new, or at least refreshingly different, is the 
willingness of the Soviet leadership to admit that it seeks 
western aid in this task, and to actively pursue better relations 
with the West in order to obtain that which it needs. In this 
regard, the remarks of the Kremlin's chief ideologist Vadim 
Medvedev on 5 October 1988, stating that there was nothing 
wrong in borrowing from the West, were revolutionary in that for 
the first time the Soviets admitted both their need of help from 
the West and their willingness to alter many of their previously 
held policies and beliefs in order to gain that assistance. 10
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While many in the West remain wary of this new Soviet attempt 
at friendship, there are more then enough people and countries 
that are ready and willing to let bygones be bygones and to give 
the Soviets whatever they desire, as long as a profit is 
involved. 11
The Significance for Export Controls
The programs set out by General Secretary Gorbachev under his 
call for 'perestroika' have been many and varied, however one of 
the recurring themes has been the need to borrow and obtain 
technological information from the West. 12 This in itself is not 
unique, as the Soviets have long sought western technology as a 
means of making up for their own deficiencies in this area. What 
is unique, and bears closer examination, are the ways in which 
the Soviets are attempting to secure this information. In the 
past, the Soviet Union focused its efforts on gaining information 
through obtaining the products that embodied this information; 
thus western nations attempted to limit the transfers of such 
technology by limiting the export of these products. Now, 
however, Soviet interests have broadened to include areas not 
traditionally addressed by the current export control regimes. 
Instead of merely the products of technology, the Soviet Union is
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attempting to obtain design and manufacturing know-how through 
Joint Ventures, electronic data links, and increasing personal 
contacts between East and West. 13 This represents a major shift 
in Soviet acquisition policy, from targeting the end results of 
technology to obtaining the information and skills necessary to 
achieve these results.
What is disturbing about this shift, from the point of view of 
protecting vital technologies, is that while the effectiveness of 
obtaining technological information from the transferring of 
products is relatively low, the effectiveness of transfers through 
these new means is very high. In the seminal work in this area,
An Analysis of Export Control, done for the U. S. Department of 
Defense and commonly referred to as the Bucy report, Joint 
Ventures and technical exchanges are cited as being two of the 
most effective ways of transferring semiconductor technology.
As part of the program of restructuring, these types of contacts 
have been emphasized and aggressively sought after. Thus, while 
the new 'openness' on the part of the Soviet Union has been 
welcomed by many in the West, there is also reason to be 
concerned that this change in approach and nature of the 
transfers between East and West may represent a threat, in the
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long term, to the West's security interests. 14 If there is indeed a 
threat, can the present regime be changed to meet this threat? If 
not, the United States and its allies may eventually end up giving 
the Soviet Union more, in terms of critical technologies, than the 
Soviets have ever been able to obtain in the past, through overt or 
other means.
Is There A Need For Change?
At the same time that the Gorbachev initiatives are 
challenging the current system of export controls, that system 
itself appears to be on the verge of collapse under its own 
bureaucratic weight. If there is any consensus among writers on. 
the topic of export controls, it is that the current system is in 
need of change. The question that nobody seems able to answer is 
how to go about making this change? Some argue that there is no 
longer a need for controls, based on the decline in the nature of 
the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the West. 15 Others argue 
that part of the reason for the decline of the Soviet threat is the 
inability of the Soviet Union to match the West technologically, 
and that export controls should be maintained, if not 
strengthened. 16 And even if agreement could be reached on the 
nature and extent of the changes to be made, further questions
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arise on how to go about implementing these measures?
As if all this was not confusing enough, there is also a body of 
thought that views the current situation unfolding in the Soviet 
Union as being the result of the deficiencies that are inherent in 
the Soviet system, which after seventy years of mismanagement 
are bringing that system to its knees. 17 For these observers, the 
inability of a centrally planned economic system to deal with the 
complexities involved with running a modern society, combined 
with the burdens imposed by the weight of commitment to the 
Soviet military industrial complex, is exemplified in the inability 
of the Soviet Union to effectively use that technology which it 
does obtain from the West. In this light, the very premise of the 
need for changes to the export control regime comes into 
question, in that even with all the problems with the current 
system of export controls, and in spite of Soviet attempts to 
obtain western technology, the Soviet Union seems little better 
off as a result of the technology transfers that have already 
taken place, and in some respects may even be the worse for their 
efforts. On the evidence that to the end of 1990 there is little 
indication that the technology already transferred to and 
incorporated within the USSR is playing any part in preventing the 
apparent collapse of the system, the question arises of whether
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there is even a need to worry about transferring technology to a 
system tottering on the brink of destruction.
The answer to these questions, and at the same time the major 
justification for this study, is that changing times and situations 
require reevaluations of old policies to insure that they fit new 
circumstances. If export controls in the past were less than 
ideal, they appeared none the less at least partially effective and 
necessary, and therefore were supported by a majority of the 
western nations that were in a position to transfer advanced 
technology to the East, including neutral nations who, while 
officially non-aligned, complied with western guidelines to 
ensure their own continued access to advanced western 
technology. 18 Now, however, with the lure of economic gains and 
the prospects for reduced tensions between the blocs, many, 
especially in Western Europe, are calling for the loosening of 
restrictions that would allow businesses in the West to take full 
advantage of the opportunities being offered. 19 Arguments from 
each side in this debate can be heard with increasing frequency, 
and as with most arguments, the truth lies somewhere between 
the various extremes. The challenge is to determine exactly 
where.
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The Western Challenge
Very few in the West would argue that restrictions on 
technology transfers should be totally abandoned overnight, on 
the mere promise of a safer world, brought about by changes in 
Soviet attitudes and outlook. The problem then, is trying to 
decide where exactly to draw the line. If there is one thing that 
history has taught in this regard, it is that attempts at reform, 
like the one that is taking place in the Soviet Union, can be short 
lived and require only a change in leadership to bring the process 
to a halt. 20 For this reason, many politicians in the West have 
adopted a wait and see attitude, wishing the Soviets well, but not 
rushing forward with open arms to embrace an effort that, as of 
yet, has no clear indication of where it may lead. Other leaders, 
emphasizing the economic advantages to be gained and responding 
to the call of businesses anxious to expand their dealings with 
the East, are putting pressure on their governments to allow such 
transfers under the most advantageous circumstances, i.e. 
without excessive control and interference from administrative 
measures imposed for political reaso n s . 21 Any approach to 
export controls has to try to meet the desires of both of these 
sides, those who fear the results of giving technology to
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countries that may in the future turn that technology against 
them, and those who would trade with all under the idea that such 
trade not only strengthens the West economically, but increases 
the chances of cooperation and understanding between nations, 
and thus contributes to political stability.
The West's challenge then, is to determine what goals it hopes 
to achieve through export controls, and how it intends to achieve 
those goals. It should also be apparent that the results of this 
examination have applicability far beyond the current case of the 
Soviet Union. As has been highlighted in the current situation in 
the Middle East and other parts of the world, where advanced 
technologies that have been transferred to other countries have 
come back to endanger the source of these technologies, the 
issues of when and where to transfer and conversely when and 
how to limit the transfer of advanced technology are both 
complex and not easily resolved. Still the difficulty of the 
problem should not deter attempts at finding a solution. Even if 
the question of technology transfer to the Soviet Union should no 
longer be an issue, for whatever reasons, the principles 
established here can serve as a basis for examining other 
situations where the issue of transferring technology between 
nations is involved. Nor should these results be looked at in
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purely restrictive terms. By identifying cases where technology 
has been effectively transferred to the benefit of both the 
receiving country and the provider, precedents for further such 
cooperation, where development is the goal, can be established.
Methodology and Reason for the Study
The method of this study is to examine the process of 
technology transfer as it relates to the Soviet computer industry 
during the years 1985 to 1990. The value of the new initiatives 
made under Gorbachev, in terms of the technology they provide, 
can be viewed as a function of three variables: the type of 
transfer and its effectiveness, the volume of such transfers and 
the aggregate value of what is obtained, i.e. the way in which 
separate initiatives combine to provide an overall increased 
potential. By examining each of these variables in the case of 
computers, it should be possible to determine if the Soviet Union, 
as a result of these new initiatives, stands to benefit 
substantially in this area. If this proves to be the case, then the 
next step is to determine the most effective way of influencing 
these variables through export controls, so as to limit their 
impact and maintain the West's technological edge.
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The broader significance of this research and the reason for the 
study is the need for an evaluation of the effectiveness of existing 
export controls in light of the new initiatives involved in the 
Soviet attempts at economic restructuring. The benefits to be 
gained by such an examination are many. It is a new and timely 
topic where little research has been done, simply because the 
Gorbachev reforms have only recently brought about the phenomena 
described above. While there have been studies of technology 
transfer and its effect on the Soviet Union in the past, 22 this 
current undertaking can be justified in two ways. First, the rise of 
Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies designed to bring about 
restructuring of the Soviet economy pose new challenges to 
western decision makers, some of whom found difficulties in 
resolving the problems posed by technology transfers even before 
the changes that have come about under perestroika. Second, in 
spite of western efforts to limit the transfer of technology, there 
is evidence to suggest that these efforts have not been as 
effective as the governments that instituted them would like to 
believe, and that it is primarily inefficiencies arising from faults 
inherent in the Soviet system, and not western efforts, that have 
limited the loss of technology. Now, however, the Soviets are 
embarking on a program that may dramatically increase their
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ability to adapt and integrate this technology, and thus increase 
the effectiveness of its transfer. If this attempt proves 
successful, and the West wishes to maintain its technological 
advantage, then it must recognize the significance of these 
changes in Soviet policies and procedures, and adapt its own 
policies accordingly. Under these circumstances, a new look at an 
old problem cannot hurt, and may in fact be of some benefit.
In troduct ion-17
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CHAPTER 1--THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Introduction
How does one document the transfer of an idea? Since 
mankind's earliest times, the sharing of information has been the 
engine which has driven the advancement of civilization.
Societies that were able to learn from others and adapt to
changing situations, as a rule, flourished. Those, on the other
hand, that shunned contact with other cultures, that rejected new 
ideas in favor of established ways and refused to adapt to 
changes in the world around them, have usually suffered a less 
than enviable fate. Yet for all the importance that the transfer of 
technology would seem to entail, relatively little attention has 
been paid to the actual mechanisms which are involved in such 
transfers, the ways that information is transmitted and, more 
importantly, accepted and integrated by the receiving group. 1 
That such transfers take place is well documented; how these 
transfers occur is far less clear.
The passing of time has not decreased the importance of such
transfers to the progress of society, and if anything such
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transfers have become even more important today. In the world 
political economy that has taken shape in the last half century, 
integration and the sharing of ideas has been the cornerstone on 
which any country that wants to guarantee its economic survival 
and well being has, out of necessity, been forced to build upon. 2 
Isolationism, as a political policy, still has its adherents in 
today's world, and even economic isolationism on occasion has 
been used as a rallying point and a means of creating or 
strengthening national pride. 3 No rational politician, however, 
would dream of isolating his country from the flow of technical 
information that characterizes the world today. To do so would 
not only be against the better interests of any nation, it would at 
best condemn that nation to a position of inferiority in relation 
to the other countries in the world community, and at worst 
might even threaten the security, if not the very existence, of 
such a nation.
With the significance of the transfer of technology all too 
apparent, as well as the implications of what may happen when 
such transfers are not encouraged or for other reasons do not take 
place, one would expect that the ways that technology is 
transferred would be fairly well defined. Such, however, is not 
the case. 4 in certain instances, the transfer of technology is
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obvious and easy to follow. The spreading of a new theory of 
design, the importation of a new product into a region, or the 
building of a factory to produce these new products locally can 
all be fairly well followed and documented. But how does one 
quantify the knowledge that accompanies a product or the skills 
that go into its manufacture? Understanding what is involved in 
these events is essential because of the effects they can have on 
the surrounding environment, on society and ultimately on the 
course of human development. The advent of gunpowder and the 
weapons that came with it can, in large measure, be tied to the 
fall of feudalism. 5 By giving a common soldier with little other 
training the means of defeating a knight whose training might 
take years, the nature of warfare was drastically changed. By 
eliminating the supremacy of armored warriors on the 
battlefield, their significance as protector and defender of an 
area was greatly reduced, with profound consequences for the 
prevailing social order. By replacing the artistry of the armorer 
with the technical skills involved in manufacturing firearms, 
another step up the industrial evolutionary ladder was also taken, 
with these new skills eventually spreading to other fields of 
endeavor.
In some respects, the passage of time has had little effect on
the basic mechanisms of this process. 6 While the technologies 
involved have changed over the centuries, the mechanisms for 
transferring these technologies have remained remarkably the 
same. Craftsmen passed their art from master to apprentice; as 
new skills evolved, these new techniques were passed from one 
generation to the next, with journeymen sometimes traveling 
great distances to study with the masters in a given field, then 
returning to their homes where they, in turn, became the local 
masters and centers of learning in their respective areas. Trade 
guilds became key organizations for the practicing and passing on 
of skills within a field. As education became formalized and 
institutions of higher learning spread throughout Europe, 
universities became centers of study, standardizing and passing 
on the basics in the fields of mathematics, engineering and the 
physical sciences. The advent of the Industrial Revolution 
brought with it not only new technologies and manufacturing 
skills, but the need for those involved in industry to stay abreast 
with and adopt these skills if they were to continue to remain 
competitive. Still, the ways in which these new technologies 
were spread continued much as they always had before, with 
those possessing advanced technologies passing them on to the 
lesser developed, much as the master passed on his knowledge to
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the apprentice.
If there is a change that has come about as a result of the 
passage of time, it is that while the mechanisms of transfer have 
remained the same, the conditions surrounding and shaping these 
transfers have been altered significantly. As the pace of 
technological change has quickened, not only is there the need for 
countries to adopt the latest technologies in order to compete in 
newly created world markets, but they must do so rapidly to keep 
up with the ever increasing pace of technological development. 
Improvements in communications and transportation facilitate 
the movement of both the products of these new technologies and 
the technologies themselves, on a scale previously unknown and 
unthinkable. Skills in manufacturing that were once the realm of 
the artisan, have become the domain of the industrial manager, 
while a secondary trade has begun in the transfer of the means of 
production; entire plants and manufacturing facilities are bought 
and sold, with entire populations finding themselves both exposed 
to and expected to master the new methods. Complexity, in terms 
of the technologies involved, has also increased, compounding the 
problems of assimilation and integration for those seeking to 
keep up with the rest of the world. Those that master these 
difficulties, prosper; those that fail, or are slow in assimilating
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these new skills, find themselves falling behind in the race to 
keep up with the flurry of new products, technologies and skills 
making their appearance.
This situation, at least in part, is the result of the increases 
that have taken place in the past several years, both in the 
amount and the complexity of information being dealt with, and 
the speed at which this information is transferred. Whereas in 
times past information might take months or years to travel from 
one source to another, and decades or even centuries before any 
benefit could be derived from the transfer of ideas, modern means 
of communication have resulted in such transfers taking place in 
a matter of seconds, while the effect of these transfers can be 
seen in a matter of days. Not only has the speed at which 
information is transferred increased exponentially, but the rate 
at which new information is created has also dramatically grown. 
Both are characteristic of the world in which modern man finds 
himself, and both play a key part in shaping that world and man's 
relationships within it. 7
The phenomenon of technological complexity is another way of 
characterizing the differences that exist between the current 
situation and previous ones. Everyone recognizes that the world
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today is a far more complicated place than it was fifty years 
before. If one were to map the changes in the world in the last 
fifty years, in terms of innovations, new materials, new 
techniques and a whole range of other areas that affect the way 
that mankind works and lives, one would probably find that the 
significant changes in this period would outweigh all those that 
had occurred during the previous five hundred years. 8 
Surprisingly though, this increased complexity has brought with 
it a decrease rather than an increase in integration time that 
normally accompanies the assimilation of new ideas. Upon 
examination, what one finds is that the increasing complexity of 
advanced technologies often brings with it new ways of dealing 
with this complexity. Telecommunication networks allow new 
discoveries to be disseminated quickly over distances that were 
unthinkable one hundred years before. Video technologies allow 
for the sharing of information simultaneously across the globe. 
Even the products of this technological revolution, in turn, can 
act as accelerators in this process, as computers, perhaps the 
icon of the technological revolution, now are employed to design 
and manufacture still more complex machinery, far beyond the 
capabilities of any single man or groups of men.
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Still, the mechanisms for transferring this new information 
have not really changed, in that new ideas still must be 
transmitted in some manner so that the receiving group can act 
on and benefit from these new ideas. While the speed of transfer, 
the distances involved and the very complexity of the information 
being carried have all increased, the actual process of 
assimilating this new information remains the same, much as 
athletes continue to improve on their performances in sports 
without changing the nature of the game. Further, not only are 
the processes basically the same, but the effectiveness of 
various types of transfers also remains fairly stable. 9 
Continuing the analogy to sports, just as better athletes tend to 
win more matches, the better mechanisms for transferring 
technology tend to be more successful in accomplishing their 
goal, that is, increasing the technological skill or level of 
capability of the receiving party. Numerous other factors play a 
part in this equation; the presence of an established 
infrastructure in the receiving society, the level of education, 
cultural and linguistic differences, etc. 10 Overall, however, the 
more successful ways of transferring technology tend to prove 
themselves over time, and thus are the ones that should be the 
focus of any discussion of technology transfer.
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Transfer Mechanisms 11
As might be imagined, the mechanisms for transferring 
technology are as many and varied as the ways that one can think 
of going to work in the morning. While some may appear more 
logical or efficient than others, there are numerous ways to go 
about transferring information, each of which may make sense 
given a specific set of circumstances. Still, for the purpose of 
analysis, three general categories can be identified: 12
1. Transfers of materials. Sometimes referred to as 
'embodied technologies' 13 these include the transfer of actual 
materials and machinery, the products of technology, and in 
certain instances the manufacturing capability to produce these 
products. This area has long been the focus of studies about 
technology transfers, since it is the most obvious and represents 
the desired result of any transfer, that is, a product or capability 
that the receiving body did not have, or could not develop without 
excessive cost or effort. 14
2. Transfers of information: Unlike actual products and 
manufacturing processes, information may not represent the 
embodiment of technology, but may be of greater value in terms
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of the ability to recreate or produce the products that embody a 
given technology. Technical information, patents, trade journals 
and other related documents all contain a wealth of information, 
and hold the added advantage of being easily transferable, 
especially in an environment of telecommunications, computer 
data links and facsimile (FAX) facilities.
3. Transfers of know-how. Closely related to, though separate 
from information, are the knowledge and technical skills in a 
field needed to make use of the information available in order to 
create the products that embody a technology. Even when both the 
elements of material and information are present, there is still a 
need for the ability to combine these two to achieve a useful 
purpose. This ability or technical expertise can be summarized in 
the term know-how, the ability to make use of both production 
capability and information to achieve the desired results. Joint 
Ventures, technical education, and academic exchanges are all 
examples of the ways that technical expertise can be transferred 
from one group to another. 15
While the effectiveness of each of these varies according to 
the circumstances involved, some generalizations as to the
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efficiency of each transfer mechanism can be made. Of the work 
that has been done on the effectiveness of various types of 
transfers and the mechanisms which embody them, the Bucy 
Report is seminal in terms quantifying the various types of 
transfers. 16 (For a summary of the finding of this report, see 
Appendix A) Still, to better understand the nature of each of 
these types of transfer, their relative strengths and weaknesses, 
and how they relate to one another, a brief discussion of each may 
help.
Transfer of Materials
The most recognizable type of transfer, and the one that has 
been the focus of most of the attention in export control, is the 
transfer of goods, both in terms of finished products and the 
manufacturing capability to produce these products. 17 Even in 
its simplest form, the introduction of a technology that was 
previously unknown in a society can have profound effects upon 
those receiving it, as in the case of the introduction of gunpowder 
and firearms into a region that previously had only bows and 
arrows. Variables such as who controls the new item, who has 
access to it, how quickly it becomes adopted, and the extent to 
which it is used, all play a part in determining the role that the
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new technology will have in the society. Once introduced, this 
process is normally an evolutionary one, that is, it will probably 
bring about changes and results that cannot easily be reversed. 
Once accepted, the new technology becomes the standard for the 
society, until it too is replaced by a still newer technology.
One of the factors that plays a decisive role in the acceptance 
of these materials into any society is the ability of the society to 
assimilate both the goods and the technologies associated with 
them. 18 To be accepted into a society, a certain basic 
understanding of the use of the object and its capabilities must 
either be present or be created. In this regard/sending  
automobiles to a country that has no roads, no fuel and no 
provisions for support in terms of maintenance and repair, will 
have little affect on the region as a whole, at least until the 
necessary infrastructure is created. 19 The same can be said for 
introducing computers into an environment that cannot take 
advantage of the capabilities that computers have to offer. Thus, 
the overall state of development plays a large role in the ability 
of a society to exploit the opportunities that a new piece of 
equipment has to offer.
Another factor relating to the effectiveness of the transfer of
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material is the ability of the society to recreate the technology, 
or build upon it. 20 As long as a society cannot reproduce a given 
product, i.e. it does not have the necessary technological skill or 
manufacturing capability, it remains dependent upon outside 
sources to provide this item. 21 This dependency, in turn, can be 
exploited by the country providing the product; by withholding 
the material in question, the provider can in effect apply a brake 
to the development process. Also, the failure to master the 
technological skills involved limits the capability of the 
receiving nation to adapt the given technology to the specific 
conditions of the region, something that broadens the product’s 
utility, and thus its appeal. Automobiles that fail to function in a
given climate, be it tropics, desert or arctic will have little
demand from the local population. The people in the best position 
to modify a product to the specifics of a region are obviously 
those who live there and have first hand knowledge of what 
features are desired. To do this successfully, however, the local
people must also understand the basics of the operation and
manufacture of the object. Without these, integration and 
widespread adoption of the technology will be slow and hindered 
at every step of the process.
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The ability to modify and produce a product thus is one of the 
factors that can be used as an indicator of a successful transfer 
process. Once the receiving society has the ability to 
manufacture the product on its own, it is no longer dependent on 
outside sources. The sooner the receiving society is able to 
adapt a given technology to its own circumstances, the sooner 
that technology is likely to be accepted on a larger scale and 
truly integrated into a society. To reach this stage, however, 
several preconditions must be met. The manufacturing base of 
the receiving country must be developed to the point that it can 
work with the technology involved and produce the products that 
embody a given technology. This requires not only manufacturing 
facilities, but people who are trained and capable of running 
them. The society itself must be at that stage of development 
where it can integrate and use the products of technology, 
otherwise there will be no demand for these goods. Finally, the 
people in the society must themselves be ready to accept and use 
the products. Perhaps the clearest example of this need is the 
case of computers in the West. When computers were the domain 
of a few specialists in the early fifties, their impact on society 
was relatively small. It was only with their widening use and 
acceptance in society that their influence has become more 
pronounced.
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All this leads to one of the key subsets with regard to 
transfers of materials, that of transferring production facilities. 
While products can be moved fairly easily from one region to the 
next, there is little or no guarantee that there will be any lasting 
benefit unless the technology that is embodied in these products 
is in some way internalized in the receiving society. One way of 
overcoming this problem is the assimilation of the technical 
skills necessary for local production, which can be accomplished 
by the transfer of the manufacturing process itself. In its most 
complete form, entire production facilities can be involved, so- 
called ‘turnkey’ operations where a plant or process is set up and 
ready to function at the turn of a key. The transfer of production 
facilities offers many advantages in terms of shortening the 
process of technical assimilation, but while seemingly ideal for 
installing a new technology into a region, such transfers may 
still be ineffective if the capability is not present to run and 
maintain such facilities. Other factors, such as cost, availability 
and the need for some minimal domestic infrastructure all can 
limit the utility of such transfers, not to mention the sheer 
difficulty of dismantling, shipping, and setting up such 
facilities. 22
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Thus, while transfers of material are the most common and 
conspicuous way of transferring technology, they do not address 
all the problems that are involved in the integration of 
technology, and the mere presence of a product within a society 
is no guarantee that it will be used effectively, if at all. To do 
this requires the ability both to adapt the product to local 
conditions, and eventually to master the skills involved in its 
manufacture. The failure to be able to do this at best leaves the 
receiving nation in a position of dependency upon its suppliers; in 
the worst case, it may slow or even stop progress in this area. 
Thus, while the transfer of goods can have a definite impact upon 
a society, this impact becomes truly manifest only with the 
presence of another essential element in the transfer process, 
that of technical information.
Information Transfers
While transfers of goods or materials incorporate some types 
of basic information, the transfer of technological information in 
and of itself represents a second major type of technology 
transfer. Technical journals, patent information, 23 
manufacturing licenses, and other types of documentation
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relating to products and/or manufacturing procedures all are 
forms of information transfers that can either supplement, or in 
some cases take the place of, the transfer of the actual product. 
While the value and effectiveness of this type of transfer is also 
dependent on a number of factors, including the medium of the 
transfer, the technology involved and the ability of the receiving 
body to make use of this information, there is no question that 
this type of transfer is of major significance, perhaps more so 
than the actual transfer of products.
One of the problems already outlined with regard to the 
transfer of materials is that actual products often do little to 
indicate how they are created, the steps and materials that went 
into their manufacture and other specifications (strength, 
flexibility, manufacturing tolerances, performance requirements, 
etc.) that apply to these products. While reverse engineering, the 
process of taking apart a particular item in order to determine 
technical data, is often used to gain this information, this 
process is slow and cumbersome at best; at worst, it still may 
not reveal all the information that is necessary in order to 
recreate the actual product. 24 Here technical information, the 
manufacturing specifications of a commodity and possibly even 
the steps in the manufacturing process itself, can be detailed in
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writing or other forms of media, making it far easier for those 
receiving the technology to duplicate the process.
The advantages of such transfers are obvious. Not only is such 
information necessary if a true picture of the technological 
process is to be gained, but additional information, such as 
insights by the original producer, can be included, thus saving the 
receiving group from having to make 'the same mistakes twice.' 
Technical information can be transferred more easily than actual 
products, and far faster. With the advent of the revolution in 
telecommunications, technical drawings and graphic 
representations can be passed instantaneously though telephone 
and other data links, while computer networks allow not only 
access to such information, but the ability to interact and query 
concerning the information being passed. Finally, cost is another 
consideration. While some expense is involved in all such 
transfers, it is hardly comparable with what the cost might be if 
the actual products were involved, much less that of an entire 
production facility. Taken together, all these factors favor the 
seeking and use of information over material.
This is not to say, however, that information transfers are a 
panacea, or a foolproof way of getting around the limitations that
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come with material transfers. To be effective, information must 
come in a format and package that is readily understood by those 
receiving this information. As anyone will attest to who has 
tried to put together a product where 'assembly is required', the 
value of written information varies directly with its clarity, 
coherency and ability to accurately depict the process that is 
called for in the actual assembly. Depending on the complexity of 
the process involved, accurate descriptions may still not be of 
any use if the receiving body is incapable of executing the 
process described. Other problems, caused by differences in 
language, technical skill and even culture may hinder the 
implementation of the instructions, no matter how expertly the 
process is reflected. Finally, even if all of the above conditions 
are met and the process is fully understood, the lack of the 
necessary production facilities makes the information of little 
more value than the paper that it is written upon.
Thus there is yet another element involved in the transfer 
process. All the information in the world does little good if 
those entrusted with this information do not have the capability 
of doing anything with it, of using its potential to produce 
something of value. An infrastructure must be present in the
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receiving society, comprising both the facilities needed to 
exploit a given technology and the people who are trained and 
qualified to use those facilities and put a given technology to 
practical use. Together, these comprise a third element and are 
the basis of the ability to combine materials with information. 
While possibly the most difficult to describe, it can at the same 
time be the most important item in integrating technological 
information and its products, so that the technology has a lasting 
effect on the society surrounding it. This element, simply stated, 
is know-how.
Technological Know-How
At first glance, it might be difficult to distinguish the 
difference between information and technological know-how. Yet 
if one approaches the question in terms of the difference between 
animate and inanimate objects, the distinction may become 
clearer. Information, as it exists on a sheet of paper (or 
reflecting current technology, in the bits and bytes of a 
computer) is an inanimate entity; in and of itself it cannot 
accomplish anything and has little value other than as a potential 
in the hands of those who possess it. To be of value, this 
information must be put to use, must be utilized in some manner
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such that it either creates or establishes the preconditions 
needed to create something of value to a society. To do so 
successfully, requires a certain degree of capability or expertise 
on the part of those people possessing that information. Just as a 
book does little for a person who cannot read, so information does 
little for those who do not have the ability to exploit that 
information. This ability, then, is the essence of technological 
know-how.
Returning to the analogy of animate/inanimate objects, it 
takes people to convert information into something of use, 
therefore the distinguishing characteristic of technological 
know-how is its human element. 25 in spite of all the advances 
that have been made in technology, as well as the conceptualizing 
that has been done about artificial intelligence, human beings are 
still the essential element in any dealings with science and 
technology. While machines may be able to perform certain 
operations faster than humans, or with more skill and precision, 
it still requires human reason, human insight, human genius to 
carry out any operation. While hardware represents the end 
result of this process and in some cases the production 
capability, and information provides the technical basis, it is the 
human element that brings the first two together and gives the
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whole its meaning. To talk of technology transfers without 
recognizing this element would be like discussing life on earth 
without giving due recognition to the part played by the sun.
Not only is the human element essential in terms of the 
inspiration needed for creation, but in spite of all the advances in 
technology, humans are still the best processors of information. 
While operations can be quantified and described in technical 
literature, it is still often far easier to demonstrate and learn by 
actual application. One need only think about trying to teach a 
child to tie his shoe through writing down the steps, as opposed 
to showing what is to be done and then practicing till the 
procedure is down, to realize the advantages of hands on 
experience in trying to pass on even the most rudimentary of 
skills. Here too is probably the best demonstration of one of the 
most efficient ways that technology can be transferred. Not only 
is direct human contact an effective way of transferring know­
how, but it can incorporate both the transfer of hardware and 
information. Active participation in this process not only allows 
for timely feedback, it helps reinforce the understanding of what 
is taking place and all that is involved in a process, something 
which is a key element for further modification and development.
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Thus, as reflected in the findings of the Bucy Report, it should 
come as no surprise that the transfers that are deemed most 
effective normally incorporate this human element. 26
While the human element plays an essential part in the 
technology transfer process, it too suffers constraints, primarily 
in terms of the technical background necessary to efficiently 
convert information and hardware into a functioning unit. Human 
beings, without the necessary equipment, can do little in the way 
of exploiting or producing technology. Humans, even with the 
necessary equipment and know-how, still require information. 
Therefore, it can be argued that each of these three mechanisms 
is, to at least a certain degree, dependent upon the others. In 
order for the transfer of technology to be truly effective, all 
three must be present to some degree.
The Transfer Process 27
Having looked at the mechanisms by which technology can be 
transferred, the next logical step is to examine the way that 
these mechanisms are employed, or the actual process of 
technology transfer. If one looks at the nature of trade, 
especially between countries of unequal development, it can be
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argued that almost all such exchanges involve at least one nation 
gaining something that it did not already possess, thus the 
underlying reason for the trade. Traditionally, this has meant 
lesser developed countries getting technically developed goods in 
return for raw materials, lower technology products and even 
cheap labor. Yet do all these involve transfers of technology, and 
if not, then what defines such transfers?
While at first it might seem that the transferring of products 
embodying a certain technology, by definition, transfers the 
technology itself, it must be remembered that if the information 
that goes into making that product is not readily apparent, or the 
know-how that is necessary for manufacture is not present, then 
the transfer of a product does little to increase the technological 
level or skills of the receiving nation. In this regard, the trade 
relations between the colonial powers of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and their lesser developed colonies did not 
represent an overt attempt at the transfer of technology, since 
there was little interest on the part of the dominant countries in 
raising the technological level of their colonies. Still, in spite of 
intentions, it can also be argued that one of the results of these 
transfers was the creation of new expectations among the 
receiving countries, new desires that led to increased demands,
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either for goods or for the means to fulfil these demands for 
goods. These demands, in turn, often led to the eventual 
production, domestically, of items that previously were available 
only from abroad, and the development of local capabilities that 
formerly did not exist. This phenomenon was further aided by the 
tendency of developed nations not only to export products, but the 
means of production, factories and plants that when they became 
outmoded by the current standards of the developed nation, could 
still be run at a profit in these lesser developed areas of the 
world. This process has been documented by James Kurth, and is 
cited as part of the classical pattern of imperialistic 
exploitation. For the purposes of this study, it is significant to 
note that whatever its initial intent, the process inevitably 
contributed to the development of the junior partner in such 
exchanges, and thus serves as a model of the way that 
technologies are transferred.
Kurth's model is worth examining in some detail as it 
establishes a framework with which to examine the pattern of 
technological transfers between highly developed and lesser 
developed nations. In his article, "The Political Consequences of 
the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes", 28
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he elaborates on the product cycle and the work of Raymond 
Vernon, a noted authority on international trade and transnational 
companies. 29 The four phase process Kurth describes, consists of:
1. Innovation of a product and growth of its sales 
in the domestic market.
2. Saturation of the domestic market and export of 
the product to foreign markets. Exports will go first 
to those countries whose demand structures (e.g. 
national income per capita) are most similar to that 
in the home country. When these markets are in turn 
saturated, the export drive will move on to countries 
whose demand structures are less similar, and 
normally whose economies are less developed.
3. Manufacture of the product within foreign 
markets. In the home country the manufacturing of 
the product has reached a plateau, while investment in 
these new countries, combined local demand and other 
favorable conditions (access to cheap labor and raw 
materials), create favorable conditions for local 
development.
4. Export of the product from foreign countries to 
the original home market. The combination of cheaper 
production costs in the new country, combined with 
the probability that the originating country has moved 
on to the next level of technology, allows for this to 
take place, however since there still may be a demand 
for the product in the country of origin, it may be 
imported from the country that received the 
technology to fulfill these demands in the country of 
origin, where it is no longer economically efficient to 
maintain the means of production. 30
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While originally designed to describe the relationship that 
existed between the imperial powers and their colonies, many 
parallels can be seen in the relationships found today between the 
industrial nations and those of the developing or 'third world' as 
it has come to be known. What distinguishes the situation today, 
however, is the nature of the technologies that are being 
transferred, as well as the environment that such transfers are 
taking place in and the speed at which they occur. In recent 
times, the development and implementation of new technologies 
and their products have grown dramatically, to the point that one 
can speculate that one-third of the products found on the market 
today were not available twenty-five years ago. The speed of 
this massive change has been brought about, in many cases, by the 
very advent of these technologies; in this regard, the 
technological revolution has been self-generated and is self- 
sustaining, as new technologies create the capability for still 
greater change. Here, once again, there is no better example of 
this than computer technology, where microprocessors give the 
possibility of performing in seconds tasks that would have taken 
weeks or even months using traditional means. With the advent 
of computer assisted design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) the 
rates of change, measured in the creation of new products,
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continue to increase.
Still, referring to the previous discussion of transfer 
mechanisms, the material portion of this transfer process is only 
part of the equation. Without people who are educated and trained 
to take advantage of these tremendous new capabilities, 
technology offers little if anything to the receiving country. 
Without the necessary infrastructure, research facilities, 
manufacturing concerns, transportation and communications 
links, etc., even trained and knowledgeable personnel will have 
difficulties exploiting the possibilities made available by 
transfers of technology. Just as an individual must be of a given 
age in order to perform certain functions in society, so too must 
an economy be at a certain level of development in order to make 
effective use of all that these technologies have to offer. This 
does not imply that a nation must already have all of the 
elements of a developed infrastructure in order to assimilate 
technology from an outside source; however, the more elements 
that are present, the easier and quicker the assimilation process 
will probably be.
Applying these new parameters to the transfer process today, 
two parallel, though not necessarily reinforcing trends can be
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seen. An increase in the technological skill possessed by a 
society furthers the stage of its development and its ability to 
assimilate new technologies, as well as the speed at which this 
process takes place. Part of this is the result of technology 
itself, as new materials, computers, telecommunication 
networks, data bases and the like give the scientific and 
manufacturing communities the ability to deal with an ever 
increasing amount of complex information. At the same time, 
however, the very complexity of these new technologies, as well 
as the level of development needed to exploit this information, 
may act to block or hinder the transfer process. If the necessary 
infrastructure exists, in terms of facilities, equipment, and 
trained personnel, then the transfer process will be effective and 
will add to the technological skill of the receiving group or 
country. If an infrastructure does not exist, then an equal but 
negative reaction can be the result. Societies that cannot 
participate effectively in this process, either because of a lack 
of personnel, facilities, material or combinations there of, stand 
to be left behind as these deficiencies are compounded by the 
inability to effectively incorporate new technologies and raise 
the level of technological skill. In this regard, technological skill 
is the key to development; the 'mastery of the applications of
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advances in science to manufacturing techniques' becomes the 
basis for further advancement, while the failure to master these 
skills can effectively halt a society's progress. Thus, for a 
transfer of technology to be effective, for it to be able to raise 
the level of technological skill, the receiving group must either 
possess the infrastructure needed to take advantage of the 
technology, or be in a position to develop such an infrastructure,
Related Factors
Outside of the constraints placed upon the transfer of 
technology based on its very nature, it should be noted that there 
are other factors as well that can come into play and affect the 
success of such transfers. Economic considerations play a large 
role, since in fact most technologies revolve around products and 
the nature of trade. Returning to the Kurth model, the 
transferring of manufacturing capabilities, along with the 
development of the necessary infrastructure that allows for the 
receiving society to fully exploit these capabilities, can often 
result in the receiving society becoming a competitor with the 
society that first provided the technology. While ideally the 
originator will have already passed beyond this stage in their own 
development, this is not always the case. Cheap labor, access to
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raw materials, and the use of proven technologies without the 
immediate need to develop or innovate, all are factors that allow 
developing countries to compete with older more established 
economies. Once assimilated, further development of a 
technology may take place in the receiving nation, causing it to 
become a rival center for technological development to the 
originator of the technology. For examples of this, one need only 
to look at the rapid development of Asia, which now leads the 
world in several areas of technology that originally were 
imported from the West. These cases of the student outstripping 
the teacher can give rise to some hesitation as to the ultimate 
utility of such transfers, and thus serve as an argument to limit 
their extent, in an effort to prevent the creation of rival 
economic powers.
The same type of considerations are present when it comes to 
discussing technologies relating to national security. Because of 
the importance placed on preserving each nation’s sovereignty 31, 
leading technologies often are applied to the development of 
military capabilities, which, it is hoped, will increase the 
security of that nation. The decision to transfer a technology 
with this type of potential is thus subject to political 
considerations as well as economic, since it would hardy be
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prudent for a nation to provide a capability to a potential 
adversary that might some day threaten the security and well 
being of the originating nation. 32 Because of the complexity of 
modern technology, not to mention the multiplicity of certain 
technologies which allows for their use in either peaceful or 
hostile pursuits, the line of what constitutes a threat is often 
blurred; the same technology that provides nuclear power can 
also provide the means necessary to produce the material needed 
for nuclear weapons. Thus, political considerations, as well, can 
play a part in the transfer process when issues of national 
security are involved, and as will be seen, security concerns 
frame much of the debate surrounding the transfer of technology 
from West to East, and especially the transfer of computer 
technology.
Summary
Summarizing what has been discussed, technology transfers 
involve more than merely the transferring of a product that 
embodies a certain technology. To be an effective transfer, the 
process must include those elements that will allow the 
receiving group or nation to assimilate the technology, reproduce
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it and adapt it to local needs. Without this integration into the 
receiving society, the effect the technology will have will be 
minimal at best, and it cannot be considered a true transfer of 
'knowledge relevant to industrial capability'. 33 To be effective 
in increasing the level of technological sophistication of the 
receiving nation, the technology must not only be integrated in 
terms of use, but it must be assimilated so that it can be 
reproduced and used to advance the general level of capabilities 
of the society, or technological skill. To do this successfully, 
certain preconditions must exist, the primary of these being the 
presence of an infrastructure, in terms of material, facilities and 
skilled personnel. The actual transfer of the technology can take 
place in several forms which can be broken down into three 
general categories: materials, information and know-how. The
effectiveness of each of these as a vehicle for transferring 
technology depends on the conditions that exist in the receiving 
society, however past experience has demonstrated that some of 
these methods are more successful than others, and that methods 
combining these elements with active human participation have 
the greatest chance of success.
In addition, other considerations, primarily political and 
economic, may come into play with regard to the effectiveness of
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technology transfer, specifically in terms of the limitations 
placed on such transfers, usually by the country or group that is 
in a position to provide advanced technologies. The latter are 
artificial in nature, in that these often take the form of 
restrictions that are knowingly implemented, as opposed to 
conditions that are the result of the stage of development the 
receiving country and its ability to assimilate technology 
effectively. This last category most often takes the form of 
export controls, and can be seen in the efforts that have been 
made to monitor and restrict the transfers of western technology 
to the Soviet Union. To restrict this flow effectively by such 
means, however, requires an understanding of the relative 
effectiveness of each category of transfer, as well as the 
aggregate effect that combinations of different methods of 
transfers may have. The problem with western efforts to create 
an effective export control regime, is that this understanding has 
not always been in evidence. Just as it does little good for the 
farmer to close the gate while leaving gaping holes in his 
barnyard fence, so does it do little good to place restrictions 
upon certain types of transfers of technology that are inherently 
ineffective, while allowing other, more efficient types to flow 
free ly .
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CHAPTER 2-TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE SOVIET UNIO N-
THE PRE-GORBACHEV ERA
Introduction
The transfer of technology plays a part in the life and 
development of every nation, therefore it should not come as a 
surprise that it has played a role in the evolution of the current 
Soviet state. But what has been the source of these technologies, 
and more importantly for the purpose of this study, to what 
extent have such transfers influenced Soviet development? If the 
effect has been relatively small, then it would be logical to 
question whether there is even a need to worry about such 
transfers. If, on the other hand, it appears that such transfers 
have played a substantial role in that development, then the 
examination of such transfers acquires added significance.
The transfer of technology from West to East is by no means a 
recent phenomenon. Peter the Great set the precedent for large 
scale importation of ideas and know-how during his program of 
westernization in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. 1 From that time onward, Russia has sought western
2-1
assistance to aid in its development. This trend was particularly 
apparent at the end of the nineteenth century when, under Count 
Witte, the country attempted to industrialize through a massive 
influx of western machinery and industrial expertise. 2 Yet even 
though these early efforts were pronounced, there has been a 
continuing debate as to their importance and even for their need. 
Beginning with the time of Peter, one of the key elements in the 
debate between the Westernizers, those who favored importation 
of western ideas, and the Slavophiles, who stood against such 
practices, was whether there really was a need for Russia to seek 
such assistance, or whether in fact the country could and should 
develop on its own. Lest this seem like an arcane and historical 
debate, it is interesting to note that the same arguments continue 
today, with one of the conservative critiques of Gorbachev's 
programs being his emphasis on importing western ideas and 
technical know-how. 3
As mentioned in the last chapter, there have been a number of 
studies written on the significance of the importation of western 
technology to Soviet industrial development. 4 Most authors are 
in agreement that, in terms of the sheer quantity of material and 
because of the significance attached to such transfers by the 
Soviets themselves, there indeed has been a quantifiable impact.
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But have these various inputs really had an effect on Soviet 
development, and if so, what has been the nature of this impact? 
While the results, as will be seen, vary from case to case, it 
should be possible through an examination of what has occurred in 
the past, to come up with some generalizations about the position 
occupied by imported technology in the Soviet Union prior to 
1985, which can then serve as a basis of comparison for what has 
been observed in the Gorbachev era.
H istory
After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the destruction 
caused by the Civil War that followed, the Soviet leadership 
displayed a keen interest in receiving western economic 
assistance, even at the same time that they were decrying, for 
political reasons, the faults and failings of the capitalist world. 
During the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), Joint 
Ventures with western firms were encouraged by the new Soviet 
government as a means of rebuilding the country's shattered 
industry. 5 Even when direct western participation in economic 
ventures was done away with after 1928, a western presence, in 
the form of engineers and technical specialists hired by the 
Soviets, continued. 6 This influence was so extensive as to lead
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Fred Busy to conclude that, "by 1930, there was not a single 
important industrial process (in the Soviet Union) which did not 
derive from transferred western technology." f
The 1930’s and the communist program of rapid 
industrialization served to reinforce the Soviet use of western 
technology. Western inputs were seen not only as a means of 
repairing what had been destroyed during the Civil War, but as a 
source of capabilities that had never existed before in the Soviet 
Union. Entire plants and in some cases whole industries were 
imported from the West and established on Russian soil; in just 
one example, the Soviet automobile industry can be traced to 
plants bought from the Ford Motor Company. 8 This period was 
significant in that the Soviet leadership appeared to make the 
conscious decision to abandon efforts to use domestic innovation 
as the basis of development, and to concentrate instead on using 
proven western methods to rapidly increase the country’s 
industrial potential. 9 During World War Two, or the Great 
Patriotic War as it is known in the Soviet Union, much of what 
had been built in the twenties and thirties was destroyed, but at 
the same time the aid given to the Soviet Union under Lend Lease 
not only helped to ease material shortages, especially in the area
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of transportation, but allowed Soviet designers access to 
material they might not otherwise have seen. 10 in the years 
following the war, the Soviets made use of both industrial 
machinery and personnel taken from Germany as war reparations, 
while the 1960’s saw them again importing factories and 
technical know-how from the West, especially in the areas of 
plastics and chemicals. In this way, the trend of importing 
western technology continued, with the Soviets turning to the 
West for assistance in those areas in which they were weak or 
did not possess any native capabilities.
Another method of measuring the part played by the West in 
Soviet industrial development is to examine the amount of Soviet 
imports from the West. In 1925, shipments of western equipment 
accounted for 13% of total Soviet imports; in 1930, the 
percentage had risen to 40%, and averaged over 50% in the 
immediate post-war years. 11 While figures show that Soviet 
imports of western equipment declined in the 1970’s, (owing 
possibly to worsening political relations between East and West, 
culminating with a near break in relations over Afghanistan), 
these figures were again up in the 1980's. 12 Anthony Sutton, 
analyzing this repeated borrowing from the West in his three 
volume study of the history of western technology and Soviet
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economic development, comes to the conclusion that, "by far, the 
most significant factor in the development of the Soviet economy 
has been its absorption of western technology and skills." -13 Yet 
while it is hard to dispute that western technology, in numerical 
terms, has played a part in Soviet development, it may be a 
misrepresentation to assume that this automatically means that 
the technology embodied in the material transferred to the Soviet 
Union has, in fact, had a substantial impact on its level of 
development. The Soviet economy today, in spite of its all too oft 
cited failings, is a mature system which even western experts 
acknowledge is more advanced than the West in some areas, n  To 
get an idea of the role that foreign technology has played in the 
Soviet system, it is necessary to examine the way that this 
technology was utilized by the system during the period prior to 
1985 and the coming of the Gorbachev reforms. This view, in 
turn, can be used to contrast the differences, if any, in the role 
that technology transfer plays in Gorbachev's attempts to 
revitalize the economic system.
The Soviet Industrial System
Soviet industry, as the product of a command economic system 
controlled by a central planning organization, presents a picture
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far different than the one presented by its western counterparts. 
Decisions in the West that would be made based on economic
considerations are instead based on political and administrative
!
factors in support of a centrally determined economic plan. This 
central planning mechanism has proven itself slow and 
cumbersome, stressing quantity and fulfillment of production 
goals over quality and demand. The system does, however, 
permit the government to channel resources into desired sectors, 
while maintaining control over the economy as a whole. This 
ability to prioritize is a key strength of the system, and has 
allowed the Soviets to mobilize their resources to achieve 
specific goals, particularly in areas where technology is 
concerned. 16 One result of this system is an industrial plant that 
is unevenly developed, that on the one hand supports a huge and 
very successful space program, but on the other cannot make 
reliable television sets. 17 In the words of Thane Gustafson, a 
leading authority on technology transfer between East and West, 
"the Soviet technological landscape is a complicated 
picture...ranging from valleys of backward technology to summits 
of world leadership." 18
One result of this practice of targeting specific areas through
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resource allocation where the interests of the state are involved, 
is the development of not one, but two industrial complexes in 
the Soviet Union. The first one deals with the military and 
defense matters; the second one encompasses all those areas 
normally associated with the civilian sector in the West. This
arrangement has evolved and is perpetuated because the 
government continually has given priority to the military in its 
economic plans; "the defense industrial sector has first call on 
the highest quality human and material resources available to the 
economy." 19 This high priority allowed the military "to mobilize 
the best brains and the best resources to overcome 
administrative obstacles and gaps" that plagued the rest of the
system, and enabled the Soviet Union to cope successfully with 
the technological challenges of the arms competition. 20
Evaluating the effectiveness of this system has been difficult 
at best. As a closed system, traditionally hostile to the West, 
the type of access needed to make a detailed study has not been 
available until recent times, and even now information remains 
sketchy. Still some observations can be made, based in part on 
western perceptions and in part upon what the Soviets 
themselves have said. That the Soviet Union has made great 
strides in terms of military strength is generally recognized and
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can be attributed to the emphasis that has been placed on this 
area. Yet because of the priority given to the military, the 
civilian sector has continually taken a back seat in the economy, 
resulting in, among other things, a dismal record in the 
production of consumer goods. 21 The lack of an effective pricing 
system in either the military or the civilian system does little to 
encourage efficiency in production or the use of resources. Poor 
labor productivity and the lack of an effective incentive structure 
is another problem inherent to the system. Soviet sources 
estimate that the productivity of the Soviet worker in industry is 
just over half that of his American counterpart, and is worse in 
some areas, such as agriculture. 22 One way of overcoming such 
problems is through innovation in the production process, that is, 
using technical advances to increase productivity; but here the 
Soviets have had more than their share of trouble. As one 
observer states, "with a command economy, the Soviet Union 
generally has been unable to provide incentives for innovation 
that work as well as those growing out of the price system in the 
(West)." 23
The Problems with Innovation
The problems the Soviets have had in the area of innovation, to a
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large degree, can be attributed to the nature of their system and 
the fact that it offers little incentive for change. These problems, 
in turn, also have a direct bearing on their apparent difficulty in 
taking full advantage of western technology. Having made the 
decision in the early days of industrialization to de-emphasize 
domestic research and to concentrate instead on expanding 
production capability, the development of a research and 
development base to support Soviet industry initially lagged. 24 
Even once a large system of research institutes developed in the 
Soviet Union, there was still a lack of incentives to encourage 
applying the results of research to the manufacturing process. 
Limited funds and economic plans that emphasized meeting current 
production goals left little in the way of resources that could be 
dedicated to overcoming this shortfall in innovative capability. 25 
Even in those cases where research was directed from above, 
endless bureaucratic procedures and obstructions owing to 
parochial interests, often stifled innovations before they had a 
chance to be implemented. The basic goals of the central planning 
structure not only limited the incentive for research, but in some 
cases, actually worked against it.
An examination of the non-military industrial sector reveals
several prime examples of why innovation and change have been 
shunned by most of the Soviet economy. Under the central 
planning concept, incentives are geared to rewarding people for 
current output and successful completion of the goals of their 
plan. The costs and delays involved in re-tooling, plus the loss of 
productivity during such periods, provide little incentive for 
bringing about change, no matter how beneficial it might be in the 
long run. 26 The Soviet press has published cases where
i
scientists physically have had to go out and 'sell' new ideas to 
industries, while industrial managers were criticized for viewing 
innovation as "uncertain, unprofitable, and unnecessary." 27 Even 
once new ideas were developed and accepted, the system lacked 
the mechanisms needed to ensure that the results of research 
were rapidly incorporated into production. 28 The same 
bureaucratic lethargy that hampered the development of new 
ideas also slowed their implementation. Instances even exist 
where advanced technological processes, developed by Soviet 
research, have been sold under contract to western firms where 
they have been in use for several years, yet the same processes 
still have not been adopted in the Soviet Union. 29
The Soviet defense industry presents a different picture. 
Because of the priority this sector has enjoyed, giving it first
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choice of technical personnel and almost unlimited resources, an 
extensive research and development base has been established to 
support military production. By targeting specific areas and 
concentrating their efforts, the Soviets have been able to 
overcome many of the problems with innovation inherent in the 
civilian sector. This, in turn, has allowed them to stay abreast 
with, and in some cases surpass, the West in the development of 
defense related technologies. On the production side, the way in 
which defense contracts with industries are written is designed 
to overcome the hesitation toward implementation of new ideas 
and production techniques. 30 Bonuses are based on achievement 
of technical standards rather than pure output, strict quality 
control is enforced, and military personnel are involved in every 
step of the production process to ensure that the equipment 
produced meets military needs. If there is a failure on the 
military side with regard to innovation, it is the inability, owing 
to the closed nature of the system, to effectively diffuse 
technology developed for the military to the civilian sector. 31 
Thus, the advances achieved by the one relatively effective 
research and development organ in the economy do little to 
benefit the economy as a whole.
In summary, it should be pointed out that the Soviets
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themselves realized the problems they were having with 
innovation, and tried to correct them. In 1969, Brezhnev called 
for a major campaign to increase indigenous innovation, while the 
ninth Five Year Plan for the period 1971-75 substantially 
increased the funds allotted for research and development. 32 
These efforts, however, proved less than successful, due in part 
to the unwillingness of Soviet leaders to sacrifice their emphasis 
on production goals in order to encourage innovation. 33 While 
Soviet scientists have often proven to be very good in the initial 
stages of the research-production cycle, they have been unable to 
bring about the rapid development and implementation of new 
ideas. In those sectors, such as the military, where the Soviet 
Union placed a high priority, it has shown that it can overcome its 
difficulties with innovation, but only with the commitment of 
large numbers of people and amounts of resources. This, in turn, 
has stripped the civilian sector of the resources it needed in 
order to keep up with the 'state-of-the-art' in the world 
industrial market. 34 The solution that the Soviet leadership 
arrived at to deal with this problem, of how to make up for the 
inability to generate new technology and bring it into production, 
has been the same one used by preceding generations to assist in 
internal development; import the needed technology and
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production facilities from the West.
Western Technology and the Soviet System
The decision to turn to the West for the technology it needed 
has not been an easy one for the Soviet Union to make. Professor 
Bruce Parrott of John Hopkins University has written that there 
were two divergent views held by the Soviet leadership on this 
issue. The first view supported the belief in the moral superiority 
of the socialist system and its eventual triumph, thus 
downplaying the value of western technology to the East. The 
second allowed that the West was in fact forging ahead of the 
East; therefore, every effort had to made to keep within striking 
distance of the capitalists. 35 For the Soviets, evidence existed 
to support both views. Starting from a position of relative 
industrial backwardness, the Soviet Union had. made great strides 
in the years since the revolution. Most western analysts concede 
that the products of technology the Soviets are incapable of 
producing are extremely rare, and that only time and commitment 
separate them from any advantage they might gain through 
imports from the West. 36 On the other hand, the Soviets 
recognized that science and technology were the very areas where 
market economies hold a greater advantage, both in overall level
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of application and the ability to generate new skills and know­
how. 37 in the end, the deciding factor which favored importing 
technology from the West was the limited nature of the Soviet 
Union's own resources. By taking advantage of technology from 
the West, the Soviets sought to lessen the strain on their own 
research and development (R&D) assets. Not only did such 
transfers cut costs, but they allowed the Soviet Union to 
concentrate efforts on areas that were felt to be critical, such as 
defense. Still, official Soviet policy prior to 1985 played down 
the value of such inputs. From the leadership's perspective, while 
western technology was nice to have, it was by no means 
essential and could be done without. 38
Unofficially, the benefits to be gained by exploiting the West's 
advanced technology base were immense. In areas where the 
Soviets were behind the West, they could save years in research 
time needed to attain an equivalent state of development. By 
buying proven technology, they avoided costly mistakes and errors 
common to the research process. 39 The Director of the Soviet 
Academy of Foreign Trade wrote that the cost of purchasing 
foreign manufacturing know-how was ten times lower than the 
economic effort that would be required by the domestic R&D 
infrastructure *o Finally, with the broad spectrum of western
technology available, the Soviets were able to pick and choose 
what they needed to eliminate bottlenecks in their own system, 
thus aiding their overall level of development. This 'supermarket' 
approach can be seen in the dual strategies the Soviets followed 
when obtaining western technology. The first was to acquire the 
materials needed to develop specific weak areas in their 
industry, such as oil or chemical equipment. The second was to 
acquire technology related to management skills, such as 
computers which, when combined with other Soviet capabilities, 
served to stimulate and improve economic performance as a 
whole. 41
While the Soviet leadership appeared to favor using western 
imports as a means of increasing production and matching world 
technological levels, they were also wary of the risks involved. 
When Soviet purchases of western technology accounted for close 
to one-quarter of the Soviet investment in machinery in 1978, an 
internal political debate arose as to whether this represented an 
unacceptable degree of dependence upon the West. 42 Another 
concern was whether, by importing the results of western 
research and development, the Soviet Union was undercutting the 
development of its own abilities in this area and further
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aggravating an already acknowledged problem. 43 Soviet fears in 
this regard were heightened by the Nixon-Kissinger view of 
detente, which held that increased western trade with the Soviet 
Union would cause the latter to become intertwined economically 
with the capitalist world. 44 Even with these reservations, 
however, the Soviet Union continued to seek the advantages to be 
gained from western technology. As one expert noted at the time, 
"It is simply more efficient and less expensive to borrow from 
the existing repository of knowledge than to waste time and 
resources on innovations that may have little utility for the 
production process." 45
The Collection Process
The general decision to import western technology was based 
upon the inability of domestic agencies to provide Soviet industry 
with the technical innovations needed to achieve and maintain 
production capabilities comparable to those of the West. Once 
the decision was made to import a technology relating to a 
specific area, obtaining that technology, or the collection 
process, became a function of the central planning apparatus. 
Industrial Ministries forwarded their requests for technology and 
equipment to the State Committee on Science and Technology,
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GOSTEKHNIKA (GKNT), which bore primary responsibility for the 
coordination of research and development work throughout the 
economy. A major function of the GKNT consisted of developing 
strategies to acquire western technology and to integrate it with 
domestic R&D efforts. 46 Upon approval of its request, the 
ministry was allotted funds for direct purchase of the desired 
material, or other arrangements for acquisition were made.
These ranged from legitimate means, such as applying for non­
restricted patent information, to covert operations mounted by 
the Ministry for State Security (KGB). As one specialist on East- 
West trade noted: "The Soviets have so many approaches, that 
once they know what they want, they will never give up." 47
Over the years, the Soviets literally have become experts at 
exploiting every legitimate source of technical information 
available to them. In order to conserve scarce hard currency 
assets, they favored buying limited numbers of items that could 
be examined to gain information or be used as models for Soviet 
produced equivalents. 48 The Soviet Union also tried to take full 
advantage of technical data published in the West; among other 
examples, the Soviet Embassy in Washington has a standing order 
for each of the 80,000 technical reports deposited annually at the 
United States Department of Commerce's National Technical
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Information Service. 49 When asked to send specific specialists 
to international conferences, the Soviets would often not send 
the individual requested, but someone who could make the best 
use of the material being presented. 50 Their effort even 
extended to the point that select Soviet lawyers were trained to 
be experts in western corporate law, so as to be able to take 
every advantage of trade negotiations. 51
On the illegal side of collection, Soviet efforts were no less 
intense. If the direct transfer of technology or equipment to the 
East was prohibited by trade restrictions, the Soviet Union had a 
network of operatives and front organizations that would attempt 
to transfer the desired material through apparently legal 
transactions until it was safely in Soviet hands. 52 Using agents, 
co-opting citizens, taking advantage of unsuspecting businessmen 
and moving goods through neutral and third world countries, the 
Soviets were able to collect western technology that might 
otherwise have been denied to them. 53 it has been estimated that 
80% of KGB operations in the U.S. are dedicated to the undramatic, 
year-in-year-out collection of technical data. 54 The Soviet 
Consulate General in San Francisco was believed to have 30 
technically trained intelligence personnel targeted specifically
2-19
against Bay Area electronics firms and the micro-processing 
industry in California's 'Silicon Valley.' 55 still, while highly 
publicized because of the types of items targeted and the 
notoriety of such operations, these efforts account for but a small 
portion of the flow of technical information from West to East. 
The majority of the technology obtained by the U.S.S.R. and its 
allies comes from open sources and trade on the world market. 56
The Western Response-Export Controls and CoCom 57
The western response to this collection effort has been to try 
and impose a number of limits or controls on the types and 
amounts of technology that are allowed to pass from West to 
East. Individual countries have always controlled imports and 
exports across their borders, normally regulated by customs 
agents or other government officials, so that the concept of 
export regulation is not a new one. What was new in this case 
was the size and nature of the task that faced the West in 
monitoring what was being sent to the East. Not only was the 
scope of Soviet operations enormous, but the problem of control 
was further complicated by the growing number and complexity of 
the technologies involved. Added to this was the fact that any 
attempt at export controls that hoped to be effective had to be
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coordinated and agreed upon by all those possessing the 
technologies involved. It did little good for one country to refuse 
to export a given technology for security or other reasons, when 
the same item or technology could be readily obtained from 
another source. 58
To meet this challenge, the countries of the West in 1949 
formed the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls, or CoCom as it has come to be known. Born out of cold 
war fears that sensitive western technology which could bolster 
Soviet military capabilities might be transported to the East, 
CoCom has been characterized as a "gentlemen's agreement" to 
coordinate both the technologies that should be prohibited from 
export and the actions taken to prevent such transfers. 59 Early 
members of CoCom included the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Norway, 
Canada, West Germany, Portugal, Japan, Greece and Turkey, so 
Technologically advanced neutrals such as Sweden, Switzerland, 
Austria and Finland did not join, fearing that such a move would 
threaten their neutrality. However, while these countries have 
often been cited as alternative sources of advanced technology, 
they have, for the most part, informally abided by CoCom
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guidelines, partly out of fear of unduly antagonizing the West and 
jeopardizing their own access to advanced technologies, and 
partly because of their own security concerns. 61 Member nations 
agreed to respect CoCom guidelines once established, though 
enforcement of those guidelines was left in the hands of the 
individual nations.
While the operation of CoCom has been shrouded in some 
degree of secrecy, its day to day activities include: "the 
development of lists of technologies and products that will be 
embargoed, controlled, or monitored; weekly consultations on 
exceptions to these lists; and consultation on enforcement." 62 in 
terms of materials subject to export control, three lists are 
maintained:
1) a munitions list, covering all items of military 
equipment or significance,
2) an atomic energy list, including sources of 
fissionable materials, nuclear reactors and their 
components, and
3) a list of industrial/commercial items. 63
Consultations are held on a regular basis to consider requests by 
individual nations for exceptions to CoCom guidance in cases 
where questions arise on whether the export of a specific piece
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of equipment or technology violates established guidelines. 
Enforcement meetings coordinate actions of the member nations 
to ensure that guidelines are not circumvented.
The effectiveness of CoCom in preventing the transfer of 
technologies from passing East is a topic of some debate, and 
underscores the many problems involved in trying to monitor and 
control such an immense area as East-West trade. One of the 
greatest problems facing CoCom as an agency is that compliance 
with CoCom guidelines is voluntary in nature, with no formal 
mechanisms for enforcement. While the member nations, as a 
rule, have been willing to comply in theory, the actual efforts on 
the part of member nations to monitor and control the export of 
items on the CoCom lists have depended on the resources that 
each nation has been wiling to expend. In the case of the United 
States and Great Britain, these efforts have been fairly 
extensive; in the case of some of the smaller nations, with fewer 
resources to dedicate to maintaining export controls, these 
efforts have tended to suffer. Finally, in spite of the attention 
given in the press and government circles to the illegal transfers 
of technology that CoCom was designed to prevent, these efforts 
form only a small percentage of the Soviet collection effort. The 
majority of the technology being transferred to the Soviet Union,
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in terms of trade and technical material, is being obtained legally 
and is not subject to CoCom control. 64 Thus, while the argument 
can be made that CoCom has been successful in preventing certain 
militarily sensitive technologies from reaching the Soviet Union, 
in terms of the overall flow of technology these form but a small 
percentage of the flow and are in an area where the Soviets have 
shown a substantial capability in generating technologies of their 
own.
Evaluating the Significance of Western Technology
In evaluating the significance western technology has had for 
the Soviet system as a whole, it is worthwhile to look briefly at 
two cases where western inputs have played a part in the 
development of specific areas of Soviet industry. As a caveat, it 
should be noted that such examinations can at best be general in 
nature, are open to interpretation, and as such often reflect the 
bias of the observer. An example of the ambiguities involved can 
be seen in the literature on the Kama Truck Plant. Thane 
Gustafson has cited this as a case where the Soviet Union already 
possessed the basic technology needed to build the complex, and 
that western input was only "a reinforcement of the Soviets’
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already considerable skill." 65 At the same time, however, a 
Deputy Minister in the Soviet automobile industry has written 
that, "It would have been hard to create such a large modern 
enterprise (as Kama)...without technical cooperation, which draws 
on all the best available in the country and abroad." 66 still, even 
with such differing viewpoints, it may be beneficial to look at 
these examples, for they demonstrate two different approaches 
to the use of western technology by the Soviet Union, with two 
different results.
The first of these examples is the Soviet chemical industry. 67 
Created in the 1930s with western assistance, by the late 1950s 
the chemical industry found itself approximately ten years behind 
the West in technical ability and incapable of meeting the needs 
of the country. 68 At this point, a campaign was launched to 
modernize the industry that included massive purchases of 
western machinery; literally entire plants were imported from 
the West and installed. The results of this campaign were both 
impressive in terms of the production increases achieved and 
instructive from the standpoint of the Soviet use of western 
technology. By 1971, the chemical industry was hailed by the 
Soviets as achieving the greatest rate of growth of any industry 
in the past 15 years; what was left unsaid was that it was also
2-25
the industry most heavily dependent on western machinery. 69 in 
just one case, showing the degree of this dependence, by the end 
of the 1970s, western equipment accounted for over two-thirds 
of the Soviet output of synthetic fibers. 70 Further, the Soviet 
reliance on foreign imports may have inhibited the growth of 
indigenous Soviet research and development in chemicals. As 
Gustafson notes, "Twenty years of western technological 
assistance has not provided an independent innovative capacity 
that can support the further advance of the industry." 71 Thus, 
while increases in production were achieved through the transfer 
of technology in terms of machinery, the impact, in terms of 
learning from this technology and developing an independent 
capability in this area, was limited at best.
The case of the Soviet computer industry represents a 
different approach by the Soviets to the use of western 
technology. Soviet computer development began in the early 
1950s and was considered to be within a year of the West when a 
decision was made to downplay the use of computers. 72 This 
attitude did not change until the early 1960s when the Soviets 
realized the potential significance of computers for the military 
and initiated a crash program to catch up with the West. 73 These 
attempts were unsuccessful until the late 1960s, when the
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Soviets illegally acquired an IBM 360 which became the basis of 
their Ryad series computers, still in use today. 74 While a copy of 
the IBM machine, the Ryad was the result of Soviet efforts to 
understand the technologies involved in order to bring the 
machine into production and use. 75 This was necessitated in part 
by western restrictions on computer sales to the East, but was 
also driven by the Soviets’ desire to be self-sufficient in an area 
of strategic importance.
Taken together, these two cases reflect not only differences in 
the Soviet approach to using western technology, but differences 
in the resulting degree of dependence upon the West. For the 
chemical industry, massive imports provided a jump in production 
capability but did little to increase the potential for further 
independent development; to progress beyond the current stage 
required still further imports of western material. In computers, 
short term gains were less pronounced because of the approach 
used, but may have been balanced by the attempt to at least 
maintain the basis of an independent computer R&D 
infrastructure, and thus avoiding dependency. As Gustafson 
notes, ”ln the case of computers, instead of accepting dependence 
on the West, the Soviets have made a serious effort to develop
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their own independent capabilities." 76
Having looked at why western technology is needed by the 
Soviet Union and the process by which it is obtained, it may be 
worthwhile to speculate about what the Soviet Union hoped to 
achieve through such imports and whether these imports achieved 
Soviet expectations. What is the true value of the western 
technology to the Soviets, and has it led to a significant increase 
in their industrial capability vis-a-vis the West? The key issue 
here is the ability of the Soviets to make use of the information 
and materiel they receive from the West, for "it is only when 
imported technology can be fully absorbed in the economy and 
improved upon that technological gaps can be reduced." 77 in 
terms of knowledge, the essence of disembodied technology, the 
Soviet collection efforts have amassed huge amounts of western 
technical material. In the area of technical literature alone, the 
Soviets have literally thousands of specialists whose sole purpose 
is to examine and digest this material, keeping them abreast of 
western 'state-of-the-art.' 78 This knowledge is further 
supplemented by Soviet capabilities in reverse engineering-the
i
examination of finished products to determine the procedures used 
in their production. U.S. government officials estimate that the 
Soviets have saved billions of dollars in R&D costs for advanced
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micro-circuitry alone through such methods. 79 Countering this 
impressive collection of information, however, there are signs 
that obtaining this information and being able to put it to use have 
proven two different things for the Soviet Union. For all the 
effort that has gone into the collection process, the general state 
of Soviet industry suggests that the information gathered has not 
been translated into improved industrial capability. One East 
European source has estimated that it took an average of five to 
seven years to copy a western product and bring it into 
production. 80 This difficulty in bridging the gap from theory to 
practice and applying the western knowledge that has been gained, 
has been a severely limiting factor for the Soviet use of western 
technical information. "A foreign patent..(as one observer 
comments)...will be more difficult to use than a fully built foreign 
plant." 81
With respect to embodied technology, the benefits have been 
more direct. By importing machinery and equipment, the Soviet 
Union has been able to overcome shortfalls in production 
capabilities and shore up weak areas in its industrial 
development. However, as was seen in the case of the Soviet 
chemical industry, this has not contributed to the ability to 
progress beyond the level of the technology at the time of the
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transfer, and may even hinder further development by 
undercutting the need for an independent R&D base. Indeed, there 
would seem little incentive for spending precious time and 
resources in developing domestic designs when it is quicker and 
cheaper to 'buy it from the West.' Problems also exist with 
incorporating western equipment into Soviet production cycles. 
The Soviet press has reported that "great amounts of western 
equipment and material have simply gone to waste," because of 
problems with compatibility and integration. 82 Such problems 
reflect back on the weakness of Soviet innovation, which also 
affects the ability to take full advantage of western material.
What has been missing from both of these efforts is the third 
element of the model for effectively transferring technology 
outlined in the first chapter, the transfer of know-how, primarily 
through personal contact, or the 'human element'. While the 
Soviet Union prior to 1985 was active in its acquisition of both 
equipment and information, the Soviet government was reticent 
about allowing either Soviet specialists to travel to the West, or 
allowing western specialists into the Soviet Union. Part of this 
can be traced to the fear of outsiders that was one of the pillars 
on which Stalin's reign was built; part, as well, may have been
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the unwillingness to allow outsiders to see first hand the 
problems with the Soviet system that were known to exist, but 
which the authorities where loath to admit. 83 As a minimum, 
this failure slowed the integration process for those technologies 
that arrived without sufficient know-how to incorporate them; 
in the worst case, failure to allow for the transfer of know-how 
made those technologies which were obtained from the West next 
to worthless. In the late 1970s and early 1980s this problem 
appeared to be recognized by the Soviets themselves, as a trend 
developed for favoring cooperative production arrangements, 
where Soviet specialists would work with western personnel 
associated with a newly purchased facility, easing the 
implementation of new methods and procedures. 84 still, it would 
not be until the Gorbachev era that official hesitation about 
allowing Soviet citizens to work with westerners would take a 
dramatic shift.
This is not to imply that technology transfers up until 1985 
did not have their uses or benefits. They have helped the Soviet 
Union to bridge critical economic gaps at minimum cost to 
domestic R&D resources, and allowed the Soviets to concentrate 
their efforts on areas they considered to be of strategic 
importance. 85 Western imports also allowed the Soviets to
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modernize sectors of their industry which, because of a lack of
internal resources or development, might otherwise have
remained backward by western standards. 86 in a few cases,
improvement due to western imports has been dramatic; in most
cases, the direct improvements were modest at best. 87 Yet
without western technology, the Soviets would have had to
reevaluate their decisions on resource allocation. Soviet 
capabilities were such that eventually they could have produced
any item they received from the West, but at a substantially
greater cost in resources. 88 With limited resources, however, 
they could not have produced everything they needed through their 
own efforts, and would have had to redirect or restrict many of 
their initiatives. Thus western technology has been invaluable as 
a kind of buffer that helped make up for the economic 
shortcomings of the Soviet system.
What western technology did not do for the Soviet Union was
help it achieve its stated goal of catching up with the West 
economically. 89 Even with all of its efforts at obtaining western 
technology, the best that can be said is the Soviet Union has 
avoided falling further behind than it already was, and even this 
claim may be questioned in light of recent events. 90 Also, 
contrary to what is assumed in most popular literature on the
2-32
subject, western technology probably has not contributed as 
significantly to the Soviet defense effort as some would like to 
believe, simply because the Soviet Union placed its highest 
priority, along with its best scientific minds and material, on 
military development. 91 This does not mean that the Soviets did 
not try to obtain western military technology where they felt it 
might help, but their capabilities are such that if they saw a need 
in this area, they did whatever was necessary to fulfil that need.
The most important point in all this, however, may be that in 
terms of increasing Soviet capabilities, western technology has 
not given the Soviet Union the ability to innovate and take full 
advantage of the material that it receives from the West. As has 
been seen, the Soviet Union is as much in need of expertise in 
integrating technologies into existing systems as it is of new 
technology itself. The Soviet Union has become very adept at 
obtaining western material, but its record for using western 
technology as a basis for its own innovations and advances in 
technological skill is mediocre at best. The Soviets realize their 
deficiencies in this area and have tried to correct them; 
however, the very nature of their system works against such 
changes. Thus, they have been caught in a cycle that fosters
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dependency upon the West.
Summary
In summarizing what has been seen with regard to the Soviet 
use of western technology, a number of points come to mind.
There seems little question that the Soviet Union has a history of 
turning to the West to obtain technology and technical assistance, 
either in areas where the Soviets were deficient themselves, or 
where it was cheaper to obtain what was needed from the West 
than to go through the process of domestic development. This has 
been due, in part, to the problems caused by the nature of the 
Soviet economic system itself, a system that is resource 
intensive in its approach to development. By stressing output 
over efficiency, this system drives up the cost of production 
while at the same time impeding development by failing to offer 
incentives for domestic innovation. In those areas where the 
Soviets have felt the need to innovate, as in the case of defense, 
they have proven the ability to do so, but at a cost much higher 
than would be needed to achieve the same results in the West. 
Also, because of the limited amount of resources available within 
the system, dedicating resources, both human and material, to 
certain areas of the economy has meant a shortage of resources
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available to other areas, and resulted in uneven economic 
development overall. This, in turn, has reinforced the need to 
borrow from the West as a 'quick fix' for the failure of the Soviet 
Union to develop in these other areas, and has compounded the 
problems by undercutting the development of an infrastructure 
that might otherwise have supported domestic development.
To gain the information and material that the Soviet Union 
needs from the West, the Soviets have over the years established 
a tremendous collection effort to obtain western technology in 
all its various forms. While comprising both overt and covert 
means, i.e. legal and illegal, the majority of these efforts, in 
terms of trade and obtaining technical documentation, have not 
violated the restrictions emplaced against this collection effort. 
Monitored by CoCom, these restrictions have tended to center 
around technologies that have military application or are in other 
ways sensitive. While evaluations of the effectiveness of these 
efforts at control vary, what is key for this analysis is that the 
CoCom restrictions do little to address what has been a major 
thrust of Soviet efforts in this area, the exploitation of open 
source material and literature.
Finally, while there have been various studies as to the
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effectiveness of Soviet use of the western technology that they 
have gained through this collection effort, the most telling 
conclusion that can be drawn is that overall, in spite of the 
efforts they have made, they have failed in taking advantage of 
what they have obtained in order to close the technological gap 
between themselves and the West. The reasons for this are 
complex, and go far beyond the scope of this study; for the proof, 
however, one need only to look at the state of the Soviet economy 
today. If the measure of a successful technology transfer is "that 
it increases the technological skill of those receiving the 
technology," 92 then it would appear that very little technology 
has been transferred to the Soviet Union. Still, there are cases 
where the use of western technology has appeared to have had 
more of an impact than others, and these may shed some light on 
ways in which western technology has benefited the Soviet Union, 
and conversely explain those where it has not. With this in mind, 
the next step is to return to the area that is the focus of this 
study, and has been a focus of Soviet efforts to catch up with the 
West by using western technology: the case of Soviet computers.
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CHAPTER 3-TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT
OF SOVIET COMPUTERS
Introduction
As was pointed out earlier in this work, though a phenomenon of 
only the last several decades, there is not a facet of life in an 
industrialized nation that is not affected by computerization. For 
any nation that wants to be competitive in the world, either 
economically or militarily, computers are essential. This alone is 
enough to explain the Soviet interest in western computer 
technology, for if the Soviet Union wanted to compete with the 
West it had to stay abreast in this vital area. But there is more to 
the case of Soviet computers than just a study of Soviet efforts to 
acquire this technology. The accomplishments of Soviet science, as 
have been seen, are not inconsequential, especially in those areas 
that were felt to be significant and warranted the priority 
allocation of resources. Thus, if there is an area that one would 
expect the Soviet Union to be able to keep up and compete with 
western developments, it should have been in the computing 
sciences. That the Soviets have not, and the reasons why they have 
been unable to do so, are two of the underlying themes of this study.
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Few analysts, either Soviet or western, would argue that the 
Soviet Union is not significantly behind the West in the area of 
computer technology. 1 Yet in spite of Soviet efforts, which have 
been substantial, such is the state of affairs today. Two obvious 
questions then, are how did the Soviet Union allow such a 
situation to develop, and what has been the nature of the 
attempts to rectify this situation? Surely a country with its 
resources in skilled personnel (over one quarter of the world’s 
engineers) and background in mathematics (key to the design and 
workings of all computers) should find itself leading this field, 
especially given the strategic importance that computers hold. 2 
The answers to these questions are neither simple nor 
straightforward. Instead, they combine many factors which, over 
time, interacted in such a way as to create the current situation. 
To begin to unravel these answers, it is necessary to examine the 
history of the development of computers, both in the West and in 
the East.
To understand the reasons that explain the failure of Soviet 
science to generate its own computing technology, and the 
subsequent need to turn to the West for technology in this area, it 
is necessary to examine the early development of the Soviet
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computers, specifically the period 1945-1975. By tracing this 
development, along with the progress of western computer 
developments during the same time frame, it should be possible 
to assess the progress of each and the ties that relate each to the 
other. This task is complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union 
has been less than forthcoming with information about its 
industrial developments, especially in areas it feels are related 
to its national security. Still, by looking at the state of western 
computer development and comparing this with what is known of 
corresponding Soviet work, it should be possible to make an 
evaluation of the influence of West upon East. This, in turn, 
should allow the evaluation of the importance that western 
technology holds for Soviet computer development today, and may 
be expected to hold in the future.
A Few Words On Computer Generations
At this point, it may be worth digressing for a moment to 
discuss some of the technologies involved in computers and 
computing. Computer development is broken down loosely into 
'generations', based on the types of technologies that are used. 
These generations, as commonly accepted, are:
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First Generation-Computers having vacuum tubes as 
their basic components.
Second Generation-Computers using transistors in 
place of vacuum tubes
Third G eneration-Com puters utilizing integrated 
circuits as their basic components, replacing 
transistors 3.
It should be noted that there are no hard and fast rules in these 
categories, and in fact some machines may combine elements of 
more than one generation. More significant are the technologies 
themselves, for each represents a major advance in the 
development of the computer. These technologies, along with 
related developments in the areas of internal memory, 
input/output devices, and external storage, serve as a framework 
for tracing the evolution of computers and comparing the 
development process in the East and the West.
History 4
The Earlv Years 1945-1950
The early origins of computers and computing are well
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documented and need only be touched on here. 5 Mechanical 
calculators, developed for processing large amounts of numbers 
in scientific problems, first appeared in the 1930s. World War II 
and the need to do large numbers of calculations to produce firing 
tables, led to the development of an electrical calculator, the 
ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), in 1945. 6 
While a major accomplishment, the ENIAC did not have a memory 
that could store programs and thus was not a true computer in the 
sense that is recognized today. That honor was to go to the 
EDSAC (Electronic Delay-Storage Automatic Computer) developed 
at Cambridge University in 1949. T
In the Soviet Union, as is the case with most items that even 
remotely border on matters related to state security, the origins 
of Soviet computing are shrouded in secrecy. It is known that in 
1941 the Soviets did have at least one of the early mechanical 
calculators. 8 After the war, they showed interest in obtaining 
the documentation for the ENIAC, and even tried to buy the whole 
machine. 9 Finally, in 1950, they built a punchcard calculator, the 
EV-80, that resembled the IBM 604. With this step, the Soviet 
Union entered the computer world.
It is interesting to note the imperatives that drove these early
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computer developments. In the West, a core of engineers and 
scientists carried out the early research and brought the 
importance of computers, in terms of their capabilities, to light. 
In the East, no such block or lobby existed, or if it did, its actions 
were severely curtailed. During the last years of his life, Stalin 
railed against the study of cybernetics, one of the elements 
essential to computer development. 10 in a dictatorship not 
known for tolerating dissenting views, this in itself was a 
hindrance to early research efforts. The other major group that 
could have spurred Soviet computer development consisted of the 
German scientists who had been captured and taken back to the 
Soviet Union at the end of World War II. While extremely gifted, 
their experience did not provide them with any background in this 
area, for the emphasis in Germany during the war had been on 
rocketry and atomic physics, and not on 'computing'. Anthony 
Sutton has even gone so far as to suggest that this lack of 
background among the Germans acted to curb early Soviet 
efforts. 11 In any case, there appears to be no Soviet counterpart 
to the group in the West that recognized the potential value 
computers held, and pushed for their development.
First Generation 1950-1957
The first generation computers that were produced in the early
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1950s appear today as the Wright brothers' first plane must 
appear in light of modern flight and space travel. Still, their 
significance was in their very being, for they represented a 
capability that man had never had before. Further, developmental 
work with these early models set the stage for what was to 
fo llo w .
In the West, UNIVAC I (Universal Automatic Computer-1951) 
became the first computer commercially available on a large 
scale. It was followed in the next seven years by over 300 other 
systems, all available to the general public. Internal memory, 
aided by the introduction of magnetic core memory devices 
(1952), increased the ability of machines to store information 
and the instructions needed to process this information into 
useful data. Input/output devices, primarily paper tape and 
punched cards, were slow at first, but improvements in reading 
devices, plus the development of buffering techniques that 
allowed computers to engage in more than one operation at the 
same time, helped to increase computing speeds. External 
memory was initially stored on large magnetic drums, though IBM 
did produce a commercially available magnetic disc storage 
device in 1956.
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The first Soviet computer of this era was the MESM (Small 
Electronic Calculating Machine), designed by S. A. Lebedev of the 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and acknowledged by one western 
expert as "an important achievement close to the technical state 
of the art." 12 This was followed by the BESM-1 (Large Electronic 
Calculating Machine), a medium sized computer, the Strela 
(arrow), and a small computer, the Ural-1. Internal memory was 
accomplished primarily by magnetic drum; magnetic core memory 
was not yet available. Input/output devices were the same as the 
West, though the quality of Soviet paper products often led to 
problems with tape and punch card readers. 13 Magnetic disc 
storage devices were unknown. Total output for the period was 
extremely limited. "Between 1950 and 1959, the USSR is 
estimated to have produced fewer than 400 computers, most of 
which were the small Ural-1." 14
Comparisons between East and West during this period reveal 
each of the two sides coming to grips with the new technology in 
their own way. While the Soviets were not, as far as can be 
determined, in the forefront of computer technology, neither were 
they very far behind. In just one example, the BESM-1 "was, in 
some ways comparable to the first American 'supercomputer,' the
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NORC." 15 As with any new field, there were false leads. One of 
particular importance was the early choice by the Soviets to 
emphasize analog over digital computers. The latter were more 
capable and eventually became the world standard; the former, 
however, were easier to build and for a period received official 
favor in the Soviet hierarchy. 16 The only other major difference 
between the two sides is one of scale. Whereas in the West 
hundreds of systems were produced, with some of these systems 
having extended production runs, the total Soviet production of 
computers was less than 500. This disparity in numbers was to 
play a significant part in future Soviet development.
Second Generation 1957-1965
Second generation computers, as noted earlier, were 
distinguished by the replacement of vacuum tubes with 
transistors, themselves a new technology at the time. The two 
characteristics of computer design and performance affected by 
the introduction of solid state electronics were size and speed. 
Decreased size meant that computers of greater capacity could 
now be built and installed in smaller areas, making them both 
more functional and more available to a larger segment of their 
potential users. Speeds increased as a result of the decrease in 
size and improvements in design and manufacturing techniques.
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Along with these two factors, solid state design increased 
reliability, something that moved computers from the realm of a 
scientific curiosity to an item of interest for fields ranging from 
engineering to business.
In the West, second generation computers became available in 
the late 1950s and were dominant until the mid-1960s. 
Improvements in core manufacture brought significant increases 
in internal memory capability and access time. Input/output 
rates for punch cards also increased, while devices such as 
cathode ray display and non-impact printers became more readily 
available. The capabilities of external storage devices also 
showed great increases due to the expanded use of disc storage.
In terms of usage and acceptance of these new machines by the 
consuming public, one need only look to the example of the IBM 
1400 series, where "IBM sold an estimated 15,000 of the 
extremely successful [series]...." 17
Second generation Soviet computers started from the same 
general position as their western counterparts, but progress was 
slower and uneven in terms of mutually supporting developments. 
Magnetic cores for internal storage, used on many first
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generation western machines, were not seen on Soviet computers 
until 1958. Further, "no particularly significant technological 
advances were apparent in Soviet central processors and internal 
storage before 1965." 18 As a result, while the IBM 7030 had up 
to 256K of internal storage in 1961, the Ural 14 could boast only 
a 64K storage five years later. Input/output devices caused 
problems either because they were not available or they were 
slow and unreliable. External storage continued to depend on 
magnetic tape or drum, for Soviet manufacturers "had great 
difficulty in trying to produce magnetic storage devices." 19
Problems of the type mentioned above were not unique to 
computers, but rather tended to mirror the problems encountered 
throughout Soviet industry. In an economy driven by command 
directives from above, rather than responding to market demands 
from below, there was little incentive for technical 
advancements and improvements. Development required the 
allocation of resources, money, skilled people, and equipment. In 
the Soviet Union all of these tended to be in short supply, and as 
noted, there was no strong sponsor or organization to provide 
these resources. The most likely candidate for supplying this 
support, the military, did not yet appreciate the full significance 
of computers. "Although the military had the capability to insist
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on the massive commitment of resources that would have been 
necessary to close the 'computing gap' with the West, that task 
was clearly not on the top of its list of priorities." 20 The 
absence of a market system also caused problems with the 
quality and suitability of those items that were produced, for 
there was no incentive to make computers that actually met the 
needs of the user. Finally, there was the question of scale and 
exposure. Production itself was a problem, as Soviet industry had 
difficulties mass-producing the complex technologies involved.
As seen in the example of the IBM 1400, computers in the West 
were, if not common, then at least no longer unique; the more 
they were used, the more people were exposed to them and the 
faster the innovation cycle was regarding changes in their design 
and use. Such was not the case in the Soviet Union. While work 
on developments continued, these efforts were normally isolated 
and thus not mutually supportive. Moreover, the 'computer 
culture' that was developing in the West failed to materialize in 
the East. All these problems were characteristic of the Soviet 
system as a whole, and as a result the system itself can be 
blamed as much as any other factor for the failure of Soviet 
computers to keep pace with their western counterparts.
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Third Generation 1965-1975
The third generation of computers brought with it the 
technology that, more than any other, has come to represent the 
computer in the eyes of the public-the integrated circuit or 
microchip. Computer microchips carried out the functions 
previously performed by transistors in the second generation; one 
early processing chip, the Intel 4004, replaced over 2000  
transistors while taking up a fraction of the space. 21 This 
decrease in size, as with the transition from tubes to 
transistors, meant not only faster processing times, but because 
more chips could be packed into a computer, greater power and 
storage capability. Computers could be manufactured that were 
small enough to be used in areas where their size had previously 
been restrictive, and were becoming cheap enough so that they 
were no longer the domain of the government and major 
industries. Thus the advent of the microchip, possibly more than 
any other technology, signaled the arrival of computers as they 
are known today.
In the West, third generation computers were also "marked by 
greater modularity of design," 22 that is, they could be broken 
down and configured to meet the needs of individual users while
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still maintaining compatibility. Perhaps the most famous of 
these computers and one of the most popular, with over 35,000  
units produced by 1970, was the IBM 360. 23 its processor and 
internal storage, benefitting from integrated circuitry, recorded 
impressive improvements in operational times. Its performance 
was further aided by the general use of magnetic disks for 
external storage. Another factor in the success of this system 
was the large number of Input/Output devices and peripherals 
developed to support the line. The overall capabilities of this and 
other machines of the third generation, combined with the ability 
to adapt to the needs of the user, played a large role in expanding 
the use of computers beyond the traditional areas of science and 
technology and into the texture of society as a whole.
At the time that the West was producing its third generation 
computers, the Soviets were at least a generation behind. Their 
largest computer of the eraTttie BESM-6 (of which 150 were 
produced during a twelve year period), was much less powerful 
than its western counterparts. Its performance, in the words of 
one expert, "was severely degraded by a slow and inadequate core 
memory and by a lack of suitable and reliable peripherals 
(magnetic secondary storage and input/output devices)." 24 The 
first significant Soviet third generation computers to appear in
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the mid-seventies were models of the Unified System series of 
computers, commonly referred to as the Ryad (the Russian word 
for series or line). These computers were noteworthy in a number 
of respects. Their performance, while not up to western levels 
and marred by technical flaws, was nonetheless impressive and 
represented a major leap in Soviet capability. Like western third 
generation computers, Ryad was a modular series designed to 
provide compatibility throughout a number of layers of users. It 
represented a joint effort on the part of the Soviet Bloc as a 
whole, with the countries of Eastern Europe sharing development 
and manufacturing responsibilities. Their most significant 
feature, however, was that these computers relied on third 
generation technology that had come from the West rather than 
from domestic efforts. According to Seymour Goodman, one of 
the West's leading specialists on Soviet computing technology, 
"The entire project [had] been based on a massive transfer of 
western technology." 25
Soviet third generation computers marked a watershed of sorts 
in Soviet computing for a number of reasons. While their first and 
second generation predecessors had appeared within a year or two 
of comparable machines in the West, the Soviet third generation 
was a full ten years behind the western lead. Indeed, while the
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West had been operating at the third generation level for several 
years, the Soviets were still developing and introducing new 
second generation machines. This phenomenon did not go unnoticed 
in either the West or the East. In the former, writings began to 
emphasize the 'gap' in the capabilities between the two Blocs in 
the computer field; in the East, though obviously not publicized, it 
appears that the gap was strongly debated at the highest levels of 
the party and the government. 26 The results of these debates are 
evidenced in the nature of the third generation that eventually 
appeared, for the Ryad series was designed to take advantage of 
and emulate western developments of the day. Soviet first and 
second generation computers, while sometimes borrowing from the 
West in terms of basic knowledge and technologies, were still 
independent efforts that reflected their own designs and 
innovation. In sharp contrast, this was the first time that the 
Soviets had consciously sought to obtain and duplicate western 
efforts rather than rely on their own developments and initiative. 
The reasons behind this decision will be examined shortly. For 
now, it is sufficient to note that as of the third generation of 
Soviet computers there has been a conscious and continuous effort 
on the part of the Soviet Union to use technology transferred from 
the West to aid in its computer development.
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The Extent of the Western Influence on Soviet Computers
Having looked at the development of first, second and third 
generation computers in both the West and the East, it should be 
possible to make an evaluation as to the extent that the former 
have affected the latter. As noted earlier, this is far from an 
easy task for a number of reasons, among them being the lack of 
information available from the Soviet Union and the general 
unwillingness to admit, much less discuss, efforts at obtaining 
western technology. Still, based on what has been established, it 
is possible to draw some conclusions as to the extent western 
technology has been used to assist Soviet developments, the 
effect these inputs have had on the overall development of Soviet 
computer capabilities, and finally, what implications this may 
have for western decision makers who must deal with questions 
concerning the transfer of technology to the East.
The first years of Soviet computing seem to owe little to 
western efforts or inputs.
By world standards, the Soviet computer industry got 
off to a good start in the early 1950s.
Accomplishments included one of the first electronic
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digital computers with internal program storage, a 
large scale scientific computer, and the serial 
production of a small general purpose machine. By 
1953, the year that Stalin died, the Soviets were a 
respectable third, after the US and UK, on the world 
computing scene. 27
As has been noted, early computer development efforts were 
somewhat hampered by the lack of a strong sponsor or supporting 
group within the Soviet bureaucracy. However, those efforts that 
did take place were basically sound and produced creditable 
results. Early developments may have paralleled the West in 
some respects, but this is to be expected with emerging 
technologies where the development of similar ideas may occur in 
several places at the same time. Further, even in those cases 
where the concepts involved had their origins in the West, the 
machines that resulted were distinctly Soviet in conception and 
design. Even if the Soviet Union was behind the West in some 
areas, the evidence suggests it was still progressing fairly well 
with domestic efforts.
The gap between western and eastern capabilities began to 
grow with the second generation of computers. While it has been 
suggested by some that the Soviets were already committed to 
copying the West, this does not appear to be the case. "Soviet
progress was not insignificant: a number of new models (not 
terribly innovative but not close, compatible copies of Western 
machines) appeared during this period, and there was something 
of a 'love affair' with cybernetics." 28 The major problem for the 
Soviets was not one of theory but manufacture, due in large part 
to problems endemic to Soviet industry as a whole. As the Soviet 
Union began to fall behind in the implementation of computer 
technologies, a debate arose within Soviet computer circles. "The 
Slavophiles, followers of the academician Sergei A. Lebedev, 
argued that regardless of what was happening in the West, the 
Soviet Union must continue developing its own line of computers. 
The Westernizers, worried by the accelerated computer 
production in the United States, Europe, and Japan, lobbied for 
copying western designs-and the Westernizers prevailed." 29 
The Westernizers carried the day, and with their victory began 
the wholesale copying of western computer designs evidenced in 
the third generation of Soviet computers.
This decision to try to stay abreast with the West by co-opting 
western technology had several impacts on the Soviet computer 
industry. In effect, it "passed a no confidence vote on the emerging 
Soviet electronics and computer industry because it failed to come
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up with the supporting computer systems to match the USA. ...
[with the result that] ... Domestic projects were scrapped." so As a 
result of this decision, imports of western related computer 
technology rose sharply, from $5,000 in 1965 to over $1 million in 
1967. 31 Beginning with the third generation, almost every major 
Soviet system has been based on Western designs; in some 
instances the copies were so close to the originals that they even 
included Western part numbers. 32 Thus, because of a conscious 
decision on the part of the Soviet leadership in the 1960s to rely 
on imported technology to make up for the shortcomings in their 
own industrial production, western technology has become the 
leading influence on the development of Soviet computers. As one 
commentator notes, "The bureaucratic party attitude became 'West 
is best; East is least."' 33
The period from 1975 to the beginning of the Gorbachev era 
represented little change in the patterns established in the 
previous ten years. In terms of imports of computers and 
computer related material, "data in the volume of Vneshnyaya 
Torgovlya on trade in computers (is) very sparse and since 1984 
no data (has) been published." 34 The data that is available shows 
an increase in imports of computers, in millions of rubles, from 
1975 to 1982, followed by a decline in 1983 and 1984. However
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when figures are added in for imports of 'computer parts' this 
upward trend continues. 35 While rough at best, these figures 
seem to bear out belief that the Soviet Union was dependent, to a 
substantial degree, on imports of foreign computer technology to 
support its domestic market. An equally telling fact would seem 
to be that in the same period, Soviet domestic computer designs 
have all but disappeared from view. Those new computers that 
did appear, as the Agat, a Soviet version of the Apple II, were 
shameless copies of western designs. 36
The Effect of Technology Transfer on Soviet Computer 
Development
The key element to be determined in the issue of technology 
transfer as it relates to Soviet computers, is the effect that such 
transfers have had on the overall level of Soviet development in 
this area. As has been shown, the Soviets began with an 
independent capability in early computers that, while lagging 
behind the leaders in the West, nonetheless showed promise and 
seemed to fulfill the needs of the country at that time. The 
realization of the importance of computers, however, combined 
with the inability of Soviet efforts to keep abreast with western
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developments, led to the decision to actively seek western 
technology in order to bridge the gap that was developing between 
East and West. The rationale for this decision was fairly obvious, 
and has been applied to other areas of the Soviet economy as well. 
Not only would the Soviets be able to keep within striking 
distance of the leading western technologies by copying western 
developments, but they would save millions and possibly billions 
of dollars in research and development costs. In an environment 
where resources are limited at best, this had to be an attractive 
incentive. This co-opting of established western designs was 
carried out to the extent that, in the case of the Ryad system of 
computers, not only was the system designed to take advantage of 
the large amount of software that was available for the IBM 360, 
but technical manuals were direct translations of the original 
documentation. 37 While the theory and rationale behind the 
decision to borrow from the West is clear, the two questions that 
arise from the implementation of these policies are, were they 
successful in achieving what they hoped to do in terms of closing 
the computing gap between East and West, and what have been the 
consequences of this decision for Soviet computer development?
Initially, it would seem that the Soviets did achieve at least 
part of their objective. While evaluations of Soviet capabilities
in the late 1960s placed the Soviets ten to fifteen years behind 
the West, by the mid-1970s this estimate had been cut to four to 
six years by at least one western observer. 38 The introduction of 
the Ryad, after some initial technical problems, was heralded as 
a great advance in Eastern Bloc capabilities, and did in fact allow 
for the exploitation of a large amount of western assets built 
around the IBM 360 series. Other Soviet computer systems were 
developed that closely paralleled western computers, often being 
built around established western processor chips. All these facts 
have led Goodman and his colleague Bill McHenry to state that, 
"The Soviets have progressed well beyond what existed around 
1970, and their earlier history is such that it is unlikely that 
they would have come as far since then without the intensive 
pursuit of technology transfer." 39
There exists, however, an equally convincing body of evidence 
that the import of western technology has not been the panacea 
that people in both the West and the East might have thought. In 
the first place, western embargoes on leading technologies, 
especially in areas such as computers, if not keeping western 
computers out of Soviet hands, at least made them more difficult 
to obtain, and prohibited the Soviet Union from buying large 
amounts of any but the simplest computer. Second, in those cases
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where western computers and computer technology were 
imported, there have often been problems with its incorporation 
and effective use. Stories where western computers were 
imported, only to stand idle because they could not be 
successfully integrated, often appeared in the Soviet press of the 
1960s and 1970s. More recently, the growing complexity of the 
technologies involved has made their absorption even more 
difficult. Underlying these problems are the same difficulties 
that led to the original decision to import western technology, 
the inability of Soviet industry to produce domestically the 
computers necessary to meet the country's needs. In the words of 
one leading Soviet computer official, "We have no industrial base 
to make the necessary computers." 40
What the observer of this process is left with is a paradox, in 
that while the Soviets sought to close the computer gap between 
East and West by importing western technology, they may in fact 
have reinforced the problems that led to that gap in the first 
place. When they turned to the West, the Soviets shelved their 
own domestic efforts-efforts that while lagging behind those of 
the West, nevertheless gave them an independent capability in an 
area of critical importance. By relying on the acquisition of
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western technology, they condemned themselves to a perpetual 
second place in computer development. While it may have been 
hoped that western technology would allow the Soviet Union to 
catch up and overtake the West, this does not appear to be the 
case. In shifting resources away from their domestic efforts to 
copying those of the West, the Soviets sacrificed the 
infrastructure their industry needed to be an innovative force of 
its own. In short, by relying on the West, "The Soviet Union has 
failed to develop an indigenous computer and electronics industry 
which can produce volume, or surpass western technical 
excellence." 41 Thus, what may have been a short-term gain for 
the Soviets from the infusion of western technology, resulted in a 
long term loss because of the failure to develop their own 
capabilities in this area.
Technology Transfer and the Role of Export Controls
From what has been seen in the case of Soviet computers, 
several observations can be drawn that may be useful in the 
analysis of the process of technology transfer. The first point, 
which has been made before in general terms but which is 
especially borne out by this case, is that the Soviet Union hoped, 
through inputs of foreign technology, to strengthen its domestic
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abilities in this area. Rather then merely being an effort to 
explore what was available, as a means of staying abreast with 
developments in the rest of the world, this was a full scale 
effort to obtain and copy proven western designs.
Since the early 1970s, there has been a drastic change 
in the character of Soviet hardware. Before then 
there had been Western influence in the designs of
Soviet computer equipment, but not much close
functional duplication, that is, the use of the same 
architecture, instruction sets, and data interfaces. In 
the last 12-15 years, functional duplication of well
established US systems has become the rule. 42
That the Soviets hoped to do this seems obvious from what has 
been outlined above. The goal of the policy after the 1970s was 
one of wholesale assimilation of western technology, often at the
expense of domestic designs, in an effort to keep up with the
West.
This does not, however, necessarily mean that the Soviet Union 
achieved what it set out to accomplish in terms of keeping up 
with the West and even closing the gap. Though unknown at the 
time because of a lack of information in the West, it now appears
that Soviet successes with this policy were limited at best. Even
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in those instances where they succeeded in obtaining advanced 
microelectronic technologies, there were problems in exploiting 
these technologies, and in taking full advantage of the 
information that was gained. One western expert categorizes 
these problems into three basic failures with regard to 
computers: the failure to be able to mass produce the copied 
technology, the failure to be able to ensure reliability and quality 
control, and the failure to generate independent domestic efforts 
using imported technology. 43 While the technical details of 
these difficulties go beyond the scope of this paper, the same 
types of difficulties can be seen in other areas of the economy as 
well. In the words of one Soviet official, "We don't lag behind 
the U.S. in basic research .... But when it comes to adapting 
scientific discoveries to industry, we have a problem." 44
With regard to export control, it is sometimes heard that 
western efforts at controlling the flow of western technology 
have been responsible, to a large degree, for Soviet failures to 
develope a strong computer industry. According to the logic of 
this argument, by denying the most advanced computers and 
technologies through export controls, the West has been able to 
keep the Soviet Union in a position of inferiority vis-a-vis the 
West. The part that export controls have played in the failure of
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the Soviets to develop a western style computer industry, 
however, appears limited at best. While it is true that the 
Soviets did attempt to obtain restricted computer technology, and 
that western efforts often did prevent high end computer 
equipment from reaching the East, 45 the Soviet problems with 
using and integrating the computer technology that they obtained 
legally suggests that even if they had been able to obtain more 
sophisticated machinery, it would have been next to worthless in 
upgrading the general level of computing in the Soviet Union.
While such computers probably would have gone to the defense 
sector, which admittedly has a better record in terms of 
innovation and those skills needed to take advantage of the things 
that western technology has to offer, compartmentalization of 
information, as well as the limited numbers of such computers 
involved, would have made their impact minimal at best. In the 
one case where an illegally obtained western computer was the 
basis of a relatively successful wide scale application, the Ryad, 
the problems involved along with the amount of time that it took 
to develop and put this series into operation were excessive. 46 
This, in turn, leads to serious questions as to the utility of such 
efforts, in terms of obtaining such material in the case of the 
Soviet Union, or trying to protect such material in the case of the 
West. The Soviet inability to effectively make use of transferred
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technology has led some commentators, with an element of irony 
based in truth, to suggest that the worst thing that the West 
could do to the Soviet Union would be to flood the country with 
the latest in computer technology in an attempt to overload a 
system ill equipped to deal with these technologies, and leading 
to a catastrophic breakdown.
What significance do these observations hold then for policy in 
the area of technology transfer and export controls? Returning to 
the model proposed in the opening chapters, technology can be 
transferred three general ways: in products, in information about
these products and in the capability to turn information into 
products or know-how. Western efforts have tended to focus on 
controlling the first of these, especially the most advanced in 
terms of technology, and to a lesser degree the second; they have 
only focused on the third in terms of the transfer of production 
capabilities that integrate all three. 47 This emphasis can be 
justified in that, until recently, the major Soviet emphasis has 
also been on acquiring hardware and information, though it can be 
argued that the main weakness of the Soviets with regard to 
computers has been in the third of these areas. Even when they 
were able to get western computing technology, legally or
3-29
otherwise, the Soviet inability to take advantage of this 
material, as well as to reproduce it in large quantities so as to 
have a significant effect on the rest of society, reflected their 
deficiencies both in the areas of innovation and production. 
Further, by shelving their domestic efforts in order to pursue 
those originating in the West, the Soviets reinforced these 
weaknesses, for as long as they continued to copy western 
technology, they were never able to develop the ability to 
generate technologies of their own. Returning to Kurth's 
description of the production cycle, the failure to develop an 
independent production capability and the ability to modify and 
innovate both hampers domestic development and maintains a 
situation of dependency on outside sources. In the case of Soviet 
computers, the failure to either master domestic production or 
obtain foreign production capabilities has been a major stumbling 
bloc in establishing the type of domestic infrastructure in 
computing that might have brought Soviet development in this 
area far further than it has to date.
Summary
In summary, what has been seen is the evolution of a sector of 
the Soviet economy that is of great importance to the Soviet
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Union's survival and economic well-being. Paradoxically, it is 
also an area in which the Soviets find themselves reliant upon the 
West, their long time ideological enemy, for technology and 
industrial know-how. What is even more intriguing is that this 
state of affairs came about as the result of conscious decisions 
by high-ranking officials of the party and state. While these 
decisions were intended to allow the Soviet Union to catch up to 
the West, the result has been to limit research and development 
efforts-efforts that might eventually have provided the Soviet 
Union with an independent capability in the field of computers. 
That the Soviets possessed the beginnings of such a capability is 
reflected in their work through the second generation of their 
computers. That this capability was either sacrificed entirely, or 
at least severely curtailed, is witnessed by the fact that all 
major Soviet computers since then have been based on western 
designs already in existence.
This does not necessarily mean that the USSR is a 'computer 
cripple.' "Although the majority of the Soviet computers are 
based on technology that is ten to fifteen years old in the West, 
many experts point out that the technology of the 1970s is 
nothing to ridicule. Among other things, that generation of 
hardware sent spaceships to the moon." 48 still, by copying from
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the West, the Soviet Union doomed itself to second place in the 
race to develop computers with greater capabilities because it 
sacrificed its own domestic research assets in the process.
Thus, as computer technologies became more sophisticated and 
complex, the Soviet Union lacked the very basis that it needed to 
effectively exploit these new developments. In the words of one 
writer, "The Soviets will always be fighting from a position of 
weakness, given their previous history, unless...[they can]... 
develop an electronics and computer industry along western 
lines." 49 This was one of the challenges that faced Mikhail 
Sergeevich Gorbachev when he assumed leadership of the Soviet 
Union in 1985, and one he would attempt to address through a 
series of measures that would not only radically alter the Soviet 
approach to technology transfer, but literally the face of Soviet 
society.
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CHAPTER ^-GORBACHEV’S ECONOMIC REFORMS
Perestro ika-A  Brief Overview
So much has been written and said about Mikhial Gorbachev and 
his reforms since he came to power in 1985, that to add anything 
would seem redundant at best were it not for the magnitude of 
the program and the spectacular changes that these reforms have 
brought about. However, with all that has taken place in the past 
six years, in terms of the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the 
reunification of Germany, new initiatives in arms control and 
domestic political changes, it is often forgotten that the original 
impetus behind these changes was economic, rather than political 
reform. From the beginning of his rule, Gorbachev has sought to 
remake the Soviet economic system in order to answer the 
demands placed upon the country by the nature of the modern 
world. The irony is that while his reforms, both domestically and 
internationally, have changed the very nature of the world order, 
they have done little if anything to improve the state of the 
Soviet economy.
The history of Gorbachev's attempts at economic reform has
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been well documented, and needs only to be briefly recounted 
here. 1 Faced with the myriad of problems that have already been 
outlined, Gorbachev's early attempts at reform amounted to little 
more than tinkering with the system, trying to make minor 
adjustments in the economy while leaving its basic structure and 
institutions intact. Recalling the tactics employed by his mentor 
Yuri Andropov, Gorbachev's first reforms, including the anti­
alcohol campaign and enforcement of rules against unwarranted 
absenteeism and corruption, were designed to bolster labor 
discipline and increase productivity by making the system more 
efficient. 2 As it became apparent that these measures, while 
garnering some initial successes, amounted to little more than 
treating the symptoms of the disease rather than the cause, 
additional measures were introduced, becoming bolder in their 
scope as they attempted to grapple with the faults that lay at the 
very basis of the system. In the course of five short years, what 
would have been totally unimaginable at the beginning of the 
reforms, now has become accepted by most, if grudgingly, as 
inevitable; the adoption of some type of market economy.
Along with the attempts to increase efficiency through 
tightening labor discipline, there was also a general recognition 
that stagnation in the economy had led to technological
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stagnation as well. One of the early elements introduced to 
overcome problems in this area was the concept of u s k o r e n iy e  
(acceleration), a speeding up "of scientific-technical progress, 
particularly in the fields of engineering and machine-tool 
technology", 3 to overcome the lack of technical innovation that 
was seen as hindering economic development. This accelerated 
effort was required to establish the necessary preconditions or 
basis that would then serve as the launching point for what was 
envisioned as a period of rapid growth and development. The line 
of reasoning behind this was reminiscent of the justifications 
used in the 1930s for the push to establish the necessary 
industrial base that would allow for the rapid passage from 
socialism to communism, though declarations now stressed the 
parallels between these actions and those of Lenin during the 
period of the New Economic Policy. 4 it was also at this time 
that discussions of Joint Ventures with the West began to appear, 
emphasizing them as a means of gaining technology as well as 
drawing parallels to similar policies under the NEP. 5
While a special conference had been held in June of 1985 to 
discuss the policies needed for u s k o r e n iy e ,  it was not until the 
XXVII Party Congress in February 1986 that perestroika began to 
evolve as a "complex program for the renewal of society." 6 in a
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five-and-a-half hour speech, Gorbachev emphasized the need for 
radical economic reform, claiming that socioeconomic 
development was the key to solving the country's problems.
Among other proposals, he called for greater autonomy for local 
managers and less interference from the central planning organs; 
for credits and a self-financing system in manufacturing; for 
price and wage reform, and changes in agriculture that would give 
greater incentives to produce. 7 While still not defined in terms 
of specific measures and programs to be carried out, it was the 
first bold pronouncement of the body of thought that would 
become the basis of perestroika. In the words of one Soviet 
commentator, "The 27th Party Congress marked the beginning of 
revolutionary changes in our society." 8
If the 27th Party Congress was responsible for setting out the 
conceptual framework for perestroika, the June Plenum of the 
Party in 1987 was the pivotal point in outlining the mechanics of 
this process. During its proceedings, bold new plans were 
announced for "restructuring", with Gorbachev calling "for the 
unconditional overcoming of stagnation and conservatism." 9 
Along with citing many specific problems, he went on to unveil 
what were to become the main elements of his restructuring
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policies. In "Basic Provisions for Fundamentally Reorganizing 
Economic Management" which appeared in Pravda on June 27th, 10 
and ten decrees approved by the Central Committee and the 
Council of Ministers in July 1987, 11 the essence of restructuring 
was laid out. Along with a new "Law on the State Enterprises" 
adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 1 July, 12 the proposals 
covered the role of central planning, the status of the firm, the 
role of central administrative bodies, the system of material 
technical supply, prices and wages, finance and credit, the 
conduct of foreign trade, private and cooperative activities and 
agricultural reforms. 13
While the reform package was truly massive in its scope, for 
the purposes of this study one area is of particular interest. In 
perhaps the most damning inditement of the system and its 
failings, in terms of the state of technological development, 
Gorbachev stated:
"...the most alarming thing is that we began to lag in 
scientific and technical development. At a time when 
the western countries have begun to restructure their 
economies on a broad scale, with emphasis on 
resource conservation and the use of the latest 
technologies and other scientific and technical 
achievements, scientific and technical progress in our 
country slowed down." n
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To answer this kind of problem, the State Committee for Science 
and Technology (GKNT) was to be reorganized to develop state 
scientific and technical programs, supervise their execution, and 
guide the work of Science and Technology (S & T) complexes 
whose role was also to be expanded. 15 While the rhetoric of this 
declaration was similar to such statements in the past, what 
made this different, as with the overall reform, is that this time 
the leadership seemed serious about implementing these 
measures, and that if the reform was taken seriously there would 
truly be new opportunities in the area of technological 
development that had never been present before.
Changes in the Superstructure-Restructuring the Mechanisms of 
Foreign Economic Relations
While the seriousness of the commitment to reform may seem  
surprising (given the past history of Soviet attempts at economic 
reform that emphasised words instead of deeds), the methods 
that were called for to assist the reform process should not. As 
in previous times, turning to the West for assistance, both for the 
products of technology and technology itself, became a key part
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of the plan to turn around the Soviet economy. What made this 
attempt different from previous times, however, was the 
importance attached to such policies. Perhaps not since the time 
of Peter the Great had there been such emphasis on establishing 
ties with the West. Calls for 'active involvement in the 
international division of labor' were accompanied by concrete 
steps to encourage integration with the rest of the world, both 
politically and economically. 16 For almost seventy years the 
Soviet Union had pursued policies that in effect isolated it from 
the rest of the world; now the barriers that had maintained that 
isolation were falling as quickly as leaves from the birch trees in 
autumn, and at the behest of the government no less. The 
contrast with the situation which existed as little as five years 
before was striking.
To help accomplish this integration, changes were introduced 
in the area of foreign trade. Reflecting the very nature of the 
changes taking place in the Soviet Union, these measures were 
summarized in an article entitled "Restructuring the Mechanism  
of Foreign Economic Relations in the USSR" by Ivan D. Ivanov, 
Deputy Chairman of the State Commission on Foreign Economic 
Relations, USSR Council of Ministers. 17 in substance, the 
reforms that Ivanov outlined were significant, however there was
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also a resemblance to previous attempts at 'reform through 
reorganization.' A State Commission on Foreign Economic 
Relations was established as a permanent body of the USSR 
Council of Ministers in 1986. The Commission was to act as a 
single "external economic complex...to organize and manage 
economic relations with foreign countries." 18 With a 
membership comprising top managers of Soviet agencies, 
including Gosplan, the State Committee on Science and 
Technology (GKNT), the State Committee for Foreign Economic 
Relations, Gosbank, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs among 
others, this agency was given responsibility for preparing and 
securing legislation that outlined and shaped the new setting for 
Soviet foreign economic relations. Among other duties, the 
Commission was responsible for the establishment of the 
position of Counselor on Foreign Economic Affairs in Soviet 
Embassies in countries with major trading relationships, 
reflecting the new emphasis on foreign trade. |9
Changes also came about in the role played by the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade, which had always maintained a monopoly of 
control over all dealings with the West. In line with the move to 
give individual industries and associations greater freedom in 
dealing with foreign businesses and obtaining foreign
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assistance, 20 on 1 January 1987 the Ministry relinquished 
control over import-export operations in many areas, but 
retaining control in the trading of fuel, raw materials, 
foodstuffs, and other areas deemed to be of national significance. 
21 This represented a major break with the past, where the 
Ministry held complete domination in areas of foreign trade. Now 
it appeared that the Ministry was to execute more of an advisory 
role, assisting with expertise when needed and creating a cadre 
of foreign trade specialists through the All-Union Academy of 
Foreign Trade. Even in those areas where the Ministry still 
maintained control, associations were to abide by the new 
principles of k h o z r a s c h e t  (self-financing) and 
s a m o o k u p a y e m o s t  (economic accountability) in their dealings 
with foreign concerns. 22
A third major body playing a part in the reform was the USSR 
State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES).
Originally constituted before the reforms to provide military, 
technical and economic assistance to foreign countries, the 
charter of the GKES was expanded to include supervising 
modernization projects within the Soviet Union with "foreign 
content", that is, with foreign involvement. 23 Tying in with
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declarations by government and party officials that what was 
needed was not to start new projects, but to complete those 
already begun and to modernize current facilities, GKES was seen 
as the coordinating agency for contracts signed with foreign 
firms in these areas. GKES was also chartered to go out and find 
foreigners willing to engage in such ventures, and as such was to 
play a role in identifying and bringing outside resources, 
particularly technology and manufacturing capability, to the 
Soviet Union. However, even as good as the intentions of these 
reforms appeared, they apparently failed to live up to the 
expectations placed on them. "On 17 January 1988 the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and State Committee for Foreign Economic 
Relations were abolished and replaced by a new Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations...." with considerably less power. 24
While these changes at the highest level of Soviet economic 
management may seem contradictory, in some cases trying to 
decentralize by allowing greater independence for enterprises, 
while in others creating new levels of bureaucracy, it is a 
contradiction that, if not logical in Western eyes, can be 
understood when viewed from a Soviet perspective. While 
reformers sought to loosen the controls that the Ministries held 
on economic development, the bureaucracies had their own
4-10
interests to protect and were loath to allow any slipping of 
control from their grasps. These bureaucracies, in the ministries 
and related organizations, were a major part of the problem with 
implementing economic reform, as over the years they had 
established their own domains and thus opposed changes that 
would threaten their position. In this context, the creation of 
what appears to be yet another level of bureaucracy did hold out 
the promise of reform; by creating coordinating bodies as the 
State Commission on Foreign Economic Relations, reformers 
sought to cut, or at least disrupt, the traditional lines of 
authority. By specifically limiting the charter of these new 
organizations, while expanding the rights and capabilities of the 
enterprises below, it was hoped that a more rational, more 
efficient way of obtaining and managing foreign resources could 
evolve. Whether this is in fact what took place is open to some 
doubt, especially since these structural reforms were rather 
abruptly abandoned in favor of openly disbanding the old centrally 
controlled mechanisms. 25
Changes in the Sub-Structure--The Law on the State Enterprise 
and Joint Ventures
While the reforms at the highest levels of the Soviet Economy
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are significant, it is at the lower levels, that of the industrial 
firms and enterprises, that the reforms must take root if 
anything is to come of them. While the upper levels of the 
economic bureaucracy may plan, project and prophesies, it is the 
enterprise level that must produce. In this regard, two reform 
actions have played a major part in changing the way that 
enterprises operate within the Soviet economy, and especially the 
way that they interact with bodies outside of the Soviet Union. 
These two are the Law on the State Enterprise and the rules 
concerning Joint Ventures, and they deserve to be examined in 
some depth.
The Law on the State Enterprise, which was approved by the 
USSR Supreme Soviet in June 1987, 26 sets out in great detail the 
expanded freedoms (as well as the responsibilities) of firms, and 
loosens the control exerted by the Ministries. "The firm now 
'independently' works out and approves its 5-year and annual 
plans, based on control figures, mandatory state orders, limits, 
economic normatives, and contracts with customers." 27 
Enterprises are expected to meet their proposed plan and honor 
all contractual agreements; otherwise they have great freedom  
in the way in which they run their affairs. A firm is to provide
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material rewards to its employees, however the details as to 
wages, bonuses, etc. are left up to the firm management to 
decide. At the same time, enterprises are to operate under 'full 
economic accountability and self-financing', that is, the firm is 
expected to generate sufficient revenue to cover its costs of 
operation. For those failing to meet this condition, "the Law 
explicitly provides for declaring bankrupt and liquidating firms 
that persistently make losses." 28 Other parts of the Law include 
provisions for greater democracy in the election of labor councils 
and selection of managerial personnel.
v
The Law on the State Enterprise also "stipulates a significant 
expansion, both of the rights and responsibilities of enterprises 
in the area of foreign trade." 29 Specifically, enterprises are now 
allowed and encouraged to form links with foreign economic 
concerns, both through 'direct ties' and with established trade 
associations. In addition, selected enterprises and ministries 
were allowed to engage in direct transactions with foreign 
markets, rather than having to go through the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade as was previously required. This included the right to 
negotiate for foreign financing and assistance, especially the 
purchase of foreign machinery and technology, for revamping the 
aging Soviet industrial plant. It was also seen as a step in
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loosening the control that the central organs held over individual 
enterprises and areas of the economy. By removing the need for 
firms to go through the Ministries for approval of foreign 
contracts, a large lever that the Ministries held for controlling 
the actions of individual enterprises was, in theory at least, 
removed.
While freeing some sectors of the economy from the stifling 
hand of state bureaucracy, the reform at the same time added 
requirements to these enterprises that were designed to cause 
them to act in a responsible and business-like manner.
Enterprises are held accountable for their foreign dealings and 
for efficient use of their hard currency assets. Just as the state 
organs have abrogated responsibility for establishing and 
monitoring foreign transactions, so too has the state abrogated 
all responsibility if and when these transactions go awry. By 
refusing to back up debts and obligations made by enterprises, it 
has been hoped to introduce a degree of fiscal responsibility into 
the actions of enterprise managers; gone are the days when 
anything would be tolerated as long as the plan was fulfilled. 30 
On the other hand, as a growing number of Soviet businesses 
forfeit on foreign loans and the government refuses to guarantee 
these debts as it has in the past, foreign investors are beginning
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to be wary about such investments. 31 Thus, even though the 
intent of these measures was to allow greater access to western 
materials and know-how, while forcing enterprises to operate 
under the principles of k h o z r a s c h e t  and s a m o o k u p a y e m o s t ,  the 
failure of the latter may well limit the success of the former of 
these objectives.
In terms of the goal of technological modernization the reform 
was, in Ivanov's own words, "intended to industrialize Soviet 
exports and to utilize Soviet potential in R&D and manufacturing 
in a more productive way." 32 with foreign assistance, Soviet 
industry could be modernized and efficiency increased, not only 
so that it could pay back loans in terms of new production, but so 
that it could compete in the world market. Further, by 
decentralizing and allowing enterprises to deal directly with 
foreign producers, it was hoped that those inputs would be more 
effectively put to use. "Not infrequently (in the past), imports 
were used to relieve existing gaps in supply or to compensate for 
miscalculations in the Ministries’ technical policies. To sum up, 
imports did not fully perform their planned function as a source 
of technological modernization." 33 still, to effectively gain from 
such imports, as has been seen, requires more than the mere
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products of technology. This appears to have been recognized by 
the people outlining the course of the reforms in the Soviet Union, 
and resulted in emphasis on one particular type of dealing with 
the West that allowed for overcoming this problem by combining 
the transfer of material with information and know-how: the 
Joint Venture.
Joint Ventures 34
Based on the previous discussion of the nature of technology 
transfer, it should come as no surprise that Joint Ventures are 
valued and sought after by the Soviet Union. While each method of 
transferring technology has its respective strengths and 
weaknesses, Joint Ventures combine aspects of all of the 
transfer mechanisms, overcoming individual weaknesses and 
strengthening the overall character of the transfer. A key part of 
this process is the opportunity for personal contacts, which not 
only facilitates the transfer of know-how, but allows the 
receiving group to develop the cadre necessary for an 
infrastructure that can modify and build upon the basic operation. 
In contrast, turnkey operations, which share some of the benefits 
of Joint Ventures, have been found to suffer once the installation 
is in place, for without the ability to modify and develop the
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original facility, these plants soon become stagnant and 
outmoded. 35 Joint Ventures, on the other hand, offer the 
opportunity for long term contacts with western scientists, 
managers and workers, thus insuring a continuing flow of western 
ideas and western technology.
As mentioned earlier, Joint Ventures are far from a new 
concept in the Soviet Union. The first Joint Venture stemming 
from the New Economic Plan was established in 1921; by 1925 
there were 64 Joint Ventures making up 10% of overall Soviet 
exports. 36 While imports of western technology continued during 
the period of industrialization in the 1930s and again after the 
Second World War, Soviet fears of excessive contacts with the 
West, especially in areas of technology that were almost always 
associated in some way with defense, tended to limit such 
endeavors. It was only with the realization of the dire situation 
that the Soviet economy was in, combined with the willingness to 
overlook the possible dangers of close associations with the 
West, that the potential of Joint Ventures to become a major 
factor in achieving modernization began to be appreciated.
The core of the laws on Joint Ventures is contained in three 
decrees that were issued on 13 January 1987, and cover:
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Establishment of Joint Ventures on Soviet Territory (Decree no. 
6362-XI), Joint Ventures with other CMEA Member Countries 
(Decree no. 48) and Joint Ventures with Capitalist and Developing 
Countries (Decree no. 49). 37 Key elements of these decrees 
included setting out the legal aspects of such ventures, general 
rules for establishing Joint Ventures, guarantees of property 
rights and guarantees of independence from central planning 
requirements. 38 The Decree on Joint Ventures with non CMEA 
nations further specified that the Soviet side of the venture 
would maintain the controlling interest (51%) of the venture, thus 
effectively giving it control over all managerial decisions.
Even though the potential of these ventures had been 
recognized, early efforts to realize this potential were hampered 
by the rules the government imposed on such initiatives. As 
recorded by Anders Aslund, Director of the Stockholm Institute of 
Soviet and East European Economics and First Secretary for 
Economic Affairs at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow at the time 
these decrees were published:
The conditions offered foreign partners were neither 
favorable, nor well conceived. The Soviet share of an 
enterprise must be a least 51 per cent; the president 
of the board and the managing director must be Soviet
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citizens; joint ventures must fall under ordinary 
Soviet jurisdiction, implying an obligation to obey 
thousands of unpublished legal acts, which the foreign 
partner had no right to see; at the same time, joint 
ventures would be isolated from the domestic market, 
being forced to purchase from, and sell to, Soviet 
enterprises through foreign trade organizations; 20%  
of the sums taken out of the country were taxed; a 
condition for the transfer of profits abroad was that 
the joint venture had earned hard currency. The most 
positive stipulations were that the profit tax 
amounted to only 30 per cent and joint ventures were 
not subject to state planning. 39
Under such conditions, it hardly seems surprising that initial 
calls for western firms to present proposals for Joint Ventures 
in 1986 were met with a lukewarm response at best, or that by 
1988 Pravda reported that only sixty-six Joint Ventures had been 
registered. 40
This early disappointing showing led to subsequent changes in 
the laws governing the structure of Joint Ventures, the most 
significant being the relaxation of the rules on percentage of 
foreign ownership, allowing foreigners to obtain and control a 
majority interest in a Joint Venture. 41 Foreign investors were 
loath to enter into deals in which they could not control a 
majority interest, and thus have the overriding say in how the
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venture should be run. With sufficient other risks involved, the 
added fear that once an investment was made the western partner 
would theoretically, if not in practice, lose control of his 
investment, was enough to scare away all but the heartiest of 
investors. From the Soviet standpoint, while foreign ownership 
of a controlling interest was an ideological and psychological 
anathema, the benefits to be gained outweighed what was to be 
given up. Therefore amendments to the three basic documents 
were issued on 17 September 1987 and 2 December 1988, 
designed to "simplify existing procedures, develop the country's 
export base (and) radically improve the pattern of Soviet foreign 
trade...." 42
When looking at what the Soviet Government hoped to achieve 
through these Joint Ventures, one other major consideration 
needs to be kept in mind. In addition to being an effective way of 
gaining and integrating western technology, Joint Ventures also 
satisfied what was now becoming a critical need-hard currency. 
In the past, firms wanting to modernize using western equipment 
had to go through the ministry bureaucracies to gain permission 
as well as the hard currency needed to make such purchases, a 
long and tedious process at best. Now, with the loosening of
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administrative regulations, firms could enter into direct 
negotiations and relationships with western concerns, which in 
the case of Joint Ventures became a ready source of hard 
currency. While arrangements varied based on the individual 
situation, in general what was sought from the western partner 
was technology, production and managerial skill, and capital to 
provide the needed production base. What the Soviets had to offer 
in these instances was cheap labor, relatively cheap access to 
raw materials, and a tremendous market potential for items 
produced to be sold in the Soviet Union. While this type of 
relationship seemed to place the Soviet Union in the same type of 
position as that which characterized colonies under imperialism, 
it was still worth the cost to the county's leadership, when 
weighed against what they hoped to gain.
Even with the potential advantages that such arrangements 
held, the changes that have been made in the laws and the 
incentives that have been offered to attract western partners, it 
must be admitted that their successes to date have been limited. 
Problems, in terms of currency convertibility, overregulation, 
bureaucratic inertia and general instability, have caused 
westerners to be cautious about such ventures. A great number of 
the ventures that are reported to have been agreed upon, have gone
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no further than the signing of agreements, with no other steps 
being taken toward implementation. 43 Even among those that are 
functioning, a great percentage of these are in the service sector, 
and have had little effect on technological awareness or 
production. 44 From the Soviet side, initial euphoria has given way 
to the practical realization that while a viable source of outside 
assistance, Joint Ventures are not the panacea they once were 
thought to be. Additional decrees on 7 March and 11 December 
1989 rescinded some of the earlier conditions that were 
considered too favorable to foreigners by some elements in the 
government. 45 still the number of such ventures has continued to 
increase (See Appendix B), and as more cases appear showing 
successful examples of what can be gained through such ventures, 
more interest is being shown. 46 Also, of special significance for 
this study, Joint Ventures continue to receive special emphasis on 
the part of Soviet officials in one area in particular-the area of 
computers and computer related technologies.
Reform and the Soviet Computer Sector
Until now Gorbachev's reforms have been dealt with in general 
terms, especially in those areas where they have had, or contain 
the potential of having, an effect on contacts with the West and
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the possibility of transferring western technology. Since this 
work uses computers as the vehicle to examine the process of 
technology transfer between West and East, it is essential to look 
as well at how the reforms have influenced this area in 
particular. As has been asserted earlier, if there is one set of 
technologies that, more than any other, acts as the flagship of the 
modern era, it is that set relating to computers. Therefore, it 
should not seem unusual that this area has been singled out by the 
Soviets for special attention. 47
Indeed, it should not be surprising that current efforts to 
reform the computer sector actually predate Gorbachev and his 
economic reforms, so great was the Soviet concern about the 
problems in this area. In 1983, a special section dealing with 
Informatics, Computer Technology, and Automation was 
established in the USSR Academy of Sciences, the first time in 
over twenty years that a new section had been created in the 
Academy. 48 The head of this new Department was Ye. P. Velikov, 
former Vice President of the Academy of Sciences and a board 
member of the State Committee for Science and Technology. 
Velikov had long been a vocal critic of the dismal state of Soviet 
computing, and now seemed in a position to do something about it.
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He announced that the basic mission of the new department was 
to secure a scientific base, "capable of eliminating in the 
shortest possible time the computer technology deficiency that 
threatens the development of the entire national economy." 49
This reform was seen as an attempt to overcome several of the 
problems that had been identified as plaguing the computer field. 
The first of these was the disparity of efforts that made up the 
existing system. Soviet computers were produced by 4 different 
Ministries, with as many as 30 other Ministries and agencies 
providing computer related parts, so Each of these had "its own 
technology policy and its own standards which [were] not always 
compatible with the standards of other branches and with the 
needs of the users." si Second, was to bridge the gap between 
research and implementation. Because of the disunity of the 
computer industry's structure, it was often difficult to get 
manufacturing concerns to make prototypes and limited runs of 
new concepts for the purpose of further testing and development. 
New designs remained on the drawing board or in the research lab, 
with no one willing to risk production. Finally, there was the
goal of getting greater acceptance for computers overall. Even 
when good products were developed, there was the usual 
reluctance on the part of industry to accept new equipment and
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changes that might disrupt their current plan. By consolidating 
all development under one organization, it was hoped not only to 
better meet the demands of industry, but to be able to lobby for 
greater acceptance and implementation once a new design was 
developed. 52
The broad objective of the reform, in terms of reorganization, 
was to bring research and development in the computer field back 
into the hands of the Academy. Earlier in the sixties, computer 
development had been distributed amongst the various Ministries 
where each had pursued their own agendas, with little regard for 
what others were doing. 53 This was one reason cited by Velikov 
and others why the Soviet Union had fallen so badly behind the 
West. 54 j o  create this new department, twelve institutions were 
joined together, some with previous ties to the Ministries 
involved in computer development, some from other departments 
in the Academy of Sciences, and four which were to be created 
specifically for the work of the new department. (See Appendix C). 
The new department was given four overriding objectives: the 
development of supercomputer architecture and software, the 
acceleration of development and production of small computers 
for mass use, the development of a new generation of integrated 
chip technology, and the development of a 'native scientific and
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technological base' in the computer area. 55
It is this last goal that deserves special attention, for it again 
raises the issue of whether it was better to develop an 
indigenous computer infrastructure, or to borrow from the West. 
The creation of this department seemed to reflect a victory for 
those who favored the former, and a reversal of the policy that 
was implemented in the 1970s over the protests of Lebedev and 
others. As reflected in Simon Kassel's analysis of the new 
reform:
Finally, technology transfer as a means of enhancing 
Soviet computer technology was rejected in favor of 
indigenous technology development that would make 
the Soviet Union equal to and independent of the West 
in this field. The Academy's belief was that 
computing technology should not be dependent on 
scientific and technical relations with other 
countries. Neither should simple technology transfers 
from foreign experience be expected to solve the 
national problem. It was stressed that no matter 
what modern specimens of foreign computer 
technology might be procured, the current world-wide 
state of the art precluded any improvement in Soviet 
technology level without the development of a native 
infrastructure. 56
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\That the lack of a computer infrastructure, along with the need to 
develop one, was obvious to the leaders of the Soviet computer 
field in 1983-84, is all too apparent. That this realization would 
still not detract from Soviet attempts to obtain western 
technology will soon be seen.
The Computer Education Reform of 1985
The Soviets also realized that part of their problem with 
computers came from a lack of qualified people to operate those 
computers they did possess, much less the massive increase in 
the numbers of computers anticipated as being needed to bring 
Soviet industry and the economy in general to a state of parity 
with the West. As managers in the West have discovered, the 
best way to overcome the initial resistance to accepting 
computers in the workplace is to have people who are not 
intimidated by them, who are willing to work with them and 
explore their capabilities. At the same time, once a large number 
of people began to use computers, development in related areas, 
such as software, is aided. Much has been written in the West 
about the 'cult of the hacker', 57 and there is merit to the 
argument that many breakthroughs and advances in computer 
programming have come as the result of individual initiatives
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rather than management orchestrated group efforts. Again, in the 
Soviet case, the lack of an infrastructure made itself manifest; 
but in this case it was an infrastructure made up not only of 
machines and buildings, but of people. The answer to this 
shortage came in one word--education.
In early 1985 the USSR Council of Ministers passed, and the 
Party endorsed, a program "to foster widespread applications of 
computers in Soviet education." 58 The elements of this program 
included a highschool course curriculum of 102 hours of 
instruction, including such topics as Computer Architecture (12 
hrs), Programming (21 hrs), Problem Solving (29hrs), and 
Computer History and Computers in Society (5 hrs). 59 Designed 
for students in the ninth and tenth grades, it was to be 
supplemented by instruction in the seventh and eighth grades in 
the mid 1990's, as additional resources, both in terms of 
computers and qualified instructors, become available. The goal, 
in the words of member of the Academy of Sciences Andrey 
Yershov, was that "the computer will become the personal tool of 
an ever greater number of people: engineers, designers 
dispatchers, librarians, cashiers, operators of program- 
controlled machine tools, production controllers, and workers in 
dozens of other professions." 60
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While a definite step in the right direction, these plans were 
ambitious; perhaps too much so. Implementation was hampered 
by those elements mentioned above-a  lack of computers and of 
qualified people to carry out the training. Estimates vary, but 
even conservative requirements called for 1 million computers to 
be used in this program; some figures go as high as 5 to 6 
million. 61 While the 12th five year plan called for substantial 
increases in the production of the types of computers needed to 
support this program, production problems as well as the lack of 
facilities and know-how have kept these plans from being 
anything more than very optimistic projections. Faced with the 
severe shortage of the one item critical to the program - 
computers-schools did their best to compensate; solutions 
ranged from the creation of a theoretical course on computer 
science that could be taught without computers, to a case where 
computers were mounted in a traveling van, and driven to area 
schools on a rotating basis, allowing students at least some 
hands on training. 62
As with so many cases in the history of Soviet attempts at 
reform, the theory behind the new education program in
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computers was good, but the execution was abysmal. The Soviet 
press was quick to pick up on the problems involved, and stories 
detailing these problems began to appear with embarrassing 
regularity. In one such case, a young student designed and built 
his own computer from locally procured parts and proposed that 
by copying his design, the shortage of computers in the local 
schools could be overcome; he was told by officials that his 
computer represented nothing that was new or interesting in the 
field, and therefore did not warrant production. 63 The logical 
solution for many was to buy computers from the West, where not 
only were they available, but of good quality and with a developed 
base of software. The problems with this, however, included 
export restrictions from the West, the cost even if the export 
restrictions could be circumvented, and the fact that the new 
thinking in computer development favored domestic, rather than 
imported products. It seemed that an impasse had been reached.
The State Committee for Computing and Informatics (GKVTI)
While the reforms just discussed occurred, or at least were 
conceived, before the the rise of Gorbachev, there have also been 
major steps taken in the field of computers that are the direct 
result of perestroika. In 1986 the State Committee for
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Computing and Informatics (GKVTI) was created, with 
responsibility "for coordinating work in the creation, production, 
utilization, and service of computational technology". 64 
Gorbachev had early on in his tenure stressed the significant part
that computers and advanced electronics would play in
restructuring the economy. 65 By creating a 'State Committee' 
specifically to oversee and coordinate Soviet efforts in this area, 
he seemed to be underlining this significance, as much as trying 
to improve the still lagging efforts in this area. It is also 
interesting to note that in this regard the GKVTI can be likened to 
another superministry created early in the reform years, the 
agricultural ministry GOSAGROPROM. 66
The charter for this new organization was broad and expansive. 
As reflected in the resolution printed in Izvestiya in 1986, the
committee was charged with:
radically raising the technical level of computer 
hardware and improving its use in the economy; 
defining the main directions of development of 
computer technology and computerized information 
processing and overseeing the fulfillment of decisions 
of the Communist Party and government on questions 
of development, production, and utilization of 
computer hardware; ensuring the integrated 
development of the production of computer technology
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and solving inter-industry problems; coordination, 
oversight, and scientific methodological guidance of 
targeted computer technology programs; and 
conducting and coordinating the training and 
retraining of specialists in this field. 67
Along with these lofty goals and aspirations, the GKVTI was 
responsible for some real world initiatives in expanding the use 
of computers in the Soviet Union. These initiatives ranged in 
scope from coordinating the efforts of the different ministries so 
as to achieve some kind of standardization in Soviet computers, 
to making computers available to the general population in an 
effort to increase computer literacy. In an example of one of the 
more innovative of these initiatives, "computer salons where the 
public can go to use personal computers for a fee" have been 
established in a number of cities across the country. 68 Thus it 
seemed that the GKVTI had been given a charter to bring the 
Soviet Union into the computer age.
Another new institution that deserves mention, at least in 
passing, is the Interbranch Scientific Technical Complex for 
Personal Computers (MNTK PC). Established in 1986, the MNKT PC 
was to act as a coordinating agency in the efforts to develop PC's 
and software that would be standardized throughout the Soviet
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Union and the countries of CMEA. To accomplish this, the complex 
was given the job of coordinating the efforts of the Ministries, 
that had traditionally claimed their own portion of computer 
development in the Soviet Union. While the concept was good, 
early indications were that bureaucratic in-fighting and 
resistance to anyone infringing on what had been the traditional 
domain of the Ministries was hampering anything useful being 
done by this organization. 69 Indications also appeared in 1990 
that the MNKT PC was receiving criticism for failing to make 
sufficient headway in achieving its goals.
The true impact that the GKVTI and the MNTK PC will have on 
computing in the Soviet Union has yet to be determined, however 
some early indicators seem to show that, as with too many other 
cases, the creation of another agency has done nothing more than 
put another player into the economic arena, one concerned with 
protecting its own members, putting forward its own plans, and 
preserving its own prerogatives and perks. Cited by some as an 
attempt to finally bring the Ministries responsible for 
manufacturing computers into line, the reform has yet to show 
any major success in this attempt, with the individual ministries 
still jealously guarding their share of the computer pie. ?o As 
with the case of GOSAGROPROM, one large central coordinating
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agency, rather than streamlining operations, only serves to add 
another layer in a system overburdened with bureaucratic layers. 
And while there may be valid reasons behind these Soviet actions, 
there still seems to be something of a dichotomy in that at the 
same time decentralization is being preached, centralization is 
still being practiced.
Summary-Some Thoughts on the Nature of the Reform
While all of the specifics of the reforms have not been dealt 
with here, it may be worthwhile at this stage to look at the 
philosophy behind the reforms, for the same logic that is the 
basis for the reforms applies to the changes that have taken place 
in the Soviet approach to technology transfer, and thus is key to 
understanding these changes. When it became clear that the 
inefficiencies that characterize the Soviet economic system 
were far greater than merely those of poor labor discipline, the 
attention of the reformers shifted to the underlying reasons for 
these problems. One of these was the nature of the planning 
mechanism and the fact that with the growing complexity of 
modern technological society, it was impossible for the State 
Planning organs to make the necessary decisions in a timely and
4-34
rational manner. The creation and acceptance of new 
technologies was another area of concern; as has been noted, the 
Soviet economy had a dismal record in the area of innovation.
Even when new ideas were generated, there was little or no 
reason for enterprises to integrate these technologies. 71 
Further, the entire process of academic research and development 
was stifled, both by limitations of contacts with the West, and by 
the compartmentalization and lack of academic interchange 
between groups within the Soviet Union. Part of this problem 
was attributed to the lack of the physical means that aided 
development and exchanges, such as computers, data links, 
telecommunications, etc. Part was tied to the very nature of the 
intellectual environment, the restrictions placed on scholars by . 
the closed nature of the system, a system where centralization 
meant not only that all decisions came from above, but that 
information from below must be sent up before it could be 
disseminated laterally. Part of the problem was the system 
itself, where entrenched bureaucracies fought to stop any 
attempt at change that might involve the loss of status, prestige 
and privileges that had been accumulated over the years. Other 
reforms in the past that had tried to address individual parts of 
the problem had failed because the parts were interconnected and 
collectively were stronger then the attempts at reform.
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Gorbachev in his early years appeared to be attacking all of the 
problems simultaneously, however this approach has yet to prove 
to be any more successful than previous attempts.
When looking at the problems facing Gorbachev and the 
economy as a whole, they can be viewed as emanating from 
different levels within the economic structure, though the faults 
at one level are often reinforced by the practices at another. At 
the highest level, the central planning mechanisms were too large 
and unwieldy to effectively deal with a complex, modern society. 
While setting overall goals for the production of steel is a 
comparatively simple process, the identification, production and 
assembly of the elements that go into making a computer or any 
other high technology instrument, is not. Literally, the expansion 
of the information and data related to modern production had 
swamped an apparatus that had been set up to deal with the 
relatively simple economic situation found in the 1930s. At mid­
level, the apparatus of the economy, in terms of the Ministries 
and other agencies that had evolved within this system, had 
become part of the problem. Over the years these bureaucracies 
had developed to the point that, along with hindering progress 
through bureaucratic inertia, they represented impediments to 
reform as they fought to preserve their own position in the face
4-36
of reforms that would lessen or eliminate their influence in the 
economy. Finally, at the lowest levels, that of the enterprise and 
the individual, reform took on the appearance of a tug of war, 
with reformers and institutional interests each sending their own 
set of instructions, often contradictory, which each then 
expected to be obeyed. That confusion was the result of this 
situation was almost to be expected, along with the fact that for 
all the lofty goals of the reform, little in reality has been 
achieved.
When looking at the aims of the Gorbachev reforms, they can 
also be seen as operating at several distinct, though interrelated 
levels. At the highest levels, decision makers attempted to 
define what the fundamental nature of the economy should be, as 
well as the changes that needed to be made to the existing 
mechanisms. Along with philosophical changes, there came some 
rather significant structural alterations, as the decision to limit 
the influence of the the party in the operation of the economy. 72 
Attempts were made to streamline the management of the 
economy, including the lessening of the influence of the 
Ministries, designed both to eliminate the bureaucratic tie-ups 
that hampered the system, and to allow decision making to take
4-37
place at lower levels where it was hoped that decisions would be 
made more realistically and in a timely manner. By implementing 
decentralization, it was also envisioned that now the old habit of 
passing the blame for failure or inefficient operation to upper 
echelons would be eliminated. Enterprises, having greater 
responsibility for the way things were run, would also bear 
greater responsibility for their successes and failures, and thus 
have increased incentives for efficient behavior. And finally, as 
if admitting after seventy odd years of ideological struggle that 
there were things of value in the West, restrictions were lifted 
so that the Soviet economy could take advantage of what the West 
had to offer.
All this is reflected in what has taken place in the field of 
computers. Not only have the reforms affected the computer field 
as a segment of the overall economy but, because of the 
significance attached to computers for the course of the reforms 
and industrial modernization, they have been singled out for 
special attention. Perhaps no other area, with the exception of 
agriculture, has received the emphasis that computers have in the 
last five years. Ironically, again with the exception of 
agriculture, perhaps no area has done so poorly in spite of all this 
attention. Looking at the computer field in terms of structural
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reform, one sees all of the classic phenomena associated with 
reform attempts in other sectors of the economy. Because of the 
reluctance of the ministries to give up their portion of the 
computer domain, along with the general inefficiency inherent in 
the Soviet system, structural reform has done little to improve 
the domestic computer situation. The GKVTI, PC MNSK, and other 
agencies established to try and bring some order to the chaos that 
exists, have for the most part become part of the chaos. Even 
with the best intentions and efforts of Velikov and others to 
establish a computer infrastructure capable of domestically 
generating computer technology, it has yet to come about, and 
even Soviet sources are doubtful that it will come to pass any 
time in the near future. 73 Given this realization, the response 
has been the classic Soviet answer to such problems, a solution 
that, if not viable, at least is familiar in that it has been seen 
before. The solution has been to turn to the West. 74
What makes the situation different from the past, however, is 
the climate and opportunities that have been created by the 
reforms. In earlier times, contact with the West was considered 
a necessary evil; only the most reliable in the eyes of the regime 
were permitted to enter into actual negotiations with western 
firms, or engage dialogues with western academics.
4-39
Unfortunately, from the Soviet standpoint, those who were the 
most reliable were not always the most qualified; as a result, 
the potential of such encounters was seldom realized. In terms 
of trade, when the Soviets did buy western goods, the preferred 
method was to buy only what was necessary in order to serve as 
prototypes, to be reverse engineered and copied for domestic 
production. Not only were the results of these efforts often less 
then desired, but by the time this process was complete, the 
technology was often obsolete. At the same time, the general 
isolation of the Soviet scientific and academic communities from 
the mainstream of world thought and research served to 
frustrate and limit those people in the Soviet Union who 
represented the best opportunity for the country to advance in 
these critical fields.
All this began to change under Gorbachev and his reforms. Not 
only did the emphasis on exchanges with the West for the express 
purpose of gaining technology and manufacturing expertise 
change, but the opportunities for greater contact and true 
academic interaction broke the isolation which the Soviet 
scientific community had long endured. Businesses were now 
given the right to make their own contacts, to enter into
4-40
contracts with western firms and shape their own destinies 
without the heavy hand of the Ministries. The general relaxation 
of the rules and controls that had so long stifled the Soviet 
society as a whole, resulted in a type of renaissance, the likes of 
which had not been seen since the 1920s. If the structural 
portions of Gorbachev's reforms have run into difficulty, this 
particular aspect, the loosening of the constraints on contacts 
with the West, may be his major success to date. What this will 
mean for society as a whole is yet to be truly determined. What 
this has meant for industry and the economy in general is the 
opportunity to obtain from the West those things that the Soviet 
Union so desperately needs to modernize, and in such a manner 
that what it obtains may truly have a lasting effect on the shape 
of the Soviet economy. What this has meant in the specific area 
of Soviet computer technology will be the topic of the next three 
chapters, which focus on the areas of computer hardware, 
software and information technology, and what has taken place in 
each during the Gorbachev era.
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CHAPTER 5-PERESTROIKA AND COMPUTER HARDWARE
Introduction
The technologies that revolve around the computer are 
normally discussed in terms of Hardware, the actual computer 
and its related peripherals, Software, the programming or 
instructions that regulate the computer’s functions, and 
Information Technology involving the control, transfer and use of 
information that is possible through the effective combination of 
hardware and software. 1 Of these, hardware is the traditional 
way in which people think about the transfer of technology from 
one source to another. It represents the end of the technological 
development cycle, the product that is the result of all the 
efforts that went into its creation. It can either be an item that, 
in and of itself, is of use or benefit to those who possess it, or 
more often it can give a capability that allows the attainment of 
still greater achievements, wealth or well being. In this sense, 
the true value of the transfer of a product of technology is often 
difficult to determine, in that it must be measured not only in 
terms of the value of the item itself, but in terms of the use that
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it is put to, and the capabilities that it brings to those who 
possess it.
Along with being the embodiment of the technological 
revolution that has occurred since the Second World War, 
computers are a prime example of this dual nature of the value of 
hardware. There is little utility in the computer alone; a 
computer, no matter how sophisticated, is nothing more than an 
assortment of electronic components. The value of a computer 
lies in the capabilities that it gives to those who possess it, 
capabilities in terms of the ability to rapidly process and
transfer data, to solve difficult calculations and perform 
functions that would normally be beyond human capability in a
reasonable or useful period of time. Computers themselves are
nothing more than a tool, but a tool so powerful that society is 
just beginning to be able to take advantage of the capabilities 
they have to offer. In the words of one commentator, if one 
considers that the first industrial revolution "levered man's 
muscles, that is his ability to perform mechanical work, then the 
information revolution, or second industrial revolution, has 
levered man's mind," in terms of giving man the ability to perform 
mental tasks that until now had been too complex to be 
attempted. 2 it is the computer that lies at the heart of this
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revolution, and is, in fact, the lever.
There are several aspects that must be taken into account 
when evaluating the value of this type of technology in this 
particular format. What is the purpose of the transfers of these 
particular items and do they achieve the goals that are set for 
them? Does the capability exist within the society to effectively 
utilize the capabilities that these pieces of hardware represent? 
Are there people who can effectively utilize these capabilities, 
or must they be trained or otherwise obtained as well? How well 
can these items be effectively integrated into society; can their 
capabilities be readily exploited, or must a supporting base also 
be developed that allows for those advantages that computers 
represent to be utilized? And finally, what is the ability of the 
society to improve upon these technologies, in terms of modifying 
them to the purposes and needs of that society, and more 
importantly, to recreate and produce locally the equipment 
involved, so as not to leave the receiving country dependent upon 
others for its supplies in this increasingly vital sector of the 
economy? All these are questions for which answers may or may 
not be readily apparent, however all play a part in the evaluation 
of the effectiveness of technology transfers of computer 
hardware, and have application in the case of Soviet computers
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during the period of reform.
Soviet Computers
In 1985, it appeared that Velikov and others were winning 
their battle to try to create an independent computer 
establishment, one capable of meeting the country's needs in this 
area through domestic research and production. It rapidly become 
apparent, however, that the Soviet computer establishment was 
in no shape to meet the demands being placed upon it, either in 
terms of the capabilities of these machines or the sheer numbers 
involved. 3 By 1986 western experts placed the Soviet Union, in 
aggregate, ten to fifteen years behind the West in terms of 
computer hardware, with individual areas, such as memory and 
storage capabilities, sometimes even further behind. 4 What is 
even more striking about these figures is that, because of the 
increasing speed of technological developments in the computer 
field, to take the five or ten years that it would require to 
establish the kind of computer infrastructure envisioned, would 
leave the Soviet Union still further behind in this area, with the 
very real possibility that it would never be able to catch up to the 
West. Computer generations were passing at a tremendous rate;
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ten years might represent two generations in terms of 
technological developments. 5 Thus, while it is difficult to 
pinpoint any one decision on the part of the Soviet leadership 
stating that computer technology from the West would continue 
to be a primary means of overcoming the Soviet Union's deficits 
in this area, the emphasis that has been given to efforts at 
obtaining this technology since 1985, makes this assumption an 
almost foregone conclusion.
Initially Soviet imports in the area of computer hardware 
followed past patterns, in that while the promise of large 
purchases of computers were held out as the bait to lure western 
companies into discussions, purchases tended to be small in 
number, and seemed to follow the previously demonstrated 
pattern of obtaining a relatively small number of machines that 
could then serve as models to be copied or emulated. 6 Quickly, 
however, the sheer numbers of computers needed exerted a strong 
influence and forced a shift in the Soviet approach toward 
obtaining western hardware. Conservative estimates on the 
number of machines needed just to fulfill the requirements of the 
computer education program alone went as high as one million, 
while at least one official in the computer industry predicted 
that by the 1990s not one million but "tens of millions...will be
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required." 7 Even though the press carried glowing 
pronouncements about increases in the plans for production of 
computers that would meet this need, it soon became apparent 
that Soviet industry could not fulfill these plans. 8 The answer 
was to make up for this shortfall through purchases of western 
equipment; the result was an increasing number of contracts 
being announced for the purchase of computers from abroad.
Along with the short term need for actual computers, the 
deficiency in Soviet industry's ability to produce the needed 
machines was addressed in efforts to obtain the manufacturing 
capability necessary to produce computer hardware. This was 
apparent in the increasing efforts being made to establish Joint 
Ventures with the West for the production of computer related 
equipment. 9 Most of these Joint Ventures called for production 
facilities to be established on Soviet soil, with the western 
partner providing the equipment and know-how, the Soviets 
providing the facilities, raw material and labor, with the goods 
produced being shared between the partners. 10 Factors affecting 
this effort included CoCom and the restrictions on the transfer of 
such manufacturing techniques, as well as western concerns over 
CAD/CAM (Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacture) 
capabilities that represented the cutting edge of computer
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manufacturing technology, n  However, with the changing 
political climate came movements in the West for a relaxing of 
these restrictions. With the perceived decline in the threat posed 
by the Soviet Union, western businessmen were eager to take 
advantage of this new and untapped market for computer goods, 
and chafed at anything that they saw as standing in the way. 12
In addition to these efforts in the area of computer production, 
Joint Ventures served as a conduit for computer hardware in 
another sense. With the general emphasis on Joint Ventures, an 
increasing number of western firms began establishing branches 
in the Soviet Union, bringing with them those items of hardware 
that have become part of the life of any western business, 
including computers and telecommunications capability. While 
common in the West, the equipment that accompanied these new 
ventures represented a tremendous new source of technology for 
the Soviet Union. The basic shift in the way that the Soviets 
interacted with the West required them to adapt to western ways 
of conducting business, with an important feature of this 
adaptation being the use of electronic data mediums, including 
computers. From the western perspective, firms dealing with the 
Soviet Union expected to conduct business the way that they did
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in the West; if a firm saw that it could not count on the Soviets 
to provide what was needed for operations in the Soviet Union, 
then it was easier to bring the necessary equipment with them 
rather than change the ways that the company did business. From 
the Soviet perspective, as western business practices became 
more prevalent, the Soviets began to adopt western ways, 
learning from the West and expanding still further the use and 
demand for the products of technology to support these practices. 
In just one small sign of the times, FAX numbers began to 
blossom on the letterheads of Soviet firms. 13 (See Appendix D)
Trade Figures
While dealing with data concerning the Soviet economy is 
always difficult at best, the trade figures for the period 1985 to 
1989 show the tremendous increase in imports in computer 
related areas. Even without referring to trade figures, it would 
be expected that this would be the case, given the general 
emphasis that has been placed on imports from the West since 
Gorbachev came to power. Using American commerce figures to 
demonstrate the trends involved, it is interesting to note that 
trade figures at first do not seem to bear this trend out. While 
overall trade figures did increase, U.S. exports in non-agricultural
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goods remained fairly stable in the period 1985 to 1988, hovering 
between 550 and 600 million dollars a year, and below the levels 
recorded in 1979, 1981 and 1982. 14 (See chart, Appendix E) The 
initial appearance of an overall increase in dollar amounts for 
this period comes from the agricultural sector, reflecting not 
only the generally deteriorating state of Soviet agriculture, but a 
string of bad harvests during this period. 15 With this type of 
showing, it might appear that the Soviets have, as in the past, 
talked a great deal about increasing trade but actually done little 
in following through with actions.
Upon looking at the specific figures for computer related 
material, however, a different story is told. Examining the four . 
different categories that the U.S. Commerce Department keeps for 
trade in computer hardware and related fields, a continuous 
increase can be seen in each of these areas from 1986 on, that is, 
the time when it became apparent that the Soviet Union would not 
be able to overcome its shortcomings in the computer area 
through its own resources and began looking to the West for 
assistance. Of particular note are the tremendous jumps recorded 
between 1988 and 1989. These can be attributed, at least in part, 
to changes in Soviet law making it easier for individual firms and 
enterprises to buy western technology, as well as the fact that
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many Joint Ventures, first created after the change in the laws 
governing JV's in 1987, were now beginning to take shape and 
import equipment. Partial credit, as well, goes to the 
liberalization of export controls announced as a 'good will' 
gesture in 1989. 16
Export figures for computers and related hardware from the 
United States to the Soviet Union for the years 1985 to 1989, as 
provided by the U.S. Commerce Department (in thousands of 
dollars) are as follows:
Line number 847192-Input or Output units for adp * m achines- 
1985: 43 1986: 515 1987: 24 1988: 681 1989: 4,661
Line number 847191-D ig ita l process units with s to rage- 
1985: 2 1986: 10 1987: 18 1988: 243 1989: 4,250
Line number 847120-D ig ita l adp machines with central processors- 
1985: 11 1986: 33 1987: 443 1988: 287 1989: 3,930
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Line number 847193-S torage units for adp m achines-
1985: 22 1986: 0 1987: 7 1988: 16 1989: 1,285 17
*adp= auto data processing
Thus, while overall expenditures for non-agricultural imports 
have remained fairly stable, it can be shown that expenditures on 
computer related hardware have dramatically increased. The 
apparent contradiction in these figures can be explained in that 
while foreign imports of technology have been increasingly 
stressed, the hard currency available to pay for these imports has 
remained about the same, accounting for the relative stability in 
the figures for overall expenditures. That within these figures 
computer related hardware has experienced a tremendous 
increase speaks of the importance placed on this area, for in 
order to purchase this hardware, other purchases had to be 
curtailed or sacrificed. 18 In a system that specializes in 
resource allocation to those areas that it feels are critical, this 
is a clear sign of the importance attached to computers. Even 
with the shift away from centrally planned and directed 
acquisition to more decentralized decision making, it is still 
apparent that the people who are now making such decisions view
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computers as key to their enterprises, and are taking advantage 
of the new opportunities to acquire these machines.
Joint Ventures and Computer Hardware
As already mentioned in the earlier discussion of Joint 
Ventures, it is envisioned by many in the Soviet hierarchy that 
these ventures will play a major part in assuring the success of 
the Gorbachev reforms. It should come as no surprise then that 
Joint Ventures in the computer area have received special 
attention in the Soviet Union. As of 1 August 1989, 772 Joint 
Ventures had been registered with the Soviet Ministry of Finance; 
of these, 64 or 9 percent were in the computer or 
microelectronics sector. 19 Many of these, as with Joint Ventures 
in general, had not passed beyond the stage of signing of a letter 
of intent and thus were not contributing anything of substance, 
either in terms of specific products or to the overall 
improvement of the situation in the computer sector. The 
potential for gains, however, even if only half of these ventures 
come to fruition, is substantial. (A partial list of these ventures, 
along with comments as to their known status, is included in 
Appendix F.)
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The exact nature of these Joint Ventures, as well as the 
specifics of their organization and relationships between the 
partners, varies from venture to venture; however, some 
generalizations can be made about the ones that have been seen to 
date. Rather than going in on the production of computers jointly 
developed by the partners, these ventures center around 
production of western designs for domestic Soviet use. 20 
Several are based on nothing more than the assembly of 
components manufactured outside the Soviet Union, a practice not 
uncommon in developing countries of the third world. 21 Also, 
answering the current critical shortage of computers in the 
Soviet Union, several JV's call for the foreign partner to provide 
an initial supply of computers or related hardware made outside 
the Soviet Union, with subsequent supplies coming from local 
production facilities once they are established. 22 in this way, 
both short term needs, and longer term solutions to the problems 
that have brought about these shortages, are addressed___
Creating a mechanism for providing foreign partners a return on 
their investment in a venture remains a problem because of the 
non-convertibility of the ruble. While the Soviets would like 
foreign partners to defer returns on their initial contribution to
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the venture in exchange for the promise of access to an expanding 
and potentially profitable market in the Soviet Union, few western 
firms seem willing to enter into such agreements simply on future 
promises and good faith. One common practice has been for the 
the foreign partner to receive a portion of the production of these 
facilities. Another approach is to receive payment in 'goods in 
kind'. These later arrangements resemble barter agreements, 
where the foreign partner receives payment in another commodity 
that can then be exported and resold. 23 Finally, payment can be 
made out of scarce hard currency reserves. While the least 
desirable from the Soviet standpoint, this has been seen in several 
instances, and reinforces the importance that the Soviets place on 
obtaining machines in this area. In November 1990, the Soviet 
Union seemed on the verge of taking the steps necessary to make 
the ruble convertible in certain cases by establishing a realistic 
commercial rate of exchange; however as of yet convertibility is 
still not guaranteed.
It is also worthwhile noting which foreign countries have been 
the most active in seeking Joint Ventures with the Soviet Union 
in the area of computers. While Japan is considered to be one of 
the world leaders in computers and microelectronics, it is 
surprising that at present Japanese ventures make up only a
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relatively small portion of the Joint Ventures that have been 
signed with the Soviet Union in this area. 24 While sources vary 
as to the exact percentages, owing to the imprecise figures and 
differing interpretations as to what constitutes a Joint Venture, 
the three countries that seem to play the largest role in such 
ventures are the United States, Germany and Great Britain, with 
Italy, Austria and Finland also claiming a percentage of this 
trade. 25 (See Appendix G). The possible explanations for this 
vary, and include everything from the political disputes between 
the Soviet Union and Japan over the northern Japanese islands 
that are still held by the Soviet Union as a result of the Second 
World War, to cultural biases and bigotry on the part of both the 
Soviets and the Japanese. To date, however, the Soviets have 
demonstrated a distinct preference for European and US, as 
opposed to Asian, technology. 26 This phenomenon is significant 
in two respects. First, it limits the number of regions that one 
must examine when analyzing technology transfers in the 
computer area, thus simplifying to a certain degree the tasks 
involved. Second, it imposes limits on the technologies involved 
in terms of legal transfers, since four of the leading six come 
under CoCom restrictions, with Austria and Finland generally 
abiding by these restrictions as well, in order to avoid sanctions 
from the West.
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Because of western restrictions on high end computer 
technology, especially in the area of microprocessor production, 
most of the Joint Ventures initiated to date in the area of 
computer hardware have dealt with less sophisticated equipment, 
with special emphasis being placed on personal computers. This, 
however, does not necessarily represent a hardship on the Soviet 
Union, as one of the areas targeted by the Soviets has been the 
acquisition of PC's, both to aid in their education program and in 
the general integration of computers into society. Going along 
with the idea that one of the key elements for expanding the use 
of computers is the establishment of a 'computer culture' similar 
to that found in the West, one can argue that the more computers 
available for use by the public, the quicker will be their 
acceptance and integration. The extent of Soviet deficiencies in 
this area is reflected by Soviet figures, which estimate that in 
1988 there were only 200,000 to 300,000 PC's in the Soviet 
Union, with projections of as many as 28 million being needed. 27 
Joint Ventures, such as with the Soviet-ltalian-French venture 
JNTERQUADRO which call for the creation of production facilities 
to help overcome this shortfall, are seen as a major part of the 
solution to this problem. 28
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It should come as no surprise that Joint Ventures account for 
such a large percentage of the trade in hardware or that they are 
seen as one way out of the dilemma faced by the Soviets in the 
computer area. Much emphasis has been given to forming 
associations with western manufactures and developing co­
production facilities because manufacturing has always been one 
of the major weaknesses in the Soviet economy. In one survey of 
the Joint Ventures done by the United States Foreign Science and 
Technology Center, personal computers and other hardware JV's 
combined to account for over one-third of the Joint Ventures 
recorded in the computer field. 29 While the category of hardware 
is a broad one, including both different types of computers 
ranging from the ubiquitous PC to supercomputers as well as 
various other periphery devices, the goal of these ventures 
appears to be the same; to establish joint production facilities, 
using western technology on Soviet territory, for the production 
of computer related hardware. Imports of western computers, 
even in large numbers, represent only a temporary solution to the 
problem. Importing and establishing a production infrastructure 
that could eventually give the Soviet Union an independent 
capability in this area, appears the long term goal.
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Changes in CoCom
If there has been a key element that has allowed the 
development of both trade and Joint Ventures with the Soviet 
Union, it has been the relaxation of export controls in the West in 
response to the changing atmosphere and attitudes with relation 
to the Soviet Union. At the political level, the shift in the 
perception of the Soviet Union as the chief threat to the West 
that had been painted for the past four decades has brought with 
it a lowering of concern about the Soviets obtaining western 
technology. Even in those cases where concerns continue to be 
expressed, the argument is made that the current situation in the 
Soviet Union provides a unique opportunity for modifying what 
has traditionally been a hostile relationship, and that failure to 
support this movement could result in the failure of Gorbachev 
and his reforms and a return to previous, more antagonistic 
ways. 30 Further, the willingness of politicians to reexamine 
export control issues has been greatly bolstered by pressures 
from the business community, who, sensing the opportunity for 
expanded sales and profits, have been quick to press for 
relaxation of the restrictions that have traditionally limited 
their ability to sell to the East. All this, combined with the
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emphasis placed on cooperation and integration by the leaders of 
the reform movement in the Soviet Union, has led to the rapid 
growth of trade in computers, as well as in other areas of high 
technology.
This change in western attitudes can best be seen in the easing 
of export restrictions under CoCom. As discussed earlier, CoCom 
has traditionally acted as a watchdog organization, monitoring 
transfers of materials to the East to insure that technologies 
which might eventually give the Soviet Union an enhanced 
military capability were restricted. Now, however, these efforts 
have come under increasing question, both in terms of the level of 
their restrictions, and even of their necessity. In response to 
these criticisms, as well as the growing pressure on the 
governments involved to allow western businesses to take 
advantage of the new opportunities being offered in the East, the 
Coordinating Committee met in June of 1990 in Paris to re-look 
CoCom's policies. The result was a major change in the 
guidelines affecting export restrictions in general, and computers 
in particular. While still maintaining controls on 'high end' 
computer equipment, particularly supercomputers and those 
machines that could be used for special military applications,
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(such as the computation of ballistic missile trajectory), 
computer technology that at one time had been considered to be 
sophisticated but was now commonly available in the West, was
decontrolled. 31
The specific changes in export controls affecting computer 
hardware, brought about as a result of the HLM (High Level 
Meeting) of CoCom, were broad and far reaching. Controls on 
"virtually all personal computers and associated peripherals, as 
well as some small mainframes," were lifted. 32 Access to higher 
level computer equipment and technology was granted through 
liberalization of export guidelines and the allowing of national 
discretion, that is, allowing individual nations to make 
determinations as to what they would allow to be exported 
without the requirement of CoCom review. 33 Specific guidelines, 
along with examples of how these affect computer hardware 
transfers, include: 34
-Decontrol of all computers with Processing Data Rates (PDR) 
of up to 275 Mbps. This decontrol covers computers with the 
Intel 80386 microprocessor and the Motorola 68030, the two 
most common microprocessors found in upper level PC's, 
including the IBM PS-2, the Compaq Deskpro 386, and certain 
models of the Apple Macintosh.
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-Decontrol of parameters for complete systems, allowing 
main memory of 32 MBytes, disk storage of 2 GBytes, and a 
maximum disk transfer rate of 20.6 Mbps.
-Decontrol of minicomputers, including the DEC PDP 11 
series, Microvax, and 8500 series that are used in engineering 
facilities and laboratories.
-Decontrol of peripherals, including hard disk drives with a 
capacity of 165MBytes and a transfer rate of no more than 10.3 
Mbps; 6250 bpi tape drives with a capacity of 10 Mbps; Local 
Area Networks (LANs) with a transfer rate of 20 Mbps; and 
standard computer displays with a resolution of 1280 x 1024 and 
up to 256 shades of gray or color.
-Favorable consideration licensing for the assembly of 
decontrolled computers and peripherals, such as those mentioned 
above.
-National discretion licensing for computers with a PDR up to 
550 Mbps, affecting large minicomputers and mid-level 
mainframes used in scientific data processing, departmental 
processing and banking applications. A 30 day notification to 
CoCom is required for export of computers with a PDR between 
400 and 550 Mbps. Examples of computers falling in this 
category are the DEC 8800 (certain models), IBM 3083, 4083 and 
3081 (certain models), and the CDC Cyber 180-850.
-Favorable Consideration for computers with a PDR of up to 
1000 Mbps in certain cases with proscribed destinations.
Intended users would include large data processing facilities and 
concerns processing seismic data. Machines affected include the 
IBM 3081, DEC 6430 and CDC Cyberl 80-860.
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-N ational discretion licensing for computers that would 
normally fall under the favorable consideration procedures (that 
is, PDR up to 1000) if they are to be used for nuclear safety 
applications. 35
The reasons behind this deregulation, while largely driven by 
business concerns, are broader and more complex than might at 
first appear. Politically, much has been made of the fact that, 
with the apparent changes in attitude on the part of the Soviet 
Union, the threat posed by such transfers has diminished, and 
with it the need for strong restrictions. Also along these lines, 
is the belief that by lessening controls and giving the Soviets 
access to technology that will aid in their attempts at economic 
reform, the West is assisting in a process that, hopefully, is 
irreversible; thus the West is actually making a long term 
investment in its future security. In a less theoretical vein, the 
ability of CoCom to enforce controls has always been one of its 
weak areas. With the events taking place in the East, these 
changes can be understood in terms of attempting to simplify 
what is rapidly becoming an impossibly complex situation to 
monitor. One need only look at the conditions that arose during 
the joining of the two Germanies and trying to regulate the flow 
of technology between what would soon be two parts of the same 
country. 36 At the same time, however, the continued need for
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some level of controls was recognized by CoCom at this meeting, 
as well as concerns over an entirely new area, that of controls of 
the flow of technology from North to South, from developed 
countries to developing countries that might none the less put 
these technologies to use against the interests of those supplying 
them. 37 These concerns were again made evident when in 
February 1991 CoCom met once more, but postponed further 
liberalization of trade restrictions. 38
The question of whether this represents a major shift in the 
philosophy on the part of those nations seeking to control the 
flow of technology to the Soviet Union or, in fact, is merely a 
recognition that new circumstances exist requiring new 
standards, can be debated. While the amount of material that has 
now been released from control and can be transferred to the 
Soviet Union is extensive, it does not represent an abandonment 
of the idea of regulation of the flow of technology from West to 
East. Indeed, the need for continued controls in certain areas, 
specifically high power computers and peripheral that support the 
types of work that might be of military value, has been 
continually recognized by political leaders in the West. To this 
end, one of the decisions of the Coordinating Committee was to
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redraw the current export control list with the intent both of 
eliminating those items that were no longer of concern in terms 
of export control, and to identify new technologies that now must 
be added. In this, the prevailing philosophy seems to be one of 
decreasing the overall number of areas to be restricted, but 
focusing greater attention to those areas that, it was felt, truly 
needed monitoring. 39 This review was to have been completed by 
the fall of 1990, and was to have served as the basis for future 
decisions in the area of export control. 40 When viewed in this 
light these changes, rather than being a stark break with the past, 
can be seen as an adjustment to recognize the realities of the 
current situation, and an attempt to deal with the future.
Joint Ventures and Computer Hardware-Som e Examples
Quantifying the data available on Joint Ventures in the area of 
computer hardware is difficult at best. Decentralization in the 
Soviet economy has eliminated the central ministries as a 
'clearing house' through which all such ventures must pass to gain 
official approval. In the West, few such formal mechanisms ever 
existed, and even in areas where CoCom regulation might apply, 
there are no formal mechanisms to insure compliance. The one 
institution that may have accurate records of material transfers
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is the state security system in the Soviet Union. Informal 
discussions with Soviet citizens involved with Joint Ventures 
indicate that all such agreements must still be reported and 
registered with the KGB, *1 and while glasnost has made great 
strides in loosening the Soviet government's control over 
information, that particular institution has not come forward 
with any record of the extent of transfers of technology from the 
West. Still some idea of the extent and nature of such transfers 
from the West, especially through Joint Ventures, can be gained 
by examining several representative examples of such ventures in 
the three countries comprising the majority of the trade with the 
Soviet Union in the computer field.
UNITED KINGDOM-British involvement in Joint Ventures seems to 
present a good cross section of involvement in several sectors of 
computer development. ENERGOINFORMATIKA, comprising Inpala 
from Britain and the Moscow Institute of Power Engineering, was 
created to facilitate "Design, production and marketing of 
computer systems and data processing networks." 42 Shipment of 
goods for consumption on the Soviet domestic market was to 
begin in 1989. MIKROGRAF, formed with Egotron, DINAMIKA with 
Gerald Computers and INTERTAKH with Perfect Technology all are 
based on joint production of computer systems and peripherals,
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though none of these appears to have achieved any significant 
degree of operation to date. Some JV's, such as Marine Computer 
Systems formed with ILC are targeted at specific areas within 
the economy, in this case "production of pc's and mini-computers 
for use in developing computer systems to ensure safety of 
navigation, raise the efficiency of operation of passenger and 
cargo ships and improve control of reloading operations." 43 
There are also several as yet unnamed JV's in various stages of 
negotiations, covering areas such as the manufacture of 
microprocessors, floppy disks, and assembly of PC's from parts 
imported from the West.
G ER M A N Y-O f all the countries entering into the Soviet computer 
market, Germany is the country that has been the most aggressive 
in pursuing the opportunities that are arising. According to the 
German Economics Ministry in Bonn, "more than 50 German 
companies have already concluded joint venture contracts with 
Soviet companies, while Soviet sources place the number at more 
than 70." 44 Of these, the preeminent company is the giant 
electronics firm Siemens AG. Building on contacts that had 
already been established through their business dealings with 
what was formerly East Germany, Siemens was one of the first
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western companies to enter the Soviet market after the 
ascendency of Gorbachev, signing a contract to upgrade the 
Moscow phone system in 1986. More recently, as reported in 
Izvestiya. Siemens signed a spectacular contract following the 
visit of Gorbachev to the Federal Republic, calling for the 
assembly "in the USSR computers made out of (imported) 
components with their gradual replacement with domestically 
produced elements." 45 Concluded with the Ministry for Higher 
and Secondary Vocational Education, as well as the production 
association ORBITA, the contract called for the immediate 
delivery of up to 80,000 PC’s made in Germany to the Soviet 
Union, with subsequent emphasis being given to production of 
computers in Siemens facilities to be established in the Soviet 
Union. 46 The value of the three year contract was estimated by 
some sources as DM 1-2 billion, and was of further significance 
because of the nature of Soviet participation. As stated in 
Izvestiya. "It is important, after all, not simply to purchase such 
equipment in the West, but also to produce it ourselves and to 
organize service and training of personnel." 47
UNITED STA TES-The United States' entry into the rush to take 
advantage of the new Soviet markets initially was stifled to 
some degree by the fact that the United States government tended
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to take a hard line on technology transfers, and did little to 
encourage such initiatives. With the warming of relations 
between the two superpowers, however, and the implied 
commitment on the part of the Bush administration to do 
whatever it can to support Gorbachev and his attempts at reform, 
American efforts have become more substantial. This process 
has also been aided in that the Soviets have often stated a 
preference for American computer technology, representing a 
combination of the recognition of US leadership in the field, as 
well as the possible cultural biases against Asian concerns 
discussed earlier. 48 Soviet-American agreements in the area of 
hardware span the entire spectrum of the computer field, from 
PC's to supercomputers. Among the former, Joint Ventures such 
as DIALOG, between CRT Corporation in the United States and 
several groups in the Soviet Union including Moscow State 
University, provide for the assembly of IBM PC/XT clones using 
imported Asian parts; 49 Innovation Industries of Boston, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Radio Industry, has plans to 
assemble up to 1 million personal computers in a contract worth 
up to $1 billion; 50 and SAMCOM, formed with Phoenix Group 
International, holds the premier American contract to date in the 
field, with plans to assemble $8 billion worth of PC's from kits 
shipped to the Soviet Union, for use in education as well as other
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areas, the largest contract of its type yet signed. 51 On the high 
end of the computing scale, Control Data Corporation of Minnesota 
has applied for permission to sell six Cyber 962 supercomputers, 
"one of which would be installed at the site of the 1986 nuclear 
accident in Chernobyl." 52 These machines would be five times 
more powerful then any previously sold to the Soviet Union. 53
OTHER COUNTRIES-W hile the United States, Great Britain and 
Germany lead the rest of the world in terms of the number of 
agreements entered into with the Soviet Union to date in this 
area, this does not mean that the Soviets are not interested in 
other sources of computer hardware that could represent a 
substantial input to this category. Both Austria and Finland have 
taken advantage of their neutral status and been sources of 
hardware, especially material that might have caused questions 
under previous CoCom restrictions. Asia represents a tremendous 
potential that is just beginning to be tapped. While Japan has 
provided some inputs of computers and related technology in the 
past, including Yamaha computers sold in 1985 as part of the 
effort to bolster the Soviet computer education program, 54 the 
Soviet Union has recently taken advantage of improving relations 
with South Korea and Taiwan to seek electronic and computer
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hardware. 55 India, a traditional friend in the international arena 
and an upcoming force in the computer field, is another player in 
this game, and holds an advantage for the Soviets in that India 
will accept rubles as a currency of trade. Even South America 
holds promise for the Soviets in this area. Government officials 
in Brazil announced the visit in 1988 of a Soviet delegation 
interested in establishing a Joint Venture with Brazilian 
manufactures to provide up to 1.5 million microcomputers for use 
in the areas of education, agriculture, medicine and public 
service. 56
Technology Transfer of Computer Hardware During the Era of 
R eform -A n Evaluation
While it may be too early to judge the overall effect this input 
of computer hardware has had on the Soviet Union, several points 
can be made. First, in spite of the activity that has been shown in 
this area, the impact to date on Soviet computing capabilities 
probably has been minimal at best. When one considers that the 
United States has something of the order of 40 million personal 
computers, or one for every six people in the country, 57 the cases 
of most of the contracts signed with the Soviet Union, numbering 
in the tens or hundreds of thousands of units, seem small indeed.
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With approximately 300,000 PC's currently in country, or one for 
every 900 people, the Soviet Union probably needs to obtain 20 
million computers along with the necessary peripherals and 
accompanying equipment to bring itself up to western 
standards. 58 Peripherals represent another major concern for 
the Soviet Union that will be discussed later; for now, it is 
sufficient to say that along with computers themselves, 
substantial investments must be made in the area of 
telecommunications to provide the means necessary for 
networking and linking of data bases that are becoming the 
foundations of the information revolution. That the Soviets 
realize this can be seen in their efforts in these related areas. 
Whether they can overcome these problems, either because of 
internal resistance, western restrictions or the sheer cost 
involved, is yet to be determined.
Other problems exist as well. In spite of the publicity given to 
agreements with western firms in these and other related areas 
involving high technology, and particularly Joint Ventures which 
are highlighted as signs of the new cooperation between East and 
West, the limited results to date are a sign of the problems 
involved in structuring and bringing such deals to fruition. 59 The 
Soviets themselves point out that while many letters of intent
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have been signed, the number of functioning Joint Ventures 
remains disappointingly small. 60 Problems with the lack of 
convertibility of the ruble, differences in standards and 
requirements in terms of quality and reliability, and just having 
the patience needed to deal with the Soviet system ail take their 
toll of the number of deals that actually take place in contrast 
with those that are planned. 61 While the Soviets often bemoan 
western reluctance to more actively seek such agreements, 
western firms often find the disincentives for participation 
greater than the incentives, and the possibilities for returns on 
their investments greater in other areas. 62 Finally, recent 
political instability in the country has done little to calm the 
fears of investors who already had ample reasons for looking 
elsewhere for places to put their capital.
This is not to say that these types of problems cannot be 
overcome, or that the limited scope of these initial transfers, in 
comparison with the overall size of the problem, is causing the 
Soviets to have second thoughts about the course that they appear 
to have chosen, especially when it comes to computer technology. 
The demand for computers is so strong that almost any means 
will be used to obtain them. In just one example, as a by-product
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of the looser restrictions on travel, a flourishing trade developed 
in bringing computers back from visits to the West. A Soviet 
citizen who managed to get enough hard currency to buy a 
$3,500.00 computer with printer in the West, could sell it for 
90,000 rubles or $145,000.00 at the official rate once he 
returned home. 63 Cooperatives have reportedly been formed to 
perform exactly the same function on a more structured basis. 
While it hardly can be expected that such efforts will eliminate 
the deficit in computer hardware, it represents the extent to 
which some sectors will go to satisfy the existing demand. If the 
Soviet Union continues on its present course toward a more open 
economy that allows these demands to be met by whatever means 
are available, it seems likely that computers will continue their 
current flow into the country. 64
But does the mere import of hardware in this case represent a 
concern in terms of the transfer of technology? Especially with 
regard to the lower end of the computer spectrum, the PC’s and 
smaller computers whose technology is already several years old 
in the West, this would hardly seem to be the case. Yet the 
argument can be made that while these machines in themselves 
are not state of the art, their mere availability represents a 
potential transfer in terms of the exposure that they give to a
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growing segment of the population. Earlier examples have shown 
cases where, even when higher technology machines were 
obtained, it was difficult to integrate them into enterprises and 
use all of the capabilities that they possessed; Soviet operators 
simply did not have the background to take full advantage of these 
computers if they could operate these machines at all. Now, 
however, as more and more machines become available both in 
schools and in industry, an entire new generation of Soviets is 
becoming computer literate. Soviet computer experts speak of 
clubs of computer "hackers" not unlike the phenomenon seen in the 
West. 65 While this phenomenon, as well as the general level of 
computer literacy and exposure is still far below that of the 
West, it is in fact rising, something that could not occur if the 
machines were not available in increasing numbers.
Returning to the question as to the value of such hardware 
transfers that was raised at the beginning of this chapter, while 
the value of the actual technology being transferred is probably 
small, the intrinsic value of the capabilities that these 
technologies embody is potentially great. In this regard, the true 
extent of the impact of loosening regulations governing the 
export of computer hardware and its eventual impact on the 
technological level of the Soviet Union is yet to be seen. In the
5 - 3 4
short term, the numbers involved in comparison with the scope of 
the dilemma, would seem to argue that little change in the Soviet 
Union's overall position will result. The deficits are so great 
that whatever numbers are involved disappear as if swallowed up 
in a vacuum. In the longer term, however, as reflected in the 
growing figures on trade and the number of Joint Ventures that 
have been proposed and initiated, it seems fair to acknowledge 
that there exists a substantial potential for increases in the 
transfer of technology, if not in the technology embodied in the 
hardware that is being brought to the Soviet Union, then in the 
general level of computer competency that comes with increasing 
availability and access. The question of whether this, in turn, 
will result in a major jump in the overall capabilities of the 
Soviet Union in the area of computers is dependent on other 
factors as well, for too many instances in the past have shown 
that the mere receipt of hardware has done little to increase the 
overall level of capability in a given area. Thus, there are other 
areas that come into play and must be considered before a final 
evaluation can be made.
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CHAPTER 6-PERESTROIKA AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Introduction
One of the problems with any analysis is deciding what exactly 
is to be analyzed. It is often difficult to separate a whole into 
its different elements simply because, without its constituent 
parts, the whole no long resembles itself and in fact may cease to 
exist. At the same time, however, if there are properties in the 
nature of one of the parts that cause it to be treated in a 
significantly different manner, with different variables and 
parameters, then the division in analytic terms may well be 
justified. Such is the case with computer software. Just as in 
science, where the elements that go into a compound may behave 
in a manner unique from the compound itself, software possesses 
a different set of characteristics, in terms of transferring 
technology and problems of control, than computer hardware.
Both must be present, but each is, in and of itself, unique. Thus 
an examination of the issues surrounding software, separate from 
hardware, is warranted.
Software is the brains of the computer, the element that tells
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it how to function, that allows it to deal with the multiple tasks 
given computers, and gives the computer the capability to adapt 
to new problems and situations. From the early days of 
computers when instructions were entered manually or by 
physical means, such as the use of punch cards, software has 
progressed to the point that today programs containing literally 
millions of instructions and bits of information can be stored on 
microchips no larger then a button. In terms of what these 
programs can accomplish, computers with the proper software 
can solve problems that as little as ten years ago were 
considered virtually unsolvable, allowing man to attempt things 
that in earlier times he could only dream about. With the advent 
of Computer Aided Design and Manufacture software (CAD/CAM), 
the possibility exists of designing new computers with even 
greater powers and writing still more complex software, further 
expanding the computer's already enormous capabilities. The 
importance of software is such that, in the words of one author, 
"Software has surpassed hardware as the driving force behind 
successful computer systems." 1
However, just as the capabilities that software represents are 
enormous, so too are the problems that it presents in terms of 
export control. In physical terms, the miniscule size of even very
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large and sophisticated programs makes the control and detection 
of efforts to illegally export software virtually impossible, a 
thousand times more difficult than finding a needle in a haystack. 
Quoting from a study done for the American National Academy of 
Sciences:
It is extremely difficult to restrict the flow of 
software. It is too widely available, too easy to 
replicate and too easy to conceal. A single 8 mm 
digital vidiocassette, small enough to fit into a shirt 
pocket, can hold all of the sources and binaries to a 
major software package representing thousands of 
person-years of effort. 2
Because of the nature of software and advances in the related 
field of telecommunications, it is not even necessary to 
physically transfer the mediums on which programs are stored; 
data links and computer networking allow programs to be sent 
great distances in a matter of seconds. Finally, there is a larger 
question in terms of software representing knowledge that 
cannot be entirely separated from the the individual who 
possesses it. Just as Einstein brought with him the seeds of the 
atomic revolution when he left Germany in the 1930s, which 
would then take root and grow once he was in the United States, 
so any programmer brings with him the ability to recreate any
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program that he has written, or improve upon any program once he 
is familiar with its nature, based on his own knowledge and 
experience. Indeed, the task of controlling any entity as broad 
and enormous as this must be considered herculean at best.
Having cited the difficulties involved, however, does not imply 
that attempts have not been made to limit the flow of technology 
in this area. CoCom lists both categories of software and 
specific programs that are restricted from export to the Soviet 
Union. Measures, such as licenses and copyrights, are also 
invoked as a means of preventing the unauthorized copying and 
use of software. Finally, in cases where a specific software 
program is available only in the West, the access of foreign 
programmers and specifically those from the East can be limited, 
so as to prevent them from making use of these capabilities in 
developing their own software. This last case raises many 
questions, especially with regard to academic freedom, that have 
yet to be resolved and serve only to highlight the enormous 
problems involved. For even as difficult as it may be to place 
controls on the transfer of technology through software, the 
alternative, that of not making any attempt, is equally 
unacceptable.
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The Nature of Software
The problem with software and efforts to control it lies in its 
very nature. Unlike hardware, which entails a physical entity of 
some specific size, shape and proportion, software has none of 
these characteristics. Yet it is every bit as essential to the 
operation of the computer as the hardware itself. As defined in 
Webster's New World Dictionary of Computer Terms, software 
comprises the "programs, languages and/or routines that control 
the operations of a computer in solving a given problem." 3 While 
physically similar in terms of the way it is written and coded, 
software can be divided into three general categories based upon 
the functions that it performs: Systems programs or operating
systems, which control the overall operation of the computer; 
Application software, programs designed to solve a particular 
problem or perform a specific set of functions; and Utility 
software, designed to interact with several application programs 
where a common function is required by all these applications. 4 
While these different types of programs will be dealt with under 
the single category of software for the purposes of this study, it 
should be noted that each has a specific role to play in computing 
that, in turn, may make its acquisition desirable or even essential
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in a given situation. Systems software for a particular piece of 
hardware may go through several iterations, upgrading and making 
better use of the capabilities of a particular computer without 
the need of physically changing the hardware. Applications may 
run only with certain operating systems, meaning that while 
someone has access to both a computer and an application 
program, they may not be able to use that program without the 
proper systems software. Utilities can enhance the productivity 
of both an application and a given system. In general terms, in
order to take full advantage of the capabilities offered by any
\
piece of computer hardware, there must be access to the latest 
software in each of these areas. This, in turn, leads back to the 
question of controlling all of these categories of software.
As to what actually comprises software, volumes exist on the 
topic so that any effort here to describe what is involved must be 
superficial at best. Today's software, reflecting advances both in 
the storage mediums and growing sophistication in programming, 
can consist of millions of instructions, stored magnetically, 
which allow computers to perform complex functions at speeds 
that humans cannot duplicate. Coding systems for software may 
vary, depending upon the type of instructions or language used by 
the programmer to create a program. The actual process of
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writing and checking a particular program can take years, 
depending upon its complexity and the function it is to perform; 5 
however, once created programs can be easily duplicated and 
transmitted electronically anywhere in the world. The irony here 
is that the item which possibly is the most essential element to 
unlocking the power of any computer and arguably one of the most 
difficult to create, is at the same time probably the easiest to 
transfer, and thus the most difficult to control.
Soviet Software
From the early days of computers, when writing software 
involved nothing more then the coding of a few commands, the 
creation of software has become a complex process, combining 
aspects of both science and art. While no one skill can be 
identified as of preeminent importance to the creation of 
software, a strong background in mathematics is helpful, as well 
as patience and the ability to think in abstract terms. In all 
these areas the Soviet Union would seem to have, if not an 
advantage, then at least a firm basis on which to build a robust 
software industry. 6 Mathematics has always been a Russian 
strength, and, in fact, early in Soviet computer development large 
numbers of Soviet mathematicians were turned into computer
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specialists. 7 in the sciences, theoretical thought has always 
been a strength of the Soviet Union, a trait reinforced in recent 
years by a lack of equipment which forced researchers to try to 
solve problems analytically rather than by experimentation. 8 
Finally, Russians, if not patient by nature, have proved their 
ability to conquer problems through sheer tenacity. Still 
software development has never been a strength of the Soviet 
computer field, and is considered by many to be an area of severe 
weakness. 9
As stated by one source:
Software has always posed a major problem for the 
Soviets, especially applications software which is job 
specific and is difficult to modify for another area of 
operation. Until the early 1980’s the USSR was 
almost totally reliant on Western software, 
especially for use in the fields of supercomputing,
NC/CNC (Numerically Controlled/Computer 
Numerically Controlled) machine tools and CAD 
applications. Since then there have been several 
attempts to develop a Soviet software base but 
progress has been limited. 10
The two questions that come to mind here are, first, why this 
should be the case given the presence of the preconditions which 
one would expect would allow the Soviet Union to excel in this
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area, and second, whether inputs of technology from the West 
have the possibility of overcoming the problems that have caused 
this weakness?
The Problems with Soviet Software Development
Aside from the general problems affecting computers 
identified earlier, in terms of the bureaucratic inertia, 
manufacturing difficulties and lack of coordination, several 
items can be identified as causing specific problems in the 
development of software. One of the most obvious is the lack of 
hardware. 11 While programs can be written manually, they must 
eventually be placed on a computer to be checked and 'debugged1. 
Even once a program has been run successfully, the development 
process normally continues as users of the software adapt 
programs based on their own experience. One of the strengths of 
western computer software is that once released, literally 
thousands if not tens and hundreds of thousands of people will 
utilize a program, identifying weaknesses and suggesting or 
making changes to the program as needed; "the notorious 
openness of the West's computer industry...propels the advance of 
quality software at a rapid rate." 12 Obviously, without the 
machines to test and run a program, the development process will
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be slowed. Thus, without a sufficient amount of computer 
hardware, Soviet software development has suffered.
Domestically, the lack of openness and the ability to freely 
exchange ideas has probably hindered software development as 
much as the lack of computers. As just mentioned, one of the 
strengths of the western software industry is the wide 
distribution that is made of programs; with telecommunication 
nets and highly developed commercial markets, software products 
may be distributed throughout the West in literally a matter of 
weeks. In the Soviet Union, not only does the lack of these 
networks hinder such distribution, but it is further limited by 
bureaucratic infighting between different industrial concerns and 
the ministries, and the general restrictions that have applied to 
the flow of information via any medium. In just one example of 
how these restrictions can affect the ability to transfer, or even 
gain access to, information that would benefit those working in 
the area of computers, for years there has been a journal entitled 
Elektronaya promvshlenost (Electronic Industry) whose existence 
has been verified, but whose availability has been restricted 
because discussions of issues relating to high technology 
electronics are felt to be to closely related to defense issues. 13
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As in other branches of science and education, the lack of the 
ability to conduct what would in the West be considered the 
normal process of intellectual interchange has severely hampered 
the software field, a field whose hallmark in the West has been 
the speed and ease of information exchange. On the contrary, as 
reflected in the findings of the American National Academy of 
Sciences, "The Soviet software industry is scattered over a wide 
range of organizations, including many in house groups that are 
isolated from the rest of the industry." 14
Finally, Soviet software development has suffered from its 
lack of exposure to the West. Just as limitations on domestic 
interchanges of information have adversely affected software 
development internally, isolation from world trends has prevented 
Soviet programmers from keeping up with and benefiting from the 
tremendous amount of development that has taken place in the 
rest of the world. In a situation that seems almost out of Gogol in 
its absurdity, the first thing that any aspiring Soviet software 
developer must do is to learn English, since almost all computer 
languages and programs are based on the Roman alphabet, with 
English commands predominating. 1 5  While several attempts have 
been made to create a Cyrillic based computer language, none of 
these has been successful enough to gain widespread acceptance
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in the Soviet Union. 16 Yet even though Soviet computer 
programmers and software developers have the capability to deal 
with the West in a common language, their opportunity to do so, 
both physically and via electronic means, has been hampered 
because of the restrictions placed upon travel and other types of 
contact. What makes this situation all the more ironic is that 
with the decision to copy western computers came the need to 
develop programs for these machines, so that "since the early 
1970s, a large fraction of the talents of East European systems 
programmers has been devoted to understanding and uncompiling 
or duplicating western operating systems...." 17 As in too many 
other cases, the West leads the software field, and without 
access to the leading trends and information in the West, Soviet 
software has run a very poor second. 18
This is not to say that Soviet programmers have not attempted 
to make up for these shortcomings, or that they do not have 
certain strengths of their own. Because of the large number of 
highly qualified people in the Soviet computer field, Soviet 
programming must be credited with a certain amount of potential, 
even if its products to date have been generally less than 
spectacular. 19 This potential has been recognized in the West, 
with several western software firms offering jobs to Soviet
6-12
programmers on the rationale that their very lack of exposure to 
western methods allows the Soviets to come up with some very 
original and unique solutions to programming problems. 20 just 
as there is an element of truth in the saying that the most 
dangerous opponent in a duel is the untrained swordsman because 
he is unpredictable, Soviet programmers often come up with ideas 
and concepts that would not have occurred to westerners 
schooled in traditional methods of programming. The success of 
the Soviet computer game TETRAS has demonstrated that Soviet 
programs can match those of the West under certain 
circumstances, and in several areas such as seismographic 
computer simulations, western experts have found Soviet 
software programs to be superior to any found in the West. 21 
However, as a general rule even the Soviets recognize and concede 
their weaknesses in this area, as can be evidenced in their rush to 
take advantage of the new opportunities for obtaining western 
software technology as these opportunities become more 
available. 22
Controls on the Transfer of Software Technology
While many of the problems with taking advantage of western
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software have been generated by the Soviets themselves, this 
does not mean that the West has not taken actions of its own to 
hinder such transfers. Restrictions on software transfers in the 
past have represented a combination of both intentional efforts 
to prevent access to software programs, and measures that, 
while not specifically designed to limit such transfers, acted to 
restrict their use nonetheless. In the first case, CoCom 
restrictions on specific programs and certain categories of 
software have always been in place, and even if difficult to 
enforce, have acted to restrict open transfers of these materials 
through the threat of sanctions against those individuals and 
companies who did. 23 That illegal transfers do in fact occur was 
most vividly demonstrated by the now famous case of the Toshiba 
milling devices, used in manufacturing submarine propellers. The 
software needed to direct these devices came from Norway, and 
when combined with the machines themselves represented a 
capability of tremendous military potential that the Soviet Union 
previously did not possess. 24 However, even as significant as 
such cases were in specific areas, they appear to have done little 
to affect the overall level of Soviet proficiency in software 
development. In general, the numbers of such transfers are so 
low that they have had little effect on the overall level of 
software development. Of greater importance to this level is the
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transfer of general purpose software, where massive inputs 
might not only have affected software development, but the 
general level of Soviet computing and computer use.
This leads to the second category of limitations, where formal 
restrictions were not in place, but where Soviet actions 
themselves have limited their access to western software. These 
center around the issues of copyright laws and agreements 
regarding intellectual property. A major problem in this regard 
has been the failure of the Soviet Union until recently to agree to 
world copyright and licensing regulations. 25 The development of 
software is extremely time intensive and costly; copyright and 
licensing agreements play a large part in ensuring that developers 
maintain a degree of control over the results of their labor. Even 
when a particular piece of software has not been restricted by 
any formal export regulation, manufactures have been loath to 
sell their work to those who did not recognize intellectual 
property rights, out of fear that once out of their control, 
software would be duplicated and used with no regard for 
agreements that call for the originator to be paid for his or her 
work. Even though the Soviet Union has now agreed to abide by 
international copyright regulations, there is no international 
system for enforcing such measures, while the Soviet record for
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abiding by such international agreements has been mixed at best.
In one respect, this should not be surprising; going back to the 
case of the Ryad, one of the reasons for adapting the IBM series 
for eastern bloc use was to take advantage of the tremendous 
amount of software that had been developed for IBM computers. 26 
It would make little sense to go through all the effort to copy the 
hardware and then not copy the software as well. At the same 
time, western software developers, having seen what has 
happened in the past in terms of programs that have made their 
way to the East and been duplicated without permission or the 
payment of royalties, are far from enthusiastic about providing 
their latest developments, even for examination. The Soviets 
themselves have acknowledged the problem and have been working 
to adopt new copyright standards throughout the Soviet Union; 
however, their ability or even willingness to abide by these 
standards once adopted, remains in doubt. 27
Yet another problem area that has limited the transfer and use 
of western software has been the lack of any developed base of 
software using the Cyrillic alphabet. As already noted, it is 
expected that Soviet software programmers learn English in order 
to use programming languages written using the Roman alphabet,
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however it would be quite another matter to require users in 
general to learn English in order to be able to operate western 
programs. As the number of western computers being imported or 
otherwise becoming available increases, the ability to use 
already developed western programs, as opposed to developing 
Cyrillic equivalents at great time and cost, is a major concern.
To be of any widespread use to the computing population, western 
software has to be converted or in other ways be made 'user 
friendly' for non-English speakers. 28 This is one case where the 
solution of acquiring western products as a way of overcoming 
domestic deficiencies has limited utility, if those products 
cannot be used effectively. In sum, such problems have presented 
greater barriers to the transfer and use of western software than 
the formal restrictions that are in place, for it made little sense 
for western firms to sell software to the East if they could not 
be guaranteed adequate protection and remuneration for their 
products, and little sense for users in the East to try to obtain 
western products which they could not readily use.
This is not to say that transfers of software have not taken 
place. The advantages to be gained, in terms of time and money 
saved in not having to duplicate the software development 
process and instead benefiting from the labor of others, often far
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outweighs the drawbacks involved. Western software is highly 
prized in the Soviet Union, as demonstrated by the lengths gone to 
in order to obtain it. 29 From a western perspective, such 
transfers are next to impossible to control; the only saving grace 
has been that, until recently, such transfers have appeared to 
have had a limited impact on the overall development of Soviet 
computing capabilities. From a Soviet perspective, while there 
are advantages to copying western software, there are also 
adverse effects. According to Dr. William McHenry, one of the 
West's leading specialists on Soviet Information management, 
"Copying IBM allowed them to take advantage of the hugh amount 
of western software, but it didn't serve their purposes by 
supporting a homegrown industry." 30 Thus, just as in the case of 
computer hardware, using western software may have undercut 
the development of Soviet domestic software capabilities.
Transfers of Software Technology in the Period of Reform
As with the case of computer hardware, the changes brought 
about by the attempts at economic reform, along with the 
western responses to these changes, have addressed many of the 
problems that earlier hindered the acquisition and assimilation of 
software technology. Increased trade and the lowering of
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barriers, both formally in terms of stated CoCom restrictions and 
informally in terms of the willingness of western firms to do 
business in the Soviet Union, have made it easier to obtain 
western software. Warming relations have increased contacts 
with the West in terms of access to both material and 
information; Soviet software developers are now in a far better 
position to keep up and even integrate with world trends. The 
mere fact that more computers are becoming available through 
trade and East-West Joint Ventures is a help as well, for with 
exposure comes increased demand, demand that helps support the 
further development of domestic software efforts. 31 This 
process is reflected in the growing number of software 
cooperatives that have begun to appear, catering to the growing 
market for their services. 32
Soviet acquisitions of western software in the past five years 
range from traditional methods to some that, spurred by the 
recent warming trend in East-West relations, represent original 
and unique ways of accessing information. The Soviets have 
continued seeking to buy software on the open market, and with 
the loosening of export restrictions the frequency of such 
transactions has grown proportionally. At the upper level of the
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software spectrum, the Soviet Union has shown particular 
interest in obtaining sophisticated application programs. In what 
was "believed to be the first deal of its kind involving 
'intelligent' computer programs" a British company, Expertech, 
sold two highly sophisticated programs to the Soviet Union in 
1989, in a deal worth 3.2 million pounds. 33 The programs, so- 
called expert systems, "give computers the ability to provide 
apparently reasoned answers to queries to specific areas of 
kn o w led g e ."  34 a  fairly new field even in the West, this 
agreement is also noteworthy in that while the sale was allowed, 
CoCom restrictions prevent Expertech from helping the Soviets 
develop specific applications from the base programs. Thus, 
while it is significant that this sort of leading edge technology 
was allowed to be transferred, a question remains as to whether 
the Soviet Union will be able to take full advantage of the 
capabilities of these programs and build upon the initial 
technological base they provide. 35
More basic in terms of the capabilities involved, but at the 
same time possibly of greater significance for the overall level 
of computer development, was the announcement in April 1990 
that the western software giant Microsoft Corp. had developed a 
Russian version of MS-DOS, one of the key operating systems in
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the West and used in most IBM-compatible computers. 36 Going 
back to the time when the Soviets made the decision to copy IBM 
designs for their Ryad series of computers, IBM has been favored 
in the Soviet Union, in addition to being the preeminent computer 
system in the world today. 37 in the past, users of IBM computers 
in the Soviet Union would have to either learn the English 
language commands governing their machines or use home made 
translations to run programs. Now, however, "working with the 
Soviet-American computer Joint Venture called Dialogue,
Microsoft has developed a method to arrange Cyrillic characters 
on the keyboard and automatically translate them into the 
mathematical language used internally by PCs." 38 The 
significance of this development needs hardly be underscored; 
with a majority of the machines in the Soviet Union being IBM 
compatibles, this translation will make it far simpler for Russian 
speakers to access and use computers, further developing the 
'computer cult' that has thus far been lacking in the Soviet Union. 
At the same time, this system allows for the wider use of the 
immense number of software programs that already have been 
developed for IBM compatible computers. 39 Other western 
software manufacturers have also indicated their interest in a 
share of the Soviet market. Aldus Corp. and AshtonTate have both 
said that "they plan to market applications, such as word
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processing packages, for sale in the Soviet Union." 40
Software Transfers and Joint Ventures
Not surprisingly, one of the ways that the Soviet Union has 
sought to integrate with the West in the software area, as with 
hardware, is through Joint Ventures. Referring to the chart of 
Joint Ventures in the computer field produced by the United 
States' Foreign Science and Technology Center, software makes 
up the largest single category of Joint Ventures. (Appendix H).
Not only does this represent the Soviet interest in this area, but 
the fact that software development is one of the few areas where 
the Soviet contribution to the Joint Venture can be a significant 
one, without requiring a large outlay of capital or other scarce 
material resources. 41 in addition to the general category of 
software, specific initiatives have been launched in the areas of 
Database Management, Computer Assisted Design (CAD) and 
Artificial Intelligence. 42 All these areas are heavily dependent 
on software, though initiatives in these cases seem to be more 
limited, possibly because of the sensitivity of these types of 
programs and the fact that they are subject to closer CoCom 
scrutiny.
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While the terms of these agreements vary, in general such 
ventures allow the Soviet Union both to integrate with current 
world trends in programming and software development, as well 
as giving it access to new software products. They can also 
allow Soviet personnel exposure to the latest in western 
hardware, since programmers will normally be developing 
software for the current or even the next generation of 
computers. As indicated earlier, hardware alone does little to 
enhance overall computing capability; it must be joined with the 
software needed to control the hardware in order to be of any use. 
Thus many of the Joint Ventures dealing with hardware 
production and installation include provisions for the 
development and maintenance of software to accompany the 
hardware. 43 The Aris-Tbilisi Joint Venture, (the first such 
agreement with a firm in France, a country that is recognized as a 
leader in the software development field), MIKROGRAF with the 
UK firm Egotror, and DIAMEKS International with the Schach Trade 
Implex of Germany, are all examples of JVs with agreements 
tying software development with hardware. 44 in a slightly 
different vein, a Joint Venture between MicroPro of the United 
States and GORISTEMATEKHNIKA representing several Soviet 
interests has been formed to create a Russian language version of
6-23
the popular Wordstar word processing program for distribution to 
the computing market in the Soviet Union. 45 Finally, there have 
been several ventures formed to sell Soviet software in the West. 
Izvestiya announced in March 1988 that a Joint Venture had been 
formed with Scandinavian Personal Computer Systems to market 
software from the Tallinn Institute of Cybernetics. 46 Talks have 
also been held between Soviet officials and the Borland software 
manufacturing corporation of the United States. These 
discussions have included not only distribution of Borland 
products in the Soviet Union, but the use of Borland's developed 
marketing and sales system for promoting Soviet software 
products in the United Sates and other western countries. 47
This last example is of particular significance, since it shows 
one of the strengths that the Soviet Union hopes to be able to 
exploit through Joint Ventures. While far behind the West in 
manufacturing capabilities and sheer numbers of computers in 
use, there is no shortage of intellectual stock dedicated to 
computers in the area of software development in the Soviet 
Union. 48 in what can only be considered an odd and ironic turn of 
events, the lack of hardware has forced the Soviets to dedicate 
tremendous amounts of intellectual capital to solving problems in 
this area, in the same way that Soviet science in general has
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tended towards theoretical solutions of problems in cases where 
the material needed for experimentation is lacking. 49 As has 
been noted, the lack of exposure to western training and 
techniques in programming has been somewhat of a hidden 
blessing, in that it has allowed Soviet programmers to develop 
their own style and approaches to writing software, which has 
led to the demand for Soviet programmers in the West, so What it 
could mean in the future is a demand for Soviet software 
products rather than just the people who create them.
The Significance of Software Transfers and Export Controls
Evaluating the significance of these transfers and the 
effectiveness of related control measures is difficult at best, if 
for no other reason than the imprecise nature of software itself. 
While a physical entity in terms of the mediums on which it is 
stored and transferred, it is in a very real sense an intellectual 
entity, the product of creative thought, without the burdens of 
the need to manufacture or in other ways put it into a commodity 
form. In its physical sense, software causes problems for the 
West in terms of monitoring such transfers and the technology 
they embody, and especially when attempts are made to in some
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manner to control or restrict these transfers. These problems 
have been further compounded by advances in 
telecommunications, specifically the ability to transfer entire 
programs anywhere in the world in a matter of seconds. In the 
intellectual sense, software causes problems for the Soviets in 
that continued access to western products in this area requires 
recognition of the rights of intellectual ownership of the 
creators of that software. Unlimited transfers and exploitation 
of software, without the permission of the originator and 
remuneration for his efforts, discourages software creators from 
sharing their work or even investing the time and effort needed to 
create these programs. Thus, the situation presents something of 
a paradox, in that a commodity which in and of itself is very 
difficult to control, requires some means of control in order to 
provide the incentives for its further development.
In terms of Cocom restrictions, while guidelines have been 
established on certain types of software, it has also been 
recognized that this is perhaps the most difficult area of 
computer technology to control. The greatest success that has 
been achieved in this area to date has been where the software 
involved has had limited application, involving a small number of 
highly sophisticated programs which are easier to control. 51
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Even though the case of Toshiba proves that such programs are 
still subject to illegal exploitation, the numbers of such cases, 
as well as the applicability of such programs, are limited and 
transfers of this type do little to affect the overall level of 
software development. For the broader body of software 
technology, there exist legal control mechanisms governing the 
transfer of software technology. These mechanisms, in terms of 
copyright laws and other guidelines regarding intellectual 
property, allow for the monitoring of transfers, and require at 
least some acknowledgement and/or payment for their use. This, 
in turn, provides a control mechanism of sorts in that the 
consequences for flagrantly violating these guidelines in terms of 
the loss of commercial access may outweigh the benefits to be 
gained by such violations. While the policing of these policies 
might seem to be problematical, the Soviet Union is showing a 
growing understanding of the need to abide by these regulations, 
especially if it hopes to gain acceptance and integration on a 
greater scale with the West. 52 Thus, while the formal control of 
general purpose applications, such as data bases, word processors 
and the like is next impossible, it should be possible at least to 
keep track of what is being transferred and to require some form 
of compensation for their use. Here the concept is analogous to 
the problems in the software industry as a whole, where once
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created, software developers and their companies must come up 
with some way of protecting their intellectual property from 
unauthorized exploitation. In this case, general compliance with 
these guidelines has been achieved though respect for the law and 
the fact that if people illegally copy and make use of others' 
programs, they cannot expect any better treatment for their own.
For the Soviet Union, this line of reasoning is particularly 
relevant in that, along with an interest in obtaining western 
software, there is a desire to see Soviet efforts enter the market 
place and accorded the same rights. To gain this, however, the 
authorities and institutions in the USSR must abide by the same 
rules covering intellectual property, thus encouraging a self­
policing mechanism. As long as the Soviets had little concern for 
the West in terms of acceptance and integration, there was little 
reason to abide by these rules; once software was obtained by 
any means, it could and was duplicated and disseminated with 
little or no thought for western restrictions or prohibitions. 53 
Now, however, policies are changing, with the emphasis on 
cooperation with the West; and with these changes have come a 
new attitude about the way that such rules are treated. This has 
led to particular attention being paid to the issue of copyrights
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and licenses, with the Soviet legislature recently seeking to 
bring Soviet rules into line with international standards in this 
area. 54 Thus, while formal control mechanisms remain a 
problem, the changes in Soviet attitudes toward such measures 
may provide an informal check on the wholesale exploitation of 
western software.
The Question of Integration
These types of issues, in turn, lead to the broader discussion 
surrounding integration with the West, for which computer 
software also serves as an interesting microcosm. While it has 
long been recognized that there are benefits to be gained through 
integration, the Soviets in the past have shown limited interest 
in developing the potential of such benefits. Now, however, this 
is seen as an area to be exploited, not only in terms of the 
knowledge to be gained, but because software is one of the few 
areas where the Soviets have something that might be of value to 
the West, something that can be traded and marketed for other 
commodities that the country needs. 55 Joint Ventures formed to 
develop trade and exploit 'intellectual capital' suffer from fewer 
of the systemic problems that plague other JVs, simply because 
of the nature of the material and the mediums involved. At the
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same time, however, arguments can be made that one of the 
reasons that the Soviets have developed these capabilities is 
because of their previous separation from the West. Going back 
to the belief of Lebedev, Velikov and others in the need for an 
independent computer infrastructure, some Soviets would argue 
that the last thing that the Soviet Union wants to do is to 
integrate to the point that it loses its independent capabilities 
and becomes further dependent on the West. This would be 
especially true in an area where the Soviets have a good chance of 
keeping up with, and even the possibility of taking the lead, in a 
field of critical importance to the computer field overall. 56 
Others would argue that the reason for falling behind in the first 
place was just this separation, and that the only way to ever 
catch up is to integrate wholly with the rest of the world. 57 At 
the moment, at least, the latter group seems to be carrying the 
day.
As if this situation is not confusing enough in itself, to it 
must now be added the western perspective. The western view of 
export controls was originally based on the need to protect 
certain high level technologies and the capabilities that could 
produce these technologies. In the area of software, this was 
extremely difficult, both because of the nature of the medium and
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of the technologies themselves. Still, a certain degree of success 
was achieved. At the upper end, the software programs that were 
of concern were relatively small in number and easier to monitor; 
at the lower end, the lack of general integration kept the Soviets 
from the widespread exposure to western trends that would have 
added significantly to their own capabilities. All this, however, 
is changing; as more numerous contacts are made, the difficulty 
in monitoring what is being transferred becomes overwhelming, 
while the general level of integration at the lower end may 
eventually increase the level of programming expertise to the 
point that the Soviets will be able to create whatever they need 
without western inputs. At the same time, there are definite 
advantages to be had by integration with the Soviet Union in 
terms of access to those areas where the Soviets have 
demonstrated strengths, as well as the ability to monitor exactly 
what capabilities they possess. The question for the West then 
becomes, do the benefits of integration outweigh the costs, and 
does integration offer a certain degree of protection, in terms of 
dependency and knowledge of the capabilities of others, when 
traditional export restrictions can no longer be enforced?
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Sum mary-Som e Thoughts on the Transfer of Software Technology
As already noted, one of the strengths of western software 
development has been the ability to distribute, access, make use 
of and modify software in an extremely short amount of time. At 
home, the Soviets have been limited by the lack of hardware 
(computer and telecommunications), by the fragmented nature of 
the computer industry (compounded by bureaucratic infighting and 
turf disputes), and by governmental restrictions on information 
flow. All these problems have been taken up in one way or another 
by the reforms. 58 The efforts at upgrading Soviet hardware in the 
computer area have already been addressed, while information 
transfers will be covered in the next chapter. Reorganizations in 
the computer industry have attempted to overcome the types of 
blockages that are the result of the nature of the system itself, 
with varying degrees of success. However, it is the area of 
general information flow and access to sources of information 
that were previously restricted, that may have the greatest 
impact on technological development of the Soviet Union. 59
While openness without the tools to exploit the opportunities 
openness presents may seem like a hollow advantage at best, it is 
a situation that still may give the Soviets their greatest
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potential in the long term, especially as the tools become 
increasingly more available. Specifically with regard to 
computers, the combination of greater access to the West and 
integration with the current world standards can do nothing but 
improve the situation in this area. At the same time, greater 
integration at home, along with the freer flow of information and 
ideas allowing for dissemination of this information, compounds 
the value of the technology the Soviets receive from the West by 
allowing it to be utilized by a larger segment of the population. 
Hardware shortages will hamper this process in the short term; 
however, as the possibilities and capabilities offered by 
computers become apparent to a broader spectrum of society, the 
desire to take advantage of these capabilities will further speed 
the drive to obtain both hardware and software. As seen in the 
case of the Latvian computer professor, 60 the desire to gain up to 
date capabilities can and will lead to creative ways of 
overcoming what have been traditional choke points in obtaining 
this material. In this sense, the two trends tend to reinforce one 
another. Greater openness fosters greater demand, which in turn 
takes advantage of the opportunities provided by greater 
openness.
Relating this specifically to the area of computer software,
the reforms have in fact begun to address those areas that have 
been at the base of the problems related to software, and by doing 
so have begun to create the infrastructure needed to make 
software development a viable part of the computer industry. The 
increasing number of computers, especially those from the West 
or based on western designs, will eventually if left undisturbed 
provide the necessary hardware to support software development. 
Drawing from the western experience, where "the most 
significant recent development in computer software has been 
the commodization caused by the arrival of IBM and Apple 
personal computers and their clones," 61 the more computers that 
are available the greater will be the strength of the software 
sector. At the same time, greater access to the West, through 
Joint Ventures and other means, will further strengthen this 
process by allowing both the ability to access western software 
and the techniques that go into its development. Finally, 
domestic reforms, in terms of greater freedom of information 
exchange and greater demands for software products, will create 
the environment needed to sustain the growth of a viable 
software industry. While this process may not occur overnight, 
there is little reason not to believe that, given the same 
conditions that were present in the West twenty years before, the
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Soviets cannot create a computer revolution of their own.
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CHAPTER 7-INFORMATION TRANSFERS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT
Introduction
Of the areas concerning technology transfer, both in general 
and specifically relating to the computer field, the one most 
difficult to describe and categorize, and therefore to control, is 
know-how. Hardware is relatively simple to define in terms of 
its existence or being; pieces of hardware, be they computers, 
their component parts or related peripherals, have size, shape, 
specific functions that they preform and ways in which they 
perform these functions. Software, even though it is less of a 
physical entity than hardware, still is comprised of specific 
elements, must be recorded, stored and transferred in some type 
of medium, and again performs given functions in a prescribed 
manner. But how does one define an idea? And even if one is able 
in some way to quantify the entity referred to as knowledge, how 
does one go about controlling it and limiting its transfer, if it is 
decided that such controls and limits on the transfer of 
knowledge are in one's better interests?
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Mankind has struggled with the concept and nature of 
knowledge since prehistoric times. The spread of knowledge was 
a key element in the evolution of man; societies rose and fell 
over their ability not only to acquire, but to disseminate and 
assimilate knowledge and the technology that normally 
accompanies it. Knowledge has always been the mark by which 
societies have been measured, from the time of the ancient 
Greeks. More recently, not only knowledge, but know-how, the 
way that knowledge is put to use, has become a key element in 
determining the place a society occupies in the world order.
During the Industrial Revolution, Britain not only led the world in 
manufacturing, but drawing on its strength in this area became 
the preeminent power of the era. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the United States with its great industrial 
capability rose to become the center of the democratic world 
after the Second World War, while today, Japan and the "Four 
Tigers" of Asia 1 have staked a claim to a major place in a world 
market dominated by the high technology goods in which they have 
shown remarkable strength. In all of these cases, while physical 
attributes (numbers of factories, output, etc.) were the eventual 
measures of a country's economic might, these attributes were 
the result of the ability of each country to apply, in practical
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terms, what knowledge and technology had to offer. Thus, 
perhaps the best way of defining know-how is to say that it is 
knowledge applied to the accomplishment of a given task, that is, 
the ability to convert theoretical concepts and put them to 
practical use. ?
Part of the problem with defining know-how is that it is an 
entity that, in real terms, has little meaning until it is put into 
use. To help explain this phenomenon, an analogy to music may be 
helpful. While music can be created in the mind of the composer 
and recorded on paper, it does not truly become music until it is 
played, until it is put into a form that, while difficult to define, 
is recognizable to all who hear it. To do this requires individuals 
both with the required skills to sing or play the music, and who 
can add their own interpretations to that which is written, who 
can improvise, turning notation into something that can be 
enjoyed by all. In this process, the skills of the individual may 
vary, from the great opera singer to the amateur in a church 
choir, from the master of an instrument to a street musician.
Still, what is essential here is that it requires man to 
operationalize the concept, to take an inanimate form and give it 
a life of its own. The same can be said of know-how, the ability 
to turn knowledge into something of use, to turn information into
a product or a function that serves mankind in some form. 
Technology, in and of itself, is of little value unless there are 
humans who can put that technology to use.
Thus, a major factor in the transfer of technology is this 
human element. What is more, while information can be 
transferred in any number of means, via printed material, the 
electronic media, etc, the ability to turn this information into 
something useful depends on human beings. While knowledge can 
be imparted through various means, as has been shown some 
means tend to be more efficient than others, with those actually 
involving human contact normally being the most efficient. 3 One 
need only think in terms of trying to learn how to play a sport by 
reading a book to see the advantages of active participation. It 
takes practice and actual application of the information, using 
real materials and facilities, to truly gain proficiency in any 
area. Along the same lines, while the necessary information 
concerning a process can be transferred without direct personal 
contacts, there is no way to insure that the information being 
transmitted is correctly received and applied by the receiving 
body. Here again, even with the advances that have been made in 
technology, no substitute has been found yet for human contact,
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the interaction of two or more people, exchanging ideas and being 
able to question and receive direct feedback about their 
questions, which leads to understanding and mastery of a skill. 
While technology transfers can take many shapes and forms, a key 
element in determining the effectiveness of the transfer always 
seems to be the extent that human interaction is involved, i.e. the 
human factor. 4
The Human Element in Transfers of Technology
When looking at technology transfers in the area of computers, 
the significance of these observations is readily borne out. One 
of the reasons already cited as hindering the development of the 
Soviet computer sector, as well as Soviet industry as a whole, 
has been the lack of interchange both between scientists within 
the country, and between Soviet specialists and their colleagues 
throughout the rest of the world. The Soviet record of 
assimilating technology that has not been accompanied by the 
human element has been chequered at best; at worst, the failure 
to have some kind of human involvement with either hardware or 
information transfers has resulted in the total inability to 
incorporate that technology, making such transfers of little or no 
value in spite of the cost and effort involved in the physical
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transfer process. Reverse engineering is probably the primary 
example of the problems involved. Obtaining a finished piece of 
machinery, taking it apart in order to determine both its physical 
dimensions and operation as well as the manufacturing process 
involved in its production, and then trying to duplicate both the 
process and the end product of this process works only for simple 
products. 5 in cases where the products and processes are 
complex, or the technologies involved are unfamiliar and even 
unknown, successes are few. And, even if the process can 
successfully be duplicated and the product reproduced, the time 
involved often makes the product and the technology obsolete 
before it can be duplicated on a broader and useful scale. The 
efforts involved in the creation of the Ryad series computers are 
a case in point. 6 By the time that the IBM 360 had been 
successfully copied it was no longer state of the art, and the East 
was left with a computing system that, while still capable, did 
little if anything to bring the Bloc up to world standards. As 
noted by one observer, "Reverse engineering a complex modern 
microprocessor has proved to be more difficult than the Soviets 
had originally anticipated." 7
The extent of the importance of the human element can perhaps 
best be seen in a number of different examples, each representing
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a specific aspect of the problem, and each with different 
approaches to achieving a solution. In terms of manufacturing 
capability, the process of turning design information into a 
finished product has long bedeviled the Soviet Union. Earlier, turn 
key plants where entire manufacturing concerns were purchased 
and erected were long the most favored and sought after solution. 
Such operations overcame the problem of transferring 
information into production capability, especially if the 
agreements included provisions for the training of individuals to 
run these plants. But these did little to develop a related 
research infrastructure and the ability to expand upon and 
innovate, based upon the initial capability. 8 Further, western 
governments, also realizing the problems involved in 
transforming information into practical capability, tended to 
focus export controls on those areas that offered a way to 
overcome these problems, i.e. manufacturing capability. This was 
particularly the case in the area of micro-processors, where 
repeated Soviet attempts to obtain facilities to bolster the 
limited Soviet chip manufacturing capability were blocked. 9 
Today, emphasis in this area has been shifted to Soviet 
involvement throughout the manufacturing cycle. This can be 
seen especially in the encouragement given Joint Ventures where
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Soviet engineers and managers work with their foreign 
counterparts, learning not only the processes involved but the 
methods by which these processes are developed. 10 The end 
result, it is hoped, will be the transfer of knowledge relating to 
production capability; the goal, it can be argued, is to assimilate 
this know-how along with the ability to modify and develop the 
technologies involved, leading eventually to an independent 
capability in this area.
At the same time, Soviet and East European access to western 
manufacturing, research, and educational facilities, where know­
how can be imparted to individuals and then taken back with 
them, is another area where the human aspect of technology 
transfer is readily apparent. Academic exchanges have long been 
considered an essential part of the development of ideas through 
the sharing of research and information; conferences, 
professional societies, and even the ability to go and visit 
colleagues doing research in a given field are all valued as ways 
to transmit information and share knowledge. Restricted in the 
past, not so much by the West as by the Soviets themselves, 
exchanges have not been an area of major concern in the West in 
terms of export control. Soviet fears of what might be lost, both 
in terms of the control of information and of people themselves,
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outweighed considerations of that which could be gained through 
such exchanges, and limited the number of Soviet academics with 
access to the West. Those scientists and researchers who were 
allowed to travel were those who were considered to be 
politically reliable, not those best qualified to take advantage of 
the opportunities that such travel presented, n  Thus, the ability 
of individuals to learn from direct contact with others in their 
field, possibly the most effective way of transferring 
information, was specifically restricted. All this, however, 
began to change with the changing climate and relations between 
the two Blocs. Literally a flood of Soviet and East European 
scientists and researchers began coming to the West, 
representing at once a tremendous opportunity for gains in the 
exchange information, and a tremendous potential for loss of 
technology with little or no way of measuring what was being 
transferred .
Finally, just as direct contact between researchers has been 
restricted, so too has their ability to communicate via the 
growing number of means that advancements in technology have 
made available. Communication links, via telephone, satellite and 
computer data networks have revolutionized the ways in which 
information is distributed and transmitted. Not only is it now
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possible to interact with people around the globe in a matter of 
seconds, allowing for the interchange of ideas that before could 
only take place through personal contact, but scientists can 
access stores of information for research, expanding the realm of 
their own efforts and furthering the development of their own 
capabilities, without the need of physically being present. These 
stores, recorded in data bases that themselves are becoming 
increasingly more detailed and complex, are a direct result of the 
computer revolution that has allowed not only their creation, but 
the ability to make practical use of the materials contained 
within through the use of highly sophisticated search and 
analysis programs. While it was initially thought that the 
greatest value of computers was their ability to perform complex 
computations, data management and communications have 
recently shown themselves to be fields of equal, if not greater, 
significance to the scientific community. 12 All of these 
capabilities, however, revolve around the individual, increasing 
greatly his ability to access, manipulate and make use of 
information, and in the end increasing his knowledge, technical 
skills and know-how. Human access to these new resources, then, 
is another area of potential gain for the Soviet Union, and one 
where it has shown a keen interest in expanding that access. 13
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These three areas then, manufacturing know-how, personal 
contacts and access to information, help to define the human 
element of technology transfer, or modifying a term from the 
computer sector, the element of 'humanware'. Relating this to 
Soviet computer capabilities, hardware and software both play a 
significant role in determining the Soviet Union's place in the 
world with regard to computers; however, it is the training, 
skills and ability of its people in this area that will ultimately 
determine where this level will be. The Soviets themselves are 
well aware of this, as can be seen in their efforts to increase 
their contacts in this vital area. 14 What follows then, is an 
examination of these recent initiatives, with the goal both of 
determining the extent of these efforts and, if possible, their 
degree of success and the effect this success has had, or may 
have, on increasing Soviet computing capabilities.
The Human Element in Practice-Joint Ventures and Other 
Contacts
It should be noted here that personal contacts in computing 
actually consist of two distinct, though interrelated, subsets. 
The first of these relates to the manufacture of computers and
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their related peripherals, including software engineering. But 
computers, in and of themselves, are only tools and must be put 
to use to be truly effective. Thus the second and larger area 
where human contact plays a part in Soviet computing is in their 
use and integration within society. As important as it is for the 
Soviets to be able to manufacture and provide the essentials of a 
computer society, there must still be an impetus within society 
to adopt and use these computers, to have a true impact. Human 
contacts with the West help to provide both.
Using Joint Ventures as the vehicle most likely to bring 
Soviets in contact with westerners, it is possible, by turning to 
the record established by these ventures, to get some idea of the 
influence these have had on the Soviet citizens involved, or may 
have in the future. Initial liberalization of the rules concerning 
these ventures led to a large number of JVs being registered; 
however, the subsequent rate of these registrations has slowed 
with fading euphoria. 15 In a report on Joint Ventures published 
by the PlanEcon research foundation, a group specializing in East- 
West trade relations, it was noted that fears of economic 
instability in the Soviet Union, combined with the difficulties in 
recovering profits from investments made in the Soviet Union 
because of the lack of a convertible currency, has led to a slowing
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in the number of JVs being registered in 1990 after reaching a 
high point in 1989. Still, new Joint Ventures continue to be 
registered, especially as noted earlier, in the service sector, 
reflecting the preference of western firms to enter into 
agreements that do not require large capital investments. 
Significantly, of the total registrations, "the largest single area 
of activity in JVs is personal computer production and 
programming, with primary emphasis on program m ing-208  
(14.2%), followed by business consulting-149 (10.2%), [and] R&D 
and engineering consulting-129 (8.8%)...." 17 All of these 
combine personal contacts with some aspect of computing, and is 
a sign of what has been described as "a voracious appetite among 
Soviet citizens for computers...." 18
In one respect, it can be argued that the net impact of these 
ventures to date has been small at best. Of the 1,542 Joint 
Ventures registered with the Ministry of Foreign Trade through 
1989, only about 200 were considered operational, with total sales 
of goods and services in the first three quarters of 1990 amounting 
to 88 million rubles, a fairly meager sum. 19 Still, in spite of such 
figures, there is a greater value to such ventures, one that cannot 
be quantified. While the individual terms and makeup of these JVs
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vary, all entail interaction with westerners and western sources 
of information; indeed, one of the points brought up again and 
again in discussions with members of various Soviet delegations, 
is the desire of the Soviets to increase these contacts and to 
"learn western ways of doing business." 20 Among westerners 
doing business with the Soviet Union, common comments include 
praise for the willingness of Soviets to learn new ways and to bend 
over backwards to accommodate those westerners who are willing 
to take the risks involved in entering into ventures in the Soviet 
Union at this time. 21 For those who have dealt with Soviets in the 
past, this is a welcome break with previous traditions and 
behaviors, which is due in no small measure to the changes in 
attitudes brought about as a result of the reforms. For the Soviets 
themselves, it may be something of a shock, both in the realization 
that after these many years they now have access to the West as 
well as incentives to emulate western ways, but a shock they seem 
ready to overcome.
As for the number of actual manufacturing enterprises that 
have been established, where know-how and manufacturing skills 
have been transferred to the Soviet partners, this number, as 
reflected above, remains small and probably will remain so at 
least for the near future. Numerous problems serve to limit the
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enthusiasm of western investors for making large capital 
investments in the Soviet Union. First is the sheer difficulty of 
getting started and the scope of what often has to be done to 
begin production. As in the case of the former East Germany, 
western firms often find that Soviet enterprises are so outmoded 
that what is required is a total overhaul of the system. 22 This is 
especially the case in high technology areas such as computers, 
where the lag in Soviet capabilities behind those of the West is 
great, and is one of the key reasons why the Soviets turned to the 
West in the first place. Second is the often mentioned problem of 
currency convertibility. Even should a company decide that it 
wants to enter into a Joint Venture and is willing to wait the 
time it takes for the venture to become profitable, there has been 
little or no guarantee that the western partner will be able to get 
their profits out because the ruble, after much discussion, still 
cannot be readily converted so that investors can secure 
something tangible for their investment. Even the announcement 
in October of 1990, that beginning in January hard currency would 
be sold by the Government at public auction does little to aid this 
situation; since there is no fixed rate of exchange, profits still 
are not guaranteed, and inflation might quickly deflate the value 
of any investment in terms of the returns to be gained. 23 Finally, 
there is the problem created by the internal instability
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manifesting itself in the Soviet Union. The continuing decline in 
public order, increasing ethnic strife and conflicts over 
jurisdiction between the central government and local authorities 
hardly is a situation designed to bring confidence to a foreign 
investor looking for a safe and secure investment environment. 
From the summer of 1990, when the first elections of local 
governments on a relatively free basis took place, there have been 
conflicts over jurisdiction and sovereignty in various regions, 
with questions of exactly who has the right to make agreements 
with outside firms. As reflected in the comments of a western 
businessman just returning form a trip to the Soviet Union, "...it 
is not always clear who is in charge and has authority to make 
commitments. A great deal of confusion between new private 
organizations, established, All-Union ministries, and the 
republics have produced conflicting claims." 24
What all of this means, in terms of the amount of technology 
being transferred to the Soviet Union in manufacturing know-how 
and those types of information passed between individuals 
through contact with the industrial process, is that at present it 
must be judged as minimal at best. While an effective way of 
transferring information, the limited scope of such operations
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prevents the quantity of material from being of any significance. 
The scope, in turn, will continue to be limited by those external 
factors that limit the willingness of western investors and firms 
from establishing manufacturing ties on a broader scale. In one 
of the 'chicken and the egg' situations that the Soviet Union finds 
itself in all too often, western investors will continue to be 
hesitant to make large scale investments in the Soviet Union 
until the situation improves, but the situation cannot improve 
without western investment. Western businessman in Moscow 
can hardly be encouraged about their prospects when they hear 
talk of Civil War and the breakup of the Union. From the point of 
technology transfer through joint manufacturing ventures, until 
the situation becomes one where western firms feel it is 
desirable to invest in this area in the Soviet Union, the number of 
enterprises structured along these lines will be small. As long as 
the number of enterprises remains small, the amount of 
technology and know-how being transferred through the personal 
contacts that come with such ventures will also be small.
Having said this, it must also be realized that the Soviets are 
aware of these attitudes as well as the fact that the situation in 
the Soviet Union will not improve without massive investment 
from the West, and accordingly have taken steps to allay western
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fears. At the international level, Soviet politicians from 
President Gorbachev down have continued to try to foster the aura 
of the beginning of a new era of improved East-West relations and 
modifying old behaviors and attitudes to reinforce this line of 
reasoning. 25 At lower levels, Soviet officials, realizing the 
apprehensions of western businessmen, are quick to point out that 
investors willing to take the chances involved will not only 
receive special considerations for their willingness to act now 
when the need is most urgent, but that in the long run they will be 
positioning themselves in an ideal situation when the Soviet 
economy begins to respond to the reforms, and as such will be in 
on the 'ground floor' of a period of tremendous economic growth. 26 
At the same time, those firms who already have made investments 
in such ventures are likely to see them through, with many that 
were drawn up in 1987 and 1988 now beginning to produce. Recent 
moves also seem to indicate that the Soviet Union, at least in 
terms of foreign enterprises, may soon have a mechanism that 
will allow for the guaranteed conversion of rubles into hard 
currency. 27 All this, in and of itself, does not mean Joint 
Ventures in the short run, will be the miracle cure that some 
envisioned. However, with continued emphasis and willingness on 
the part of the Soviet Union to offer incentives to western 
businesses, plus some indication of a stable domestic situation,
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they do hold the possibility of being a major source of technology 
and know-how at some point in the future.
Academic Exchanges, Trade Fairs and Other Contacts
Perhaps there is no greater sign of the change in relations 
between East and West than the dramatic increase in the numbers 
of Soviet and Eastern Bloc visitors that has taken place in the 
last few years, as well as the reciprocal increase in the number 
of westerners, especially scientists, engineers and businessmen, 
visiting the East. In the former case, glasnost and perestroika 
have meant unprecedented opportunities for Soviet researchers 
and other specialists to travel abroad, meet with foreign 
colleagues, gain access to foreign information and even establish 
ties that allow them to maintain contacts once they have 
returned to the Soviet Union. The significance of these 
opportunities cannot be overemphasized; for years the only 
Soviet citizens allowed to travel to the West were those who 
were considered politically reliable, or who, in many cases, had 
been co-opted or were working for the security agencies in some 
manner. The average Soviet academic or industrial 
representative could only dream of such travel. Now, however,
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with the open encouragement of such travel and contacts, an 
increasing number of people in these areas are benefiting from 
such opportunities and the experience that can be gained. At the 
same time, openness on the part of the Soviet Union and the 
attempts to attract foreign capital and business have produced a 
steady stream of westerners to the Soviet Union, seeking out 
their counterparts in business and technical areas, exchanging 
ideas and exploring areas for future cooperation. What is 
significant here is the type of people engaging in such exchanges; 
westerners have always found it fairly easy to go to the Soviet 
Union, however those that went tended to represent non-technical 
fields. The situation was such that a standard joke in academic 
circles for years, describing those exchanges that took place, was 
that for every Soviet student who came to the West to study 
engineering, physics and computer science, another western 
student was allowed to go to the Soviet Union to study Russian 
language, literature, and art history. 28 in this respect, as others, 
the current situation represents a radical change from the past.
The extent of this increase can be seen in the visa figures for 
Soviet citizens coming to the United States for business and 
academic pursuits. 29 Maintained by the U.S. Office of 
Immigration, these figures document the dramatic climb in the
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numbers of visas issued to both Soviets and other members of the 
Eastern Bloc. In the B-1 visa category, issued to temporary 
visitors from the Soviet Union for business purposes, figures for 
the period 1980 to 1987 range between 1,169 (1984) and 2,602 
(1987). In 1988, this figure jumped to 5,829, and in 1989 there 
were 12, 910 visitors, almost a five fold increase in a two year 
period. The same type of increase is reflected in the figures for 
pleasure and for the business/pleasure categories. While the 
term pleasure may at first seem to denote other than business 
purposes, the intent of such visits is often to gather information 
and establish contacts, since very few Soviets are in a position 
to take purely pleasure trips abroad. In terms of academic 
exchanges, while the numbers are not as impressive as those for 
business visas, the percentages reflect the same upward trend.
In the J-1 category-applicants accepted to participate in 
exchange visitor programs sponsored by the United States 
Information Agency--the highest number prior to 1986 was 175 
(1981); in 1986, 328 such visas were granted for the Soviet 
Union, in 1 9 87 -2 93 , 19 88 -63 7 , and 1989 -1 ,0 30 . While 
specific figures for other western countries such as Great Britain 
and Germany are not available, discussions with representatives 
that deal with visiting Soviets indicate the same phenomena in 
their countries, so (For detailed figures, see Appendix I)
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Trade fairs, exhibitions, conferences and other business/ 
industrial/scientific gatherings also are providing new 
opportunities for information exchange on the personal level. In 
terms of Soviet citizens traveling to the West, the doors have 
literally been opened, with almost anyone with the price of a 
ticket being allowed to leave to attend such events in the West. 31 
Within the Soviet Union, the new opportunities for sales have 
brought western firms showing their latest wares. While there 
are no figures as to the total number of such exhibitions taking 
place, a listing provided by the American Department of 
Commerce for the period 1990/1991 runs to five pages. 32 Not 
only are the numbers impressive, but the nature of the material 
being shown would have been unheard of five years ago. From a 
list of exhibitions printed by the All Union Association 
Expocenter, there were exhibits dedicated to "Local Networks 
Based on PC and Computing Systems; CAD/CAM Systems, 
Automation of Biotechnical Processes in Medicine and 
Agriculture, and Spectroscopic Equipment for Scientific 
Purposes." 33 Nor are such exhibitions only for showing off the 
latest in equipment. TASS reported in 1990 that a meeting to 
discuss "problems of economic reforms and the policy of the
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coordinating committee for Export Controls...." was held between 
representatives from the United States and The Soviet Union 
during an exhibition of computer equipment and software, "World 
PC Forum," held in Moscow. 34
While these figures and examples give an overall appreciation 
of the extent of these contacts, an anecdotal experience may shed 
some light as to impact that these types of contacts and 
exchanges can have. 35 As related earlier, the author had the 
opportunity to talk for several hours with a professor of 
computer science from the University of Riga in the spring of 
1990. 36 This individual had been traveling in the United States 
for several weeks under the auspices of a Latvian emigre 
organization. Along with talking to gatherings of this 
organization, he stated that his purpose was to gather as much 
useful information for his department as he could, and establish 
academic and professional ties that he could draw upon once he 
returned to the Soviet Union. He was quite open about his work 
and the state of computing in the Soviet Union, and anxious to 
find information that would aid in solving problems that they 
faced. (He was also quite appreciative of the opportunity to 
travel in the West, and the fact that as little as two years before 
he would not have had such an opportunity.) In just one example
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of the type of information that he was able to obtain, one of the 
problems that he said the Soviet Union was having was tied to the 
fact that most of their modems were outdated, and transferred 
data at the slow rate of 1,200 baud, 37 which not only tied up 
scarce communications lines, but made these modems 
incompatible with those used in the rest of the world. Upon 
hearing this, an IBM programmer present showed him how, through 
a software modification, these modems could be made to 
transmit and receive at 2,400 baud. This solution was especially 
significant, since it allowed the Soviets to continue to use the 
outdated equipment that they already possessed, without the need 
for expensive replacements that they had little prospect of being 
able to afford.
Again, while the overall significance of these contacts is 
difficult to quantify in terms of the exact amount of information 
being transmitted, it should be apparent that the greater the 
number of contacts, the greater will be the amount of information 
transferred, knowingly or otherwise. It should also be 
remembered that the nature of these contacts in itself is 
inherently a most efficient means of technology transfer. 38 in 
the example above, the Soviet professor and the IBM programmer 
sat down together at a ComputerLand in a matter of minutes the
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latter was able to demonstrate a solution to a problem that had 
apparently been plaguing the Soviet Union for some time. The 
fact that they were able to communicate directly, with the 
former asking questions and receiving direct feedback, no doubt 
enhanced the process. The questions that the Soviet professor 
raised in this case were ones that would normally not even come 
up in western literature, since the problem did not exist in the 
West, and even if the solution had been written about in some 
western journal, it is questionable that reading the answer in a 
foreign language without the opportunity to discuss the solution 
and seeing it implemented would have had the same impact, or 
been assimilated as quickly. Further, this is but one example of 
the effectiveness of human contact as a means of transferring 
technology. The results of the rapid expansion of such contacts 
into the thousands or tens of thousands can only be imagined.
Telecommunications and Other Means of Information Transfer
Great as the importance is of face to face contact for 
effectively transferring information, technology itself has 
created other means for accomplishing this task, means that 
were unknown until a relatively short time ago. Embodied in the
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form of telecommunications, computer networks, data bases and 
other types of electronic interfaces, these means have 
revolutionized information transfers in the West and hold the 
potential to do the same in the East. In some respects, these 
means do have their limitations and are still inferior to what can 
be accomplished by direct contact. On the other hand, the ability 
to communicate almost instantaneously across the globe has 
overcome the barrier that distance imposes on such direct 
contact, and in terms of transferring large amounts of material 
or allowing access to stores of information that might not 
otherwise be available, technology may, in fact, offer advantages 
over trying to establish face to face coordination. Along with the 
computers that make such contacts possible, these mediums are 
another tool necessary for creating a modern technological 
society.
Of the devices mentioned above, probably the one that has done 
the most to revolutionize the ways that information is stored and 
transferred is computer networking. Tying together computers 
and the people using them throughout the world, and allowing 
direct communications and access to material stored at these 
locations, has given capabilities to individuals that have never 
before been present. With the only requirements being a
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computer, a modem and a functioning phone system, the West is 
criss-crossed with tens of thousands of computer nets, tying 
together academic institutions, industrial and research concerns, 
government offices and the like. Nor have the benefits of the 
ability to share information been lost on the Soviet Union. In just 
one example, a Soviet author in 1984 cited the need for a 
"collective of computers", adapting the rhetoric commonly used to 
promote united action for the benefit of socialist society to 
argue for the joining of Soviet computers to aid in solving 
problems too enormous for one individual or institution to deal
with. 39
While the values of these nets are recognized, the same 
problems that have plagued the Soviet computer industry in other 
areas have affected information transfers. "Computer networks 
represent one of the most sophisticated applications of
computing, one that entails gluing together numerous pieces of
technology. It is therefore not surprising that this is one of the
weakest areas in the USSR." 40 Physical constraints, in terms of
equipment and facilities, have limited the Soviet Union's ability 
to accomplish anything of substantive value. In addition to the 
limited number of computers available and problems with inter­
operability caused by the variety of foreign and domestic models
7-27
present, the Soviet phone system has proven to be too antiquated 
and unreliable to support even the most rudimentary of electronic 
networks. Perhaps the most ambitious and highly acclaimed 
effort to create a major computer network, ACADEMSET, was 
designed to link member institutions of the Academy of Sciences 
in a common research and information net spanning the length and 
breadth of the Soviet Union. 41 While much heralded, technical 
problems were such that even after several years of being 
discussed and worked on, "as of 1987, all centers were not yet 
able to communicate with each other." 42 Additional information 
since then indicates that the system still suffers problems, at 
the same time when literally thousands of similar networks are 
functioning in the West. 43 On a lesser scale, the Soviets seem to 
have had greater success with Local Area Networks (LANs), 
though again suffering severely in comparison with the West. 44
Still, this less then auspicious first step should not be 
interpreted as meaning that the Soviets have given up on the idea 
of computer networking. In a major step towards improving the 
data transfer environment, the Soviet Union has aggressively 
sought to upgrade its telecommunications system by obtaining 
western equipment. One of their first cooperative ventures with
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a western firm in 1986 was a contract with Siemens to upgrade 
the Moscow phone system, which has been followed by subsequent 
agreements with the German electronics giant. 45 a  similar 
agreement to provide digital telephone switching equipment was 
signed with Alcatel N. V. Owned in part by the ITT Corp., the Joint 
Venture, named LenBell, will provide both communication lines 
and switching equipment. 46 Following the example set in other 
JVs, it calls for production facilities to be set up on Soviet soil, 
with a portion of the production being returned to Alcatel for sale 
abroad; a parallel agreement calls for Alcatel and Soviet 
authorities to cooperate in developing a Soviet 
telecommunications industry. 47 in yet other examples of Joint 
Ventures in this area, International Message Switching 
Corporation of California signed an agreement in mid-1989 with 
the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to "help upgrade 
the Soviet Union's data transfer network..." supplying advanced 
high-speed telecommunications software and equipment as well 
as consultations services, 48 while the Spanish firm Telefonica 
has entered into an agreement to produce 500,000 telephones a 
year in the Soviet Union. 49
Hardware, however, is only one aspect of the networking 
process. Even with the appropriate equipment, access must be
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available and willingly granted to a participant if it is to be of 
value. Thus, at the same time that the Soviet Union has been 
trying to upgrade the hardware that it needs to effectively 
network, it has been pursuing ventures that would tie it to 
existing nets and give Soviet institutions access to western 
information. As reflected in the National Academy of Science 
report on computer technology, "the director of the All Union 
Scientific Research Institute of Applied Automated Systems 
(VNIIPAS) seems to be actively encouraging the establishment of 
links and has said that the Soviets have access to a large number 
of western data bases." so in just two such examples of such 
efforts, the West German firm Taylorix has signed a letter of 
intent to establish a Joint Venture with the VNIIPAS to establish 
a network that would transmit data on a variety of topics to both 
Soviet and western customers, si The same Soviet Institute has 
also arranged a joint Soviet-American effort, SOVAM TELEPORT, 
offering "a wide range of telecommunications-information 
services" to include data banks, reference-information systems, 
telex, telefax and vidiotex networks. 52 Subscribers include the 
USSR Academy of Sciences, the Soviet Space Research Institute, 
Institute for Nuclear Physics (Novosibirsk), International 
Computer Club, the Institute for Automated Systems, and the USA 
and Canada Institute. 53 As part of its services, SOVAM TELEPORT
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has established a direct digital satellite hookup between the 
United States and the Soviet Union for business use. 54
Even though the establishment of computer networking and 
related means of data transfer are high on the list of Soviet 
desires, they are not the only means of information transfer that 
have come about as a result of the reforms. In one of the most 
interesting, relating directly to the computer field, International 
Data Group Communications Inc. has brought out a Russian 
language edition of its popular publication, PC World. 55 Entitled 
PC World USSR, it is the second western publication that has 
appeared in translation in the Soviet Union, preceded by a Russian 
edition of the German fashion magazine, Burda Moden. Such 
publications have long been a source of popular information 
exchange in the West; the fact that this was high on the 'want' 
list in terms of western publications, and that the response to it 
has been overwhelmingly favorable, serves to underline the 
significance of such publications to the Soviet Union. Further, 
the value of such publications comes not only in terms of the 
articles in the magazine (the first edition ran articles on the 
history of the IBM PC and computer productivity in the United 
States), but from the advertisements carried in them. In an early
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test issue, Soviet editors rejected many advertisements for 
"lacking sufficient technical data", a fault corrected in the 
premiere issue. 56 Even though it can be argued that little 
technical data can be realistically transferred on the pages of a 
magazine ad, the mere act of exposing Soviet citizens to what is 
available in the West serves the purpose of expanding Soviet 
computing horizons, and has led in this particular case to a 
number of requests for information from those firms placing the 
ads. 57
In summary, what can be seen from these examples is both a 
recognition of what can be gained in terms of information from 
the West through open sources and personal contacts, and an 
attempt to take advantages of these sources through 
establishment of the necessary infrastructure and information 
links. As in the West, the so-called information revolution has 
two components. The first of these is to access the tremendous 
amount of information that is being produced as a result of the 
advances made in science and technology. But second, to be of any 
use, this information must be assimilated by those who are 
capable of doing things with it; information in and of itself has 
little value, unless it can be put to use. In trying to establish 
ties with the West, as well as improving their own systems for
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accessing information, the Soviets have addressed the first of 
these two elements. In stressing personal contacts between East 
and West for people in the sciences and industry, they have tried 
to address the second. Their ability to make effective use of this 
information may still be in question, however they have 
demonstrated the desire to learn, and thus are taking steps in the 
right direction.
Information Transfers and the Computing Environment
While it can be seen through the efforts that the Soviets have 
engaged in that they value access to western sources of 
information, as well as the technologies that help to gain access 
to and use this information, the question still remains as to the 
impact that this information has had to date, or may be expected 
to have in the future. Again, this is far from an easy task; just 
as knowledge and information are not commodities that can be 
bundled up and counted the way that computers can be, the impact 
that a given piece of information will have, or for that matter the 
aggregate of many sources of information, is not something that 
can be easily measured. Still, based upon what has been seen, it 
should be possible first to draw some overall conclusions as to 
the value that the increased flow of information has had for the
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Soviet Union in the field of computers today, and second to 
postulate what effect this increased flow may have for the future 
of Soviet computing.
There seems little question that the increased openness of the 
Soviet Union under Gorbachev, in terms of access to information, 
increased lines of communication and general easing of 
restrictions on contacts with the West, has altered Soviet 
society as a whole, and Soviet science and technical fields in 
particular. Long cut off from its western counterparts, Soviet 
science has progressed in many areas, but at great cost and 
without the benefit of the experience and knowledge that were 
being accumulated in the West at the same time. 58 in a few 
cases, such as software development, this 'splendid isolation' 
may, in fact, have had its advantages; however, in general the 
Soviets have suffered because of this isolation, being forced, as 
it were, to make the same mistakes involved in the learning 
process that had already been made in the West. 59 Being 
burdened with a less efficient system as well, in terms of 
resource allocation and general bureaucratic inertia, has led the 
Soviet Union to fall further behind the rest of the world as a 
result. This backwardness, in turn, only served to exacerbate the
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problem. Now, at least, the way appears to be clearing, if not for 
total openness and access to information from the West, then at 
least to greater access and interchange than there was before. 
This may not mean that the Soviet Union will catch up with the 
West, but at least there should be reason for the Soviets to hope 
that they will fall no further behind. 60
The question arises, however, of whether this is really a true 
description of the situation, or if there is, in fact, more to the 
problem. For years the Soviet Union dedicated great efforts to 
gaining western information, both through legal and illicit means. 
The story has already been told of the massive efforts to obtain 
and translate every piece of western technical literature that 
was available to the Soviet Union. If information itself were the 
sole source of knowledge, then the Soviets should not be in the 
position that they find themselves today. The answer to this 
apparent contradiction goes back to the initial discussions of the 
nature of know-how and the transferring of knowledge. To be 
effective, information transfers must include in them not only 
information, but the ability to put that information to use, or 
know-how. This ability is not something that is readily 
transferable in figures or the written word; it must contain in it 
the human element, the ability of a human being to process
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information and put it into a form that makes this information 
useful to those who need it.
This leads us back to the human element in technology 
transfer, or 'humanware'. Humanware can be understood as 
consisting of that element of technology transfer that is not 
easily defined, however which can be identified in terms of the 
effectiveness of transfers involving contacts between people, as 
opposed to the simple transfer of machines or information. For 
years the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc have concentrated 
their efforts in the computer area on obtaining either technical 
data, or if possible actual computers and related peripherals. For 
years, in spite of successes in this area, it can be argued that 
they have been hindered in their efforts to make advances based 
on these acquisitions, in part at least because they have lacked 
this element, the element of human exposure that allows both the 
effective transfer of information and its implementation and use. 
While tremendous strides have been made in technology and the 
means by which information is transferred, man has been unable 
to improve on the single element that allows all of this 
information to be put to effective use-m an himself. In terms of 
understanding design philosophies, manufacturing processes, 
information management and distribution, and countless other
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areas relating to computers and every other field of technological 
endeavor, man remains the most efficient means of transferring 
technology. By placing artificial limits on the ability of 
scientists, technicians, academicians and others in Soviet 
science and industry to interact with their western counterparts 
in the past, the Soviets have themselves placed the greatest 
obstacle in the path of their successfully obtaining and making 
use of the technologies that the West has to offer.
Having come to this realization, it must also be noted that this 
situation, which has hampered Soviet efforts at obtaining 
western technology, is rapidly changing. Under the reforms 
implemented by Gorbachev, and as reflected in the figures for 
visits by foreign academics, businessmen and the like, there has 
been a tremendous increase in the number of contacts between 
East and West, both in the sciences and business in general and in 
the computer field in particular. While some areas still suffer 
from certain deficiencies, such as the lack of telecommunication 
equipment, these are mechanical deficiencies that can be 
overcome with time. The greater problem in the transfer of 
technological information, that of the limiting of human contacts 
and associations, is being overcome by the general philosophical
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change in the thinking of the Soviet leadership that allows and 
actually encourages such contacts between East and West. While 
the significance of this change may not yet be fully apparent, due 
both to the limited number of early contacts and the the lag time 
between this change and when the fruits of these contacts may 
begin to appear, the increase in their number signals both the 
importance that the Soviet Union attaches to these contacts and 
the possibility down the road for tremendous amounts of material 
to be transferred, and transferred in a very efficient manner. 
Whether the West is ready to allow this to take place, and in fact 
if the West is even in a position to keep it from occurring, 
becomes the final question that must be examined.
Sum m ary-The Significance for Export Controls
Little has been said about export controls in this section, for 
the simple reason that they have had very little to do with the 
items covered under this topic. While visa applications to 
western countries from the Soviet Union are screened, this has 
been mostly pro forma, to insure that known intelligence agents, 
terrorists or other undesirable agents are denied entry. 61 With a 
strong history of encouraging academic freedom, few prohibitions 
have been placed on Soviets specialists traveling in the West,
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aside from formally posted restricted areas. 62 Nor did there 
appear to be a reason for concern, since the numbers involved 
were extremely small. In terms of the hardware related to 
information transfer, CoCom restrictions did prohibit the 
transfer of some equipment required for upgrading 
communications, based on the claim that the same materials 
could be used to upgrade military command and control systems; 
however, recently the same relaxations that have allowed the 
shipment of formerly prohibited computer items have been 
applied to communications equipment as well. 63 The only area 
where export controls would seem to affect human transfers is in 
terms of restrictions on transferring manufacturing facilities for 
computer related technology, and even here, as reflected in many 
of the Joint Ventures that have been registered, assembly 
facilities that put together western supplied components are 
being established in the Soviet Union. 64
What this means with regard to the overall effectiveness of 
technology transfers is still more difficult to ascertain. Many 
would argue that increased exchanges between East and West can 
only help the status or relations between the two, by increasing 
understanding and cooperation. 65 At the same time 
improvements, such as those in the Soviet phone system, achieved
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through purchases of western telecommunications material, or 
the allowing of access to western data bases which do not 
contain classified material, in and of themselves do not seem to 
do any harm. Yet returning to the comment made at the beginning 
of this study, that the whole often has characteristics that are 
different from its parts, so too must the overall impact of these 
individual cases be examined in aggregate for their true potential 
to be realized. Thus, having looked at the individual pieces, it is 
time to reassemble the puzzle.
7 - 4 0
ENDNOTES
1 The Four Tigers refer to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, which are seen as representing a new and growing 
force in the world economy, especially in the area of advanced 
electronics. For an excellent book on Soviet relations with these 
and other countries in the region, see Gerald Segal, The Soviet 
Union and the Pacific. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).
2 The definition for know-how given by the Oxford Dictionary is 
"practical knowledge or skill". Used here, it refers to the ability 
to take the information and knowledge that had been acquired 
about computers and turn it into something that can be applied in 
such a way as to be of use to the Soviet economy. As with the 
explanation of what constitutes a successful technology transfer, 
know-how, to be of value, must be applied.
3 J. Fred Bucy, Chairman, “An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. 
Technology - A DOD Perspective,” Office of the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering, 1976, p. 5-7.
4 Ibid. The Bucy Report stresses the effectiveness of 'active' 
over 'passive' transfer mechanisms, referring to the degree of 
human involvement. Despite the differences in terms, the 
underlying concept is the same.
5 Philip Hanson, Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western 
Relations. Studies in Soviet History and Society, ed. R.W. Davis 
(London: MacMillian Press Ltd., 1981), p. 200.
6 For a complete history of the development of the Ryad, see 
Richard Judy, “The Riad Computers of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, 1970-1985: A Survey and Analysis,” Hudson 
Institute Report, 1986.
7 David A. Wellman, A Chip in the Bloc-Computer Technology in 
the Soviet Union. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1989), p. 94.
8 The Soviet chemical industry, as mentioned earlier, is a prime 
example. See Ronald Amann, “The chemical industry: its level of
7-41
modernity and technical sophistication,” The Technological Level 
of Soviet Industry, ed. Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper, and R.W.
Davis, (London: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 227-320.
9 For a summary of Soviet attempts in this area, see chapter 
eleven, "Univac-A Sputnik Shock For Moscow: The Eastern 
Electronics industry" in Jay Tuck's, High-Tech Espionage. (New 
York: St. Martain's Press, 1986), pp. 131-152.
10 Soviet citizens involved in trade and industry that have talked 
with the author have emphasized that they value human exchanges
and the opportunity to learn western production techniques as
much as acquiring actual pieces of equipment.
11 During the discussions held at a NATO conference on Soviet 
Science, attended by the author in 24-26 September 1986, this 
practice was noted by several academics who had had dealings 
with the Soviets under such circumstances. Specifically, the 
charge was made and substantiated by several people that the 
Soviets practiced a variation of the 'bait and switch’ tactic, 
where a given Soviet academic would be asked to a western 
conference because of his expertise in an area, but at the last 
second another, sometimes totally unknown representative would 
be sent in his place. While the aforementioned concern of the
Soviets over letting their first class scientists out of direct
control must have played a large part in these maneuvers, it must 
also be judged an overall loss both for the individuals involved 
and for the Soviet Union, in terms of the opportunities missed for 
true scholarly interchange and development.
12 Keith H. Hammond, Deidre A. Depke, and Richard Brandt, 
“Software: It’s a New Game,” Business W eek. 4 June 1990,
pp. 102-106.
13 During the same NATO conference referenced in endnote 11, it 
was noted that, in answer to an electronic questionaire 
distributed on a European academic computer net, more than forty 
responses were received from countries in Eastern Europe which 
no one previously thought had access to the network. The result 
was that Western European users learned quickly to be careful 
about what they put on their computers networks. It also 
demonstrated the interest that the East had in tying in to 
established western nets, even for perfectly legitimate uses.
7-42
14 Global Trends in Computer Technology and Their Impact on 
Export Control. Report to the National Academy of Sciences, 
(Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988), pp. 180.
15 Jan Vanous, Editor, “PlanEcon Report,” vol. VI, no. 17, 1990,
p. 2.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Mark Meredith, “Soviet Union's painful road to capitalism,” 
The Daily Telegraph. 25 February 1991, p. 29.
19 Jan Vanous, Editor, “PlanEcon Report,” vol. VI, no. 17, 1990,
p. 2.
20 Comment made to the author by a Soviet delegate to the 
Forum for U.S. Soviet Dialogue, held on 8-14 July 1990, at West 
Point, N.Y. Along with acquiring western production techniques, 
the Soviet Union is now attaching great importance to learning 
western business practices and management techniques as well. 
For an interesting description of a program that has been 
designed to meet this desire, see Paul D. Staudohr, “Welcome to 
Business 101, Comrades,” Personnel Journal. December 1990, pp. 
3 6 -4 3 .
21 Another comment made to the author during the Forum for U.S. 
Soviet Dialogue which has been made to other westerners doing 
business in the Soviet Union. The substance of the reasoning 
seems to be, that while the Soviets realize that there is a certain 
degree of risk involved in investing in the Soviet Union at this
time, they will look with favor on anyone willing to take that risk
now when foreign inputs are needed most, and that such risk
taking will be rewarded with special considerations both now and
in the future. It is interesting to note that while the Soviets 
seem to understand risk in these terms, as noted earlier they 
have very little conception of economic advantage as applied to 
investments. Political risk, in this sense, is far better 
understood than economic risk.
7-43
22 While credited as industrially being in better shape then the 
Soviet Union, recent stories about the attempts to modernize 
industry in what was formerly East German must surely have a 
sobering effect on anyone who is even mildly knowledgeable on 
the state of Soviet industry.
23 Figures from the first three auctions held in 1991 set 
exchange rates varying from 18 to 31 rubles to the dollar, with 
the number of rubles far exceeding the supply of hard currency 
offered at these rates. While a mechanism that may eventually 
allow foreign partners in Joint Ventures to change ruble profits 
into hard currency, this can hardly be seen as an encouraging sign 
for western firms with large ruble holdings. From the notes of 
Professor B.P. Pockney, based on information in Ekonomika i 
zhizn. 11 March 1991, pp. 16-17.
24 Quoted from a private letter to the author by Dr. Eric Novotny 
Vice President for International Marketing and Business 
Development, Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT).
He goes on to comment that, "...as the saying goes, in chaos there 
is supposed to be profit."
25 Though Soviet politicians continue to pursue this line, events 
relating to the war in the Middle East and the intervention by 
Soviet military forces in the Baltic republics in early 1991 have 
led western politicians to take a more cautious view of such 
pronouncements.
26 Relating to the line of reasoning put forward in endnote 21 
above, the author was told by a former official of the Soviet 
Ministry of Trade that while he realized that there were risks 
involved, he viewed the current situation as being ideal for any 
western firm to invest in the Soviet Union, since the present 
problems would be worked out, and eventually the economic 
potential of the Soviet Union, both in terms of resources and 
markets, would offer tremendous opportunities for anyone with 
the foresight to get in on the 'ground floor' of this development.
27 Recently there have been indications that some mechanism 
will be created to allow Joint Ventures to convert profits into 
hard currency, even if the ruble remains a non-convertible 
currency for the near future. Whether this is in response to the 
disappointing results of the initial currency auctions, or the
7-44
realization that if foreign investment is to be seriously pursued 
this issue must be resolved, is open to speculation.
28 Not only student exchanges, but faculty exchanges have 
increased as a result of the new relations between East and West. 
In a letter to the author from a faculty member of the University 
of Wisconsin, a member of Slavic Linguistics Department 
indicated that there is a continuous stream of Soviet academics 
looking for exchange positions, and who once they arrive, "are 
very reluctant to return." This raises another issue that, while 
outside of the realm of this study, is of great significance to the 
Soviet Union and its attempts at reform. With greater access to 
the West, more Soviet scientists and academics are traveling 
outside of the Soviet Union in hopes of finding a position so that 
they do not have to return. While a sensitive topic, the problem 
of a potential 'Brain Drain' has been acknowledged by some Soviet 
officials, as well as being noted in the West, and may become a 
very real concern if recently proposed changes to Soviet laws on 
passports and emigration are enacted. See, Gina Kolata, "Soviet 
Scientists Flock to U.S., Acting as Tonic for Colleges, " New York 
Times. 15 August 1990, pp. A-1, C-14.
29 The information on visa requests was provided by Ms. Victoria 
Prescott, Defense Intelligence Agency, during an interview 
conducted in Washington D.C on 18 July 1990.
30 A telephonic interview with Mrs. Anna Forey, Regional Officer 
for the Soviet Union, The British Council, conducted on 22 March 
1991, confirmed the general trends reflected in the American 
figures, specifically the tremendous rise in interest and numbers 
for Soviets academics wishing to visit Great Britain in the last 
several years. While she thought that no centralized figures were 
kept for such visits in the United Kingdom, she indicated that 
both the data kept by the British Council, as well as other 
organizations that she worked with bringing Soviet citizens to 
the United Kingdom, bore this out.
31 The case of the Latvian Computer Professor is good example. 
He first came to the attention of the author through a friend who 
met this individual at a 'MacWorld' Macintosh computer Trade Fair 
held in San Francisco, which traditionally highlights the latest in 
products and technologies for this particular computer.
7 - 4 5
32 The list described was part of a packet prepared for 
businessmen interested in dealing with the Soviet Union by the 
United States Department of Commerce and provided to the author 
by that Department in August 1990.
33 “International Exhibitions in the USSR,” Foreign Trade. June 
1990, front inside cover.
34 Georgiy Meizerov, TASS Correspondent, “Foreign Experts 
Attend Meeting on Reforms,” TASS news release, 11 July 1990.
35 While the use of anecdotal information may be questioned in 
some academic circles, its use in the case of the Soviet Union has 
achieved a certain degree of acceptance as a way of 
supplementing what is often scarce or partial data. In this case, 
the example is offered to show the ways in which personal 
contacts and exchanges of this type can be of tremendous benefit 
to the Soviet specialists involved, and in turn to the Soviet Union 
overall.
36 Interview conducted with a Latvian computer science 
professor conducted in New Windsor, NY on 24 April 1990.
37 A baud is defined as, "a unit of measurement that denotes the 
number of discrete signal elements, such as bits, that can be 
transmitted per second: for example, a device that transmits 300 
bits per second can also said to transmit at 300 baud." Webster's 
NewWorld Dictionary of Computer Terms. (New York: Prentice 
Hall Press, 1983), p.20.
38 Bucy, “An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology - A 
DOD Perspective,” pp. 4-8.
39 R. Tavast, “One Computer Is Good...,” Sovetskaya Estoniya. 2 
October 1984, p. 2, translated in JPRS-UST-004, 2 May 1985,
p. 87.
40 Global Trends in Computer Technology and Their Impact on 
Export Control, p. 180.
41 It should be noted here that there are probably Soviet military 
computer networks that have equal or possibly better capabilities
7-46
of those in the civilian sector, however such information is 
classified, and as such outside the scope of this work.
42 Global Trends in Computer Technology and Their Impact on 
Export Control, p. 183.
43 The Latvian professor of computer science reported that a 
demonstration of a computer net connecting his University with 
Academy of Sciences facilities in Moscow was attempted 
sometime in 1989; the system was on line for about two hours, 
during which time several test messages were transmitted, and 
the net was then shut down. Almost a year later, nothing more 
had been heard by him about the system.
44 Global Trends in Computer Technology and Their Impact on 
Export Control, p. 183.
45 “Siemens announces JV in digital telecommunications 
switches,” Financial Times. 22 June 1990, p. 28.
46 Roger Woolnough, “Alcatel rings up Soviet switch deal,” 
Electronic Engineering Times. 2 July 1990, p. 18.
47 Ibid.
48 "Communications JVs," Soviet Business & Trade, vol. XVII, no. 
11, 29 June 1989, p. 2.
49 Susanne Sternthal, “Ailing Soviet Phone System Is Trying to 
Ring in the New,” Insight. 6 August 1990, pp. 40-41.
50 Global Trends in Computer Technology and Their Impact on 
Export Control, p. 185.
51 Communications JV's” Soviet Business & Trade, vol. XVII, no. 
7, 29 April 1989, p. 2.
52 O. Smirnov, “Telecommunications Across the Ocean,” 
Sotsialisticheskaya industriya. no. 214, 17 September 1989, p. 3.
53 Ibid.
7-47
54 “Communications JV's,” Soviet Business & Trade, vol. XVI, 
no. 18, 9 October 1988, p. 1.
55 “Russian-Language Computer Magazine," Foreign Press Notes. 
22 July 1988, p. 2, citing a report in Moscow News, no. 26, 3-10  
July 1988, p. 7.
56 Gary Stix, “Do you wanna buy an ad,comrade?,” The Institute. 
February 1989,. p. 3.
57 Ibid.
58 Gary Taubes and Glen Garelik, “Soviet Science: How Good Is 
It?,” Discovery. August 1986, p. 42.
59 Alex Beam, “Russia Gropes For A Way To Enter The High-Tech 
Age,” Business W eek. 11 November 1985, p. 98.
60 It should be noted that there are two elements at work here. 
Access to information and technology embodied in material 
should, provided that the receiving group is capable in some form 
of integrating it, raise up the level of that group if only in that 
particular area. As in the case of the Soviet chemical industry, 
the importation of chemical plants allowed a jump in the level of 
technology, at least to the level represented by the equipment it 
received. However the ability to develop and generate new 
technologies based on what is received is a separate, though 
related issue. Thus freer access to western technology will 
probably allow the Soviet Union not to fall any further behind the 
West, as long as it has access. However to close the 'technology 
gap' requires more than mere copying, as the past history of 
computer development in the Soviet Union has shown.
61 It also must be added that each country has different entry 
requirements, screening procedures, and degrees of enforcement. 
The result is that there is no way of effectively telling how many 
Soviet citizens are in the West or what they are doing.
62 In what was a major battle over academic freedom involving 
Eastern Bloc personnel in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
University of Illinois was asked to restrict access to their 
supercomputer, llliac IV, (at the time one of the most powerful 
computers in the United States) for security reasons. After a
7 - 4 8
heated debate, the University declared that it would not issue a 
blanket restriction since this would infringe upon academic 
freedom, but would instead require researchers from Eastern Bloc 
nations to show that their research was non-defense related 
before allowing them to use the machine. While eventually 
resolved in this case, it points to a larger issue in that academic 
circles in the West tend to jealously guard the right of freedom in 
academic pursuit, and protest anything they view as undue 
government interference. This, in turn, causes additional 
problems in terms of monitoring exactly what is being done by 
Soviet and other foreign academics in the West.
63 Interview with Colonel John Carney, Military Advisor to the 
U.S. Delegation to CoCom, conducted at CoCom Headquarters,
Paris, on 18 February 1991. Colonel Carney indicated that the 
CoCom position on transfers of telecommunications was that 
upgrading of local area systems was now looked on favorably, but 
would continue to be banned where it was felt that these 
upgrades increased country-wide capabilities that might be used 
for military command and control networks.
64 “Western Computer and Microelectronic Joint Ventures with 
the USSR,” British Government Document, August 1989.
65 This philosophy is reflected in the charter of groups such as 
the Forum for U.S.-Soviet Dialogue. The Forum has organized 
meetings between Soviet and American citizens in all walks of 
life over the past 18 years on the belief that such exchanges 
increase understanding and cooperation between East and West.
7-49
CHAPTER 8--AN ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE CASE
OF SOVIET COMPUTERS
A Summary of the Parts
As should be apparent by now, the issues surrounding 
technology transfer, its methods, impact and the ways that have 
been employed to monitor and control such transfers, represent a 
complex set of variables whose relationship is not always clear, 
but whose aggregate impact can be immense. Using the scientific 
method, an analyst wishing to untangle and define these 
relationships might try to isolate these factors, and in a 
controlled environment vary one or more of them while keeping 
the rest constant, in order to determine the effect that each has 
upon the other and the part that each plays in making up the 
whole. Unfortunately, in real life such luxuries as a controlled 
experimental environment are seldom available to the researcher. 
Instead, he must do his best to break out pieces of the puzzle, 
examine each as to its nature, and then return them to the whole 
with, hopefully, a better understanding of how each piece relates 
to the other pieces and how they affect the overall nature of the 
phenomena being examined.
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Thus, having looked at individual pieces of the puzzle in the 
case of Soviet computers, it is necessary to step back and see 
how these pieces fit together. While hardware, software and 
information exchanges have each been examined individually, it 
should already be apparent that each of these areas is dependent 
to a great degree on the nature of the others, and that in some 
instances they contain elements that are common to all three. In 
one sense this makes the task more complex, but at the same 
time it should come as no surprise since very few things in real 
life are simple and allow themselves to be readily broken down 
for the benefit of the analyst. Technology transfer is a 
phenomenon whose parameters are shaped by real world 
considerations and constraints and it would be unrealistic to try 
to draw any serious conclusions about the nature of the whole 
solely by examining the parts. Therefore, the last step in this 
analysis is to reassemble the parts, to see how the changes in the 
approach towards the transfer of technology in the areas of 
hardware, software, and information technology may affect 
Soviet computer development as a whole.
Having said this, however, it still might be appropriate to 
begin with a review of the nature of each of these elements, in
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order not only to summarize the characteristics of each that have 
already been determined, but to gain a better idea of how each 
relates to the other. The results of this review will, in turn, lead 
to the discussion of the overall effect on the state of Soviet 
computer development and what this may mean for western 
efforts in the area of export control. If the changes brought about 
by the reforms increase the effectiveness of technology transfers 
in this area, and if the western goal continues to be to maintain a 
lead in these technologies, then it follows that the measures 
employed by the current export control regimes will have to be 
modified to meet these changing circumstances.
Hardware
The most tangible of the three elements of technology transfer 
in the computer area is hardware, in that it is a physical entity, 
something that can be seen, touched and dealt with in terms that 
are easily comprehended by the average individual. It is also the 
element that has received the majority of the attention from the 
export control regimes, in part because it represents the 
embodiment of computer technology but also because, unlike 
software and information flow in general, it has been far easier 
to deal with. In some respects, the emphasis on hardware seems
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well justified; the evolution of the early computer industry in 
both the East and the West was measured in the capability of 
machines, with the desire always being for computers that were 
bigger (in terms of capacity), smaller (in terms of size), faster 
and more capable. Those not possessing such machines could not 
maintain themselves on the cutting edge of the field, therefore 
controls that prevented access to such machines seemed to make 
sense if the goal was to maintain a technological lead. At the 
same time, from a Soviet perspective, the drive to catch up 
caused them to focus attempts at obtaining the latest hardware. 
What resulted was a classic cat and mouse game, with the West 
trying to impose restrictions on hardware transfers and the 
Soviet Union trying to overcome them.
While the successes and failures of each side in this effort can 
be argued, it is generally accepted that the Soviet Union has never 
been able to catch up with the West through its efforts to obtain 
and incorporate western computer hardware. Some would even go 
so far as to say that this, in itself, shows the effectiveness of 
western controls on hardware transfers, and that in fact the 
West’s goal of limiting Soviet computer development has been 
achieved. 1 Based on this examination, however, this argument
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seems overstated. In spite of export controls, the Soviet Union 
has been able to obtain a significant amount of computer 
hardware over the years, both through legal and illicit means. 2 
The fact that the Soviets were able to duplicate an entire set of 
IBM computers in their Ryad series, as well as make copies of 
numerous other pieces of western equipment, points to their 
achievements in this field. 3 The fact that in spite of these 
successes, the Soviet Union is little better off for its efforts 
than when it started, and has never achieved the goal of catching 
up with the West, leads to the conclusion that it requires more 
than access to hardware to develop and maintain a state-of-the- 
art computer capability.
The possible reasons for the Soviet failure in this area are 
many and varied. Part of the answer can be attributed to 
bureaucratic problems and the fragmented nature of the Soviet 
computer industry. Part of the answer rests in the failure to 
successfully incorporate the technology which they were able to 
obtain into their existing industrial system. Part of the answer 
lies in the inefficiencies of the system itself, the inability to 
learn from what was obtained as well as expand upon and improve 
domestic capability based on transferred technology. Finally, 
part of the answer can be tied to the inability to translate
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advances in research into manufacturing capability, always a 
weak point in Soviet industry. All this led to the failure to mass 
produce computers and their peripherals with adequate quality 
and reliability to put them into widespread use, thus hindering 
further development and innovation, as well as limiting the 
growth of a Soviet computer culture similar to the one that has 
spurred computer development in the West. Whatever the reasons 
one may choose to attach, the fact remains that the Soviet Union 
has failed to take full advantage of the hardware which has been 
obtained from the West, as reflected in the failure to close the 
'technology gap' in computers. 4
What this has to say about the effectiveness of export controls 
may be open to interpretation, however, it seems at least 
plausible to argue that the Soviet failure to catch up with the 
West has not been the result of western export controls on 
computer hardware, as much as the Soviet Union's own inability 
to use western technology to close the gap. All too many 
examples exist where even when the Soviet Union has had access 
to western technology, it has either been unable to make use of it 
or, as in the case of Toshiba, the utility that has been achieved 
from western inputs has been limited and has not contributed 
greatly to overall Soviet computing capabilities. While it might
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be stretching a point, it can even be argued that export controls 
have not been necessary, simply because even if the Soviets had 
been able to import everything that they wanted, they would not 
have been able to make use of this material in improving their 
capabilities, s More realistically, it seems reasonable to state 
that the Soviet Union’s own weaknesses in the computer area have 
been a far greater limiting factor in their development than the
lack of access to up-to-date western technology brought about by
*
export controls from the West.
Applying what has been observed above to the policies of 
reform and their results, it is significant to note that while 
Soviet interest in obtaining western computer hardware has not 
changed, their approach to obtaining this hardware has, thus 
increasing the impact it may have on Soviet computing overall. 6 
Earlier Soviet practices centered around obtaining models of 
western computers and reverse engineering them for Soviet 
domestic production, a slow process that suffered both because 
of the difficulties involved as well as the failings in Soviet 
manufacturing capabilities. Now, with the general change in 
Soviet attitudes and the corresponding response from the West in 
terms of loosening export restrictions, 7 the Soviet Union has
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access to a ready supply of relatively inexpensive western 
computers. 8 While this does little for improving the top end of 
Soviet computer capabilities where western imports are still 
restricted, it does foster a wider availability of computers 
within the Soviet Union, including those for use in education, 
business and scientific research. Further, Joint Ventures for 
production of western computers on Soviet soil stand to upgrade 
the Soviet Union's domestic computer industry by introducing 
western production methods and quality standards. While still in 
its embryonic stage, the potential for increasing the number and 
type of computers available in the Soviet Union cannot be 
dismissed. 9 if, as one source states, "the cornerstone of 
Gorbachev's technology program is a plan to 'computerize' the 
economy," 10 then these steps to obtain a sufficient supply of 
computer hardware must be viewed as a key element in this 
entire process.
S oftw are
As has been shown, software exhibits a different set of 
characteristics relating to technology transfer, as well as a 
different set of problems concerning its monitoring and control. 
Part information in terms of the material that it conveys, part
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physical entity because some means is necessary to store and 
transmit the information it entails, and part intellectual property 
because its creation and development is so clearly tied to the 
individual efforts of the programmer, software is difficult to 
quantify simply because of the various aspects that comprise its 
nature. It is also this elusive nature that has caused problems 
with its control. In something of a parody of the person who 
hopes that by ignoring his problems they will somehow go away, 
export control regimes have tended to shy away from trying to 
create specific measures for controlling software transfers 
simply because of the difficulty involved in enforcing such 
controls. 11
As has also been shown, software is a critical element in 
computer development; without it, all the sophisticated hardware 
in the world is next to useless. However it is not a unitary 
entity, in that without the proper hardware to run the software, 
it is just as useless as hardware without software. Each alone is 
helpless without the other; the two must act to complement one 
another and must be present for any computer system to work. 
This has led to the argument that since the efforts to control the 
transfer of hardware have been so successful, there is no real 
need to worry about monitoring software transfers. The logic
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here follows the path that if both hardware and software are 
needed for computers to operate effectively, then prohibiting one 
element lessens or even eliminates the need to attempt to control 
the other, and since software is inherently more difficult to 
control, then why not concentrate all one's efforts on controlling 
hardware? 12
While this sort of reasoning is appealing in terms of 
simplifying the lives of those charged with controlling the 
transfer of technology, it is also spurious in that it rests on what 
may prove to be a false assumption, that western efforts at 
controlling the flow of computer hardware have been and will 
continue to be successful. This type of reasoning could also lead 
to serious problems as Soviet access to western hardware 
increases due to the lessening of export restrictions. 13 in the 
past, Soviet software development has suffered from many of the 
same problems that have plagued hardware development, 
including a lack of machines, lack of coordination among the 
official organizations responsible for computers in the Soviet 
Union, lack of commercial motivation and a lack of interaction, 
both with domestic developers and foreign. This last point has 
become particularly significant, as Soviet programmers have
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increasingly been expected to develop software for computers 
based on foreign designs and using foreign based languages. Now, 
however, many of these circumstances appear to be changing 
under the reforms, and with these changes the utility and appeal 
of using western software is increasing. The question that 
western specialists are left to deal with is still one of how to 
control the transfer of software, especially in the wake of these 
new demands?
From the Soviet perspective, software development serves as 
an interesting showcase not only of the weaknesses of the Soviet 
system, but of some of its strengths. As has already been noted, 
the Soviet Union has devoted tremendous resources to software 
development, and in some cases has been rewarded by a number of 
successes, n  In other cases, the relative isolation of Eastern 
Bloc software developers has led to the development of 
approaches to writing software that are now prized in the West, 
as well as cases where software solutions have been devised to 
overcome hardware deficiencies. 15' As access to the West 
increases, there is the possibility that these talents will 
disappear, however, it is just as viable to argue that access to 
the West will allow the best of both worlds, and that 
programmers will still maintain the unique skills that come from
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their particular upbringing, but with access to new and more 
powerful computers they will be able to create new hybrids in the 
area of software. Wider access to computers throughout the 
economy will also increase the demand for domestic software, 
further assisting the development of programming skills. Finally, 
ties to western sources, as in the case of hardware, will allow 
the Soviet Union to follow the latest in software developments 
and access new programs without the traditional lag time that 
was often brought about by the lack of direct access in the past.
Thus, the prospects for advances in Soviet software 
development seem good. In one respect, reform in the software 
field may not result in a substantial jump in Soviet capabilities, 
simply because they already have demonstrated at least the basis 
for a strong domestic software industry. On the other hand, these 
skills will only increase as greater integration with the West is 
achieved. To argue that Soviet software and those individuals who 
create that software are inferior to those in the West reflects the 
erroneous perception that people with access to inferior 
technology are somehow themselves inferior. Given the increased 
access to western systems and techniques, there is every reason to 
believe that while Soviet programmers in the past have been at a 
disadvantage, overcoming this disadvantage will only be a matter
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of time. In the words of one Soviet mathematician, "Our brains are 
no worse than yours...We just don't have any equipment to work 
with." 16 Given access to sufficient computers, Soviet software 
could be every bit as effective as its western counterpart.
Information Transfers and the Human Element
Returning to the original discussions about the nature of 
technology transfers, historically such transfers have been 
brought about by the interaction of people and their ideas. While 
technology can be codified in documents, described in writing and 
visually represented in drawings, it is still most effectively 
conveyed by human interchange. Technology itself has greatly 
aided the process of exchanging documentation; with 
telecommunication, fax and data links, information can be 
transferred in quantities and at speeds never before imagined. 
What technology has been unable to do, however, is overcome or 
replace the need for an individual to comprehend the 
technological processes involved, something that is essential 
before they can be recreated and then improved upon or otherwise 
adapted for a particular use. To do this requires the interaction 
of individuals, and it is here that the Soviet Union traditionally
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has suffered its greatest problems in the transfer of technology.
What is ironic about this situation with regard to export 
control, is that the Soviet Union’s problems in this area have 
come about not so much through western restrictions, as through 
Soviet policies themselves. From the 1920's and Stalin’s program 
of developing 'socialism in one country' onward, the Soviet Union 
has been wary of contacts with the outside world and has limited 
these contacts out of fear of what might be given to the West, 
what the West might find out about Soviet weaknesses, and even 
what the results might be of Soviet citizens being exposed to the 
realities of life outside the Soviet Union rather than the pictures 
of such life that the Soviet government wished to convey. While 
the rationales for such prohibitions on contacts carry a certain 
validity from the Soviet point of view, what was not understood 
at the time was the disadvantage that these policies placed the 
Soviet Union at, especially in the areas of science and technology. 
While autarky might appear to be desirable in terms of limiting 
foreign dependency, it also led to weakness in terms of keeping 
up with the rest of the world, especially in areas where rapid 
changes were taking place. When the Soviet government realized 
that it was falling behind in the area of advanced technology, it 
tried to take advantage of what was available in the West in
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terms of written material, documents and even representative 
examples of the products of technology, while still maintaining 
the limits on human interchange between the two systems. The 
scale of these efforts at obtaining information from the West and 
then trying to reproduce the processes and products reflected in 
this information, stand as testimony to the seriousness of these 
attempts. Yet these efforts either failed or had only limited 
success, as can be seen in the overall result that the Soviet Union 
has continually fallen behind the West in areas were it has sought 
to catch up by copying or adapting western technology.
Based on what has been seen, it can be argued that one of the 
primary reasons for this is the failure to recognize the 
importance of the human element in technology transfer. As long 
as the Soviet Union has continued to limit and prohibit contacts 
between Soviet citizens and their counterparts in the West, they 
have never been able to effectively take advantage of and 
incorporate all that the West had to offer in terms of advanced 
technology. This failure can also be tied to the limits placed on 
the interchange of ideas within the Soviet academic and 
scientific community itself. A product of over seventy years of a 
society where the ability to exchange information and ideas was 
severely constrained, not only was contact with the West limited,
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but communication within Soviet society as well. Even in the 
case of defense related industries, where the best scientists and 
engineers were traditionally placed, rigid compartmentalization 
prohibited those ideas that were developed from receiving the 
widespread dissemination that would have allowed them to have a 
far greater impact on society as a whole. The failure in the past 
to recognize the importance of human contact and the exchange of 
ideas, in effect, preordained failure in attempts at increasing 
Soviet capabilities across the wide spectrum of the Soviet 
economy. In the words of one commentator, "Perhaps the biggest 
factor preventing the USSR from competing scientifically with 
the West is the lack of a free flow of ideas." 17
Applied to the case of Soviet computers, it can be seen where 
the failure to allow for this human element in these transfers has 
hindered the attempts to effectively utilize foreign technology in 
the past. In spite of Soviet efforts to obtain and benefit from 
western computer technology from the mid-sixties onward, they 
have continued to fall behind. It has been argued that this has 
been due, in fact, to the lack of knowledge and skill in putting the 
information that has been gained into use, as much as limitations 
on access to foreign material caused by export controls. Part of
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the problem comes form the nature of the Soviet system and 
those weaknesses that have already been discussed. Part of the 
problem, however, is that once information was obtained, it still 
had to be 'digested', i.e. put into a comprehensible form before it 
could be put to use, leading to delays in the application of this 
information. One of the ways that this time lag can be overcome 
is through integration into the process of information 
development and transfer itself, that is, rather than standing on 
the outside and merely observing what is going on, becoming an 
active participant. As long as the Soviet Union remained on the 
receiving end of the technological development process, waiting 
for the end results and then trying to apply them in the field of 
computers as well as other areas, it could not possibly hope to 
keep up with the West. At the same time, the decision to divert 
resources from computer development in the fifties stopped the 
growth of the infrastructure needed to continue development in 
this field domestically, while the decision to borrow from the 
West rather than go back and develop such an infrastructure in 
the sixties and seventies only compounded the problem. The 
answer to this dilemma is that of integration. Once Soviet 
computer specialists are allowed to integrate with the West, 
they will not only be able to take better advantage of western 
developments, but they will become part of that developmental
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process, be able to develop their own skills, and finally with 
sufficient material support and experience, will be able to 
generate technology on their own. In this respect, it is precisely 
the opportunity to achieve this type of integration that may be 
the greatest accomplishment, to date, of the current economic 
reform s.
A Question of Integration
Having looked at each of these areas of computer technology in 
terms of the economic reforms, it is also possible to summarize 
the relationship of each to the question of export control. With 
regard to hardware, export controls in the past have probably 
been fairly effective in keeping the most capable and latest 
computer hardware from reaching the Soviet Union, however 
based on the Soviets' poor track record for using the hardware 
which they did obtain, it is doubtful that even if they did have 
access to this latest technology, it would have made a 
substantial difference in their level of computer development. 
The same can be said about software; high end sophisticated 
programs probably have been protected by export controls, while 
the sheer difficulty in monitoring lower end software packages, 
even if on the control list, allowed the Soviet Union access to a
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substantial amount of material. Again, however, this led to little 
or no substantive increase in Soviet capabilities. The Soviet 
inability to gain from western inputs in these first two 
categories revolves around the third area, that of information 
transfer and human inputs, where the reluctance to allow 
contacts between Soviet specialists and those of the West were 
as responsible for the problems in this area as any restrictions 
imposed by export controls. It is this last category that is at 
once the most significant and the most ironic, for while well 
intended, western export controls have probably been of 
secondary importance in limiting the effectiveness of technology 
transfers when compared to the Soviet reluctance to allow 
integration of their specialists with the West, which might have 
resolved many of the problems they faced while allowing them to 
more effectively take advantage of western hardware and 
softw are .
The policies prohibiting such integration, however, are 
changing. Whether the Soviet Union consciously recognized the 
need for such integration through reasoned thought, or has come 
to this realization through mere happenstance, the change in 
Soviet policies in this area cannot be questioned. As has been
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seen, one of the key elements in Gorbachev's overall drive for 
restructuring is the increased use of western technology and 
integration with the West, to act as the bridge over which his 
technology starved nation can pass into the 21st century. This, in 
turn, has led to a lessening of the former restrictions and a 
significant increase in Soviet contacts with the West. While it is 
impossible to quantify all of these contacts in terms of what 
they achieve, at the same time it would be difficult to argue that 
these contacts will not result in a significant increase in the 
amount of information that is transferred to the Soviet Union via 
a medium that will increase in the ability of the Soviets to make 
better use of this information. As has been seen in the past, 
information alone has not provided the solution to the problems 
that the Soviets face, either in the specific area of computers or 
in the broader realm of science and technology. By incorporating 
the human factor into their efforts in this area, the Soviets have 
provided a key element that has been missing in the past, one that 
is essential to making technology transfers truly effective. 
Combined with other changes designed to overcome what have 
been traditional problems with the Soviet economy, the results, 
in time, could lead to a significant increase in the Soviet ability 
to make use of foreign technology and thus increase their overall 
level of economic development.
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While at first deceptively simple in its appearance and 
formulation, the significance of this change should not be 
underestimated. In spite of some twenty years of effort at 
obtaining and incorporating western technology as a means of 
bolstering their own computer field, the Soviet record in this 
area has been lackluster at best. At the same time, countries 
such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and even India and Pakistan 
have developed thriving computer industries, partly because of 
their domestic economic structure, but more importantly because 
of their ability to interact with the rest of the technically 
developed world. One would be hard pressed to argue that these 
countries have any inherent advantage in native intelligence or 
skills, or that their efforts have been any more pronounced then 
those of the Soviet Union in the field of computers. The features 
that stands out as different, however, are that their industries 
were able to integrate with the more technologically developed 
countries in this area, their students were able to study in 
western universities, and their businessmen were able to 
establish contacts and contracts in the West. Once these ties 
were established, in was then a matter of keeping up with the 
current technological developments abroad, while developing an 
independent infrastructure at home, that eventually allowed them
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to begin to make technological advances and innovations on their 
own. Combined with other factors, including low labor costs, 
external investment, and government intervention to protect 
these fledgling efforts until they had developed sufficiently to be 
able to compete in the world market, some of these countries 
were able to advance to the point that they now challenge, and in 
some cases have surpassed, the West, just as predicted in Kurth's 
model for colonial development. 18 All this can be attributed, in 
large measure, to the free exchange of information and the 
interaction of people dealing in these areas, as well as the 
market system that fostered this development through 
competition and incentives. Previously, neither of these 
conditions existed in the Soviet Union; now, however, both are 
actively being pursued. 19
The significance of the other elements called for by the 
reforms cannot to be overlooked either, as they are 
complimentary and designed to assist in bringing about the same 
goals. Not only do Joint Ventures encourage integration, but in 
real terms they may help in overcoming the material shortages, in 
terms of hardware, that have plagued computer development. 
Education programs, once sufficient computers are available to
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support them, could begin to produce a generation of computer 
literate students ready to carry their skills into the work force. 
Efforts at decentralization, breaking up of ministerial control and 
encouraging of initiative from below, all will contribute to an 
environment in which individual efforts can bear fruit, where 
earlier none was present. Finally, the policies of reform in the 
Soviet Union have not only set about to change the way that the 
Soviets deal with the rest of the world in the areas of science, 
trade and technology. They have brought about a revolution at 
home, a revolution that, given time, may change those very 
elements of the economic and social structure that have for so 
long hindered the effective incorporation of technology into 
Soviet society. One need only look at the stories of new 
information services, cooperatives and even political offices 
bristling with computers and other electronic technology to know 
that in spite of all the obstacles in their path, the Soviets are 
making rapid strides to enter into the information revolution. 20
While there are some who would argue that the Soviet Union is 
so far behind in the area of computers that it will never be able 
to catch up with the West, such arguments may well prove to be a 
serious underestimation of Soviet capabilities, with potentially 
adverse consequences should the Soviet Union turn away from the
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away from the path of seeking better relations with the West. If 
countries such as South Korea and India can become major actors 
in the world computing arena in a matter of twenty years, there 
is no reason to believe that the Soviets cannot as well. While 
traditional logic would argue that it will take the Soviets a fairly 
substantial amount of time to make up all of the ground they have 
already lost, technology itself may help to cut the time that is 
needed to recover from their early problems. What is more, the 
inability or unwillingness of westerners to realize what is taking 
place and the potential that changes in Soviet policy in this area 
may hold, represents a type of intransigence that can be likened 
to that shown by the Soviets in former times. Just as the race 
goes to those who are swift, so the lead not only in the computer 
field but in technology in general will go to those who have the 
fewest preconceived notions about what is possible and what is 
not, to those who are wiling to explore without reservations or 
biases, and to those who are willing to allow that things formerly 
not considered possible, can, in fact, take place.
Assembling The Whole--The Need For An Infrastructure 21
To understand why technology transfer, as seen during the 
Gorbachev era, may eventually play a significant part in improving
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Soviet computing where it has not done so before, one must 
return to the earlier discussions of the failings of the computer 
establishment as a whole, in order to see how the current 
initiatives address these failings. While there are many 
weaknesses in the Soviet computer industry, the underlying one, 
that to some degree takes into account all the others, is the 
failure to establish a computer infrastructure capable of 
sustaining independent development in this area. It should be 
remembered that through the second generation of computer 
development, the Soviets did have the beginnings of such an 
infrastructure and were able to keep up with, and in some areas 
were even able to surpass, the West in their early efforts. While 
it is true that in comparison with today’s standards these efforts 
were small and unsophisticated, they nonetheless did represent 
the cutting edge of computer technology at the time, and the 
Soviet Union through its own initiative was able to do very well.
It was only with the diversion of resources to other areas that 
this development was curtailed, and with it the development and 
maintenance of the research and development facilities, academic 
programs, manufacturing concerns and trained specialists that 
would be needed for further growth. 22 When priority was 
returned to the computer sector in the sixties, there were
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literally not enough people and materials to carry out the work 
that needed to be done. Further, when the decision was made to 
concentrate on obtaining and integrating western computer 
technology, what infrastructure there was, was assigned to this 
task, leaving little time or resources for developing domestic 
efforts. 23 The failure to effectively make use of western 
technology, reflected in the failure to integrate, reproduce, 
innovate from and improve upon imported technology, compounded 
the problems the Soviet Union faced, causing it to fall even 
further behind the West. This failure was made manifest as 
technological advances in the West, suffering none of these 
problems and enjoying an ever expanding computer infrastructure 
of its own, blossomed exponentially.
While the Soviet Union has repeatedly sought to advance its 
own level of development by the use of western technology, these 
efforts were hampered by the ways in which technology was 
obtained as much as by western attempts at blocking these 
efforts. In seeking western hardware and then copying and 
integrating this hardware into their own system, the Soviets 
encountered several problems. One, in fact, was the difficulty in 
obtaining the hardware that they desired, though this was not 
always due to export controls. 24 Once they obtained this
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hardware, however, they had to determine how it was 
manufactured, duplicate the process, and finally integrate what 
were essentially foreign designs with Soviet systems that were 
built along different lines. Another problem was that by placing 
restrictions on Soviet scientists and manufactures that 
prevented them from interacting with their western 
counterparts, Soviet authorities were hindering the very contacts 
that not only might have eased the assimilation process with 
regard to hardware, but would have allowed the transfer of the 
principles that went into the hardware's design and operation. In 
sum, the Soviet computer community suffered from two major 
failings; first they were never permitted to develop the 
infrastructure that would have allowed them to create and evolve 
their own designs and systems, and second, when they were told 
to borrow from the West, they were never given the opportunity 
to develop the contacts necessary to fully understand and 
assimilate the western systems. The situation is analogous to 
the earlier mentioned pattern of colonial development, where a 
developing country is given a technologically advanced product by 
a developed nation. The former may be able to learn how to use 
this product, but until an indigenous infrastructure is developed 
that can build, supply and support this product, the developing 
country will never be independent of its supplier, and the
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technology that went into the creation of the product cannot be 
considered to have been effectively transferred from one to the 
other.
While the failure to create a computer infrastructure has long 
been recognized in the Soviet Union, 25 jt is only with the current 
reforms that conditions have been created which, given time, may 
allow a computer infrastructure to develop. The major difference 
between current efforts at overcoming the problems that the 
Soviet Union face and earlier attempts, comes down to the shift 
in Soviet philosophy that seeks not only Western technology in 
terms of hardware and software, but to increase the human 
contacts that go along with and assist these transfers. As has 
been shown, this can take many forms, either in terms of Joint 
Ventures, scientific meetings and exchanges, increased 
educational opportunities or any other of a number of vehicles 
that take advantage of and emphasize human interaction between 
East and West. Since human contact is one of the most effective 
ways of transferring technology so that it is successfully 
assimilated, increasing such contacts will only increase the 
benefit that is achieved from such transfers. 26 Not only is the 
encouragement of such contacts in stark contrast to previous
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Soviet policies, but the scale on which such interchanges are 
being proposed has never been seen before in relations with the 
Soviet Union. 27 The long term consequence of this change may 
well be that this greater access and integration will allow the 
Soviets to assimilate the technology needed to establish an 
infrastructure of their own in the computer field, an 
infrastructure that, once established, will be able to develop 
technology on its own, giving the Soviet Union a computing 
capability no longer dependent upon inputs from the West.
Building An Infrastructure-How It Could Be Accomplished
The nature of the process by which a computing infrastructure 
would come about is complex, and could take years, possibly even 
decades to achieve. 28 still, in terms of developing an 
infrastructure, the process would be shorter than if the Soviet 
Union tried to accomplish this entirely on its own. If one goes 
back to the arguments of Lebedev and others in the sixties, 
building an independent infrastructure in this manner was called 
for along with developing domestic computers without western 
inputs, thus insuring Soviet independence from the West. 29 At 
the time, the counter argument was that to do so would take too 
long, be too expensive both in terms of cost and resources, and
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would ignore much that had already been done in this field in the 
West. Western inputs, the counter argument ran, could be of use 
in closing the gap between Soviet and western computing. The 
same argument can be made today, and in fact is even more 
relevant, given the tremendous advances that have been made in 
western technology and the chronic shortages of computers in the 
East. The previous failure of the Soviets to effectively establish 
an infrastructure using western inputs can be attributed in no 
small measure to the failure to involve humans actively in the 
transfer process, and instead concentrating almost exclusively on 
hardware and technical documentation, which did little to 
establish the type of knowledge and know-how needed to 
effectively assimilate western technology. The combination of 
greater access to hardware at home, greater contacts abroad and 
freer information flow both at home and from abroad, may allow 
this attempt to succeed.
Just how such an infrastructure could be developed in the 
present context is open to a certain amount of conjecture, simply 
because it would be an evolutionary process, without specific 
milestones. However several elements can be identified which, 
by their presence, may be seen as essential in establishing the 
preconditions for such an infrastructure. The first of these is
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access to large numbers of computers and amounts of software, 
necessary for the development of a cadre of trained and qualified 
computer personnel. One of the conditions that spurred the 
development of computers in the West was the 'computer culture' 
that evolved because of easy access to computers. 30 The 
widespread availability of computers in schools, businesses and 
industry, and the resulting number of people who are computer 
literate, have had a tremendous impact on the ease with which 
new ideas, equipment and applications are developed and accepted 
in the West. The Soviets are no less capable than their western 
counterparts, however the limited access they have had to 
computers has slowed the development of a similar culture in 
their country, and thus slowed the overall course of computer 
development. 31 Now, however, the lifting of import restrictions 
and potential for improving domestic computer production 
facilities through Joint Ventures and other associations, should 
mean a substantial increase in the numbers of computers 
available in the Soviet Union during the next several years. 
Availability, in turn, will lead to increasing familiarity and 
acceptance, and eventually to the ability to modify and develop 
both hardware and software independent of western inputs. In 
short, the broader the use and acceptance of computers in the
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Soviet Union, the broader the basis for an independent computing 
infrastructure.
Manufacturing procedures as well as modern efficient 
computer production facilities are an area which stands to gain 
by the new openness and increasing ties to the West. Long the 
Achilles heel of Soviet industry, not only in computers but in 
most areas of high technology, the primary failure of Soviet 
manufacturing has not been that it could not produce limited 
numbers of high technology products, but that it could not produce 
and distribute goods in mass with an acceptable level of 
reliability. 32 Even production in the military related sector, or 
"A" economy, while meeting reliability standards, suffered to a 
degree from those problems endemic to Soviet industry, which 
were overcome only by methods and procedures that flew in the 
face of western concepts of efficiency. 33 The problems with 
shifting production of these military plants to the civilian 
sector, or conversion as this process is known, has done much to 
show the true nature of what was thought to be the one efficient 
part of the Soviet economy. 34 Yet in this area Joint Ventures, 
combining western know-how and technology with Soviet raw 
materials and labor, have shown that Soviet industry can be as 
productive and efficient as western concerns. In the past several
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years, stories have begun to appear on how, aided by western 
investment and technical assistance, various Soviet 
manufacturing firms are showing improvements in their ability to 
produce. 35 in the area of computers, as has been seen, a number 
of agreements have been reached providing for western 
assistance in establishing computer production facilities on 
Soviet soil. The beginning of the shift to an economy based on 
market principles, plus adoption of western procedures, can only 
help in this area. Given the proper incentives, there is little 
reason to believe that eventually, Soviet industry is not fully 
capable of producing adequate goods in sufficient quantities to 
meet domestic demands. In the area of computers, this would go 
a long way towards eliminating the shortages in hardware that 
have always been a limiting factor, as well as establishing the 
manufacturing base that would be an essential part of a computer 
infrastructure. 36
The establishment of a pool of scientists and technicians that 
would allow the Soviet Union to staff and support an independent 
computer infrastructure, along with sufficient research 
institutions and manufacturing facilities, is a function of the 
degree to which human integration and interaction exists in these 
areas. If the Soviet Union is to take full advantage of what the
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West has to offer, then it must be willing to let its personnel be 
trained in western ways and assimilate western concepts of 
management, design, and development that are associated with 
the computer revolution. In the past, this has not been the case, 
with the result that whatever western material was obtained, it 
was seldom effectively put to use, and the lessons to be learned 
from it often went to waste. Now, however, with the open 
encouragement of integration, in terms of academic, scientific 
and industrial exchanges, the Soviets stand to develop a cadre of 
personnel that not only will be able to more effectively use that 
which is received from the West, but may eventually be able to 
apply this expertise in creating technologies of their own. Human 
interaction again could prove its worth.
All these elements combined could provide the Soviet Union 
with solutions to the problems that it faces in terms of the 
ability to incorporate and generate technology, both in the area of 
computers and in the broader spectrum of its scientific and 
industrial communities. Greater access to western computers 
and computer related hardware and software provide a short term 
solution to many of the problems that have plagued the Soviet 
computer industry from its inception. Joint Ventures, co­
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production facilities and increased interaction with the West and 
the computing infrastructure that already exists there, offers the 
possibility of a longer term solution, either by becoming 
intertwined with these western institutions, or by paralleling 
them and duplicating their functions. Through such a process, the 
Soviets stand to gain the infrastructure that they have always 
lacked in this area, and which, in turn, has always hindered their 
development. The key element in all this is the human one, for 
only through human interaction on a broad scale can this come 
about; only through human interaction can the necessary 
technologies and know-how be effectively transferred. Only once 
an effective computer infrastructure is established, once the 
computers and the trained people are present in sufficient 
numbers, will the Soviets be able to achieve their long sought 
after goal of being able keep up with the West in this area. In 
what may be the ultimate irony of Soviet computer development, 
integration with the West may be the only path by which the 
Soviet Union can achieve the the infrastructure needed to allow 
the country to eventually achieve an independent computing 
capability. 37
In summary, the process outlined above hinges on the question 
of integration. The failure of the Soviet Union in the past to
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integrate with the West, not only in the field of computers but in 
all areas of technology and science, has been one of the reasons 
for its failure to keep up with the West in these fields. The 
realization of what has been lost because of this has brought 
about a reversal in previous Soviet policies, and a drive not only 
to gain from the West that which it has to offer, but to integrate 
generally with the West, so that the benefits from integration 
can be institutionalized and the Soviet Union will no longer be 
subject to falling behind due either to self-imposed restrictions, 
or restrictions imposed from without. This desire to integrate 
has led the Soviets to modify not only their actions in the 
international political arena, but the ways in which they 
traditionally have have done business, bringing new respect for 
western norms such as in the area of copyrights and licensing 
agreements, that previously were shunned or ignored. In doing 
this, the Soviets have had to pay a certain price, but it is a price 
they seem willing to absorb in return for the advantages that they 
feel they will receive. The question, from the western 
perspective, becomes one of whether it is in the West’s best 
interests to encourage this trend, or even just to stand by and 
tacitly let it take place, or whether the potential costs to the 
West outweigh that which may be gained.
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The Implications For Export Controls-The Need For A New 
Approach
All this leads back to the question of export controls, their 
utility, and even their viability under the present circumstances. 
The rate at which change has occurred in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe in the past five years has gone beyond what anyone 
could possibly have imagined in 1985. In the broad area of East- 
West relations and the world order in general, a shift has 
occurred that has brought into question many of the underlying 
beliefs and guidelines that governed relationships between 
nations and political alliances for over forty years. At the 
domestic level in the Soviet Union, the policies of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, while neither fully implemented and still questioned 
as to their ability to correct the problems brought about by 
seventy years of economic and political mismanagement, have 
started the Soviet Union along a road from which it will be 
difficult at best, if not impossible, to return to previous policies. 
These changes, as reflected in the changes that have been 
outlined in the area of technology and those pertaining 
specifically to Soviet computing, have brought the Soviet Union 
into a new situation with regards to its relationships with the
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West, with the Soviets in many cases showing remarkable 
flexibility and quickness in their willingness to exploit the 
opportunities that are becoming available to them. Less flexible, 
however, has been the western response, especially in those 
areas where old ideas, and the policies based on those ideas, are 
firmly entrenched. This is particularly true in the case of export 
controls, and it forms the basis of a dilemma facing western 
nations and their policy makers.
The traditional approach toward export control and limiting 
the flow of technology from West to East has been one of denial. 
Through the CoCom list and the efforts of the member nations, 
the transfer of technology was monitored, with those items or 
areas that were determined to be sensitive or of military value 
prohibited from export to the East. These restrictions, while 
sometimes questioned as to their effectiveness, were generally 
viable with regard to computers for two reasons. First, while 
individual items of computer hardware, carrying with them  
selected technologies, might slip through, the restrictions did 
prevent a large scale transfer of equipment and technologies 
which were needed by the East to develop their computing 
capabilities on a broad basis. The element of scale here is 
essential, since it was only with the development of a widely
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based infrastructure that the Soviets could hope to duplicate the 
type of 'computer culture' that led the computer/information 
revolution in the West. 38 Second, while western efforts limiting 
the transfer of technology embodied in individual pieces of 
computer hardware may not always have been effective, this has 
not really mattered since Soviet efforts at incorporating western 
technologies through hardware have themselves been less than 
efficient. By focusing on small numbers of hardware items, the 
Soviets have gone after western technology in a form that has 
proven to be one of the least efficient means of transferring 
technology. Even when western computers were obtained, the 
process of reverse engineering, duplicating the manufacturing 
processes involved and then adapting the final products to fit 
their system, was time consuming at best; at worst, it proved 
next to impossible to gain anything in these efforts that would 
allow the Soviets and their allies to close the gap in computing 
between East and West. The picture that comes to mind from this 
situation is that of two boxers who are trying to hit each other 
while blindfolded-neither has been effective because of the 
inherent inefficiencies in their efforts, with the result that no 
one was hurt.
This situation, however, is rapidly changing. As has been seen,
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the new policies being put forward as part of Gorbachev's 
economic reforms have altered not only the direction and 
emphasis of the Soviet efforts at obtaining western technology, 
but the scope of these efforts. By encouraging the acquisition of 
western computer hardware and manufacturing capabilities on a 
broad scale, rather than going after a few prototypes, the Soviets 
stand to overcome the chronic shortages of equipment that have 
always hindered their development. Overcoming this shortage, in 
turn, is key to speeding up the process of general integration of 
computers in society, leading to greater use and greater demands 
for the services that computers can provide. By such measures, 
not only in the area of computer technology but in all areas where 
computers play a part in modern life, the Soviet government is 
consciously or unconsciously helping the transfer of information 
in a manner that will assist the country in integrating computers 
and developing the computing infrastructure that it has always 
lacked. At the same time, from a western perspective, not only is 
there political incentive in the West for trying to assist the 
reform efforts of the Soviet government, but there is a 
tremendous push from business interests to continue this 
process, with an eye towards new markets and the profits they 
represent. A consequence of all of this, however, is that in the
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rush to take advantage of these new opportunities, old guidelines 
and procedures are being overwhelmed and ignored, with the very 
real possibility that in the process more will be given up, in 
terms of technology, than might be desirable.
For their part, western regulators have tried to keep up with 
the changes taking place. However, pressures from both the 
business community and political circles to loosen CoCom 
restrictions have risen steadily as opportunities for profit 
combine with a perception of the reduced Soviet threat to argue 
against maintaining old limits based on security concerns. In an 
early, yet significant concession to these pressures in the 
computer field, the United States in July 1989 announced the 
dropping of restrictions on the export of personal computers 
using 32 bit architecture. 39 Comprising a great number of what 
had previously been considered fairly sophisticated machines, 
including among others the Apple Macintosh and IBM OS-2 
systems, this was seen as a major signal in the shift of western 
attitudes on these issues. *o This was quickly followed by the 
announcement that a comprehensive review of the entire CoCom 
list would take place, with emphasis on streamlining procedures 
and cutting down on the number of monitored items, effectively 
opening up a number of formerly restricted areas of technology
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for export to the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc.
While well meaning in its intent, the results of this process 
and the attempts to keep up with the changes taking place have 
been haphazard at best and have generally lagged behind the 
reality of the situation. 41 Critics have noted that the effort to 
come up with new guidelines on export controls may be an effort 
in futility, since virtually no one believes in the threat posed by 
the Soviet Union any more, and even if they did the opportunities 
for gain appear to far outweigh the potential costs involved. 42 
Because of the number of these opportunities, any system of 
control would soon be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of 
materials being transferred. It was hard enough to keep track of 
contacts and contracts when initiatives were small; now the 
limited enforcement mechanisms find themselves inundated. 43 
Further, to a large degree the old regime of export controls 
worked through self-restraint and enforcement on the part of the 
members. Now, however, those restraints have been ail but swept 
aside in the rush to cut the best deal with this new market before 
someone else can do the same.
What this means from a western perspective, is that current 
export control regimes no longer represent an effective way of
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controlling the flow of technology from West to East. This may 
seem perfectly acceptable as long as one believes that the Soviet 
Union no longer represents a threat to the West, however one need 
only look to the tremendous changes that have taken place in the 
past five years to see that the totally unexpected can, and often 
does occur in international politics. While few would argue that 
a return to the cold war world order seems imminent, at the same 
time the reestablishment of some type of strict authoritarian 
regime in the Soviet Union willing to use the country's still 
substantial military capabilities, cannot be ruled out. 44 At the 
same time, as noted earlier, some conservative elements within 
the Soviet hierarchy have been open in their condemnation of 
present reform policies, especially the move toward better 
relations with the West. While possibly not a major factor in the 
current situation, the presence of such sentiments could play a 
role in the future course that the Soviet Union follows. 45
At the same time, what can be seen as a result of this 
situation, where the current export controls have been 
outstripped by the new initiatives, is the potential for a massive 
transfer of information and technology. While the argument has 
been made by some that this is not significant because of the
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traditionally poor track record on the part of the Soviets in 
making use of western inputs, the counter-argument can be made 
that the current situation permits transfers of a different type, 
that both the amount and nature of these transfers have changed, 
reflecting the changing circumstances in the Soviet Union and the 
realization of the nature of the problems they have had with such 
transfers in the past. Not only will these changes allow for a 
more effective use of foreign technology, but in larger terms they 
go a long way towards addressing the major weaknesses that 
have always plagued Soviet computing. While, in the short term, 
Soviet computing will assuredly continue to lag behind that of the 
West, to believe that the Soviets are incapable of duplicating the 
type of computer revolution that has taken place in the West not 
only ignores what has been seen in other countries such as South 
Korea, but shows a certain arrogance that is not only unfounded 
but could have serious consequences should political reforms in 
the Soviet Union falter, while economic reforms succeed. There 
is no reason to believe that given sufficient inputs, in terms of 
hardware, information and technical assistance, a viable 
computing community cannot develop in the Soviet Union. Not 
only that, but should at some future point the Soviet Union or 
elements therein decide to return to earlier antagonistic ways, 
reinstating previous forms of export controls could hardly be
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expected to recoup what has already been lost. Once the genie is 
out of the bottle, it is difficult if not impossible to put him back 
in; once the Soviet Union has developed an independent computing 
capability based on a domestic infrastructure able to generate its 
own technology, there will be little need to continue turning to 
the West. 46
What all this argues for is a degree of prudence in the West's 
current policies. Since no one can predict the political future of 
the Soviet Union, it would seem wise to be cautious in what is 
given to the Soviets lest, as was the case earlier in this century 
with the materials that were sent to Japan in the 1920s and 
1930s, these materials becomes the basis of a very real threat to 
those who supplied them. At the same time, however, this is not 
to say that all aid and assistance to the Soviet Union should be 
halted till a clearer picture of what the future may bring comes 
into focus. In truth, not only would this probably be impossible to 
enforce, but it might bring about the very consequences that the 
West hopes to avoid, in terms of a return to the previous cold war 
era and all of the uncertainties that that type of a world involved. 
Instead, what seems to be called for is a new approach in export 
controls, one that recognizes the changes in the world situation 
in general, and in the Soviet approach toward technology transfer
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in particular. If the current situation is a result of restructuring 
in the Soviet Union, then what may be needed is restructuring of 
the West's ideas about export control, to meet the new challenges 
that are being posed.
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46 A key element in this scenario is the continued transition 
from the current command economy to some form of market 
mechanism. Just as the old economic order was responsible to a 
large degree for the conditions that led to the difficulties in 
assimilating western technology, the transition to a different 
system is essential if there is to be any substantial improvement 
in the process of technology assimilation. Among other things, a 
market economy would improve efficiency, allow for consumer 
feedback, attract foreign investment and provide the general 
conditions which might foster sustained growth and advancement, 
not only in the area of computers, but in the economy overall.
After apparent hesitation, the Soviet leadership as of this 
writing appears to have re-committed itself to this type of 
economic transformation. Whether it will maintain this 
commitment, remains to be seen.
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CONCLUSIONS-SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
As with any scholarly endeavor, there are often as not just 
as many new questions that are raised from a study as there are 
old questions answered. This paper has attempted to shed new 
light on the nature of technology transfer, both to better 
understand the processes involved and through this 
understanding to act as a guide for policy makers who must 
decide on the appropriate ways of controlling the flow of 
technology where issues of national security are involved. To 
do this, the history and state of computing in the Soviet Union 
have been used as a case study for examining both the impact of 
technology transfer upon a nation seeking to develop its 
capabilities through the use and integration of foreign 
technology, and the effectiveness of efforts to limit these 
attempts. While it is realized that some of the material 
examined may be unique to the computer area, both because of 
the nature of the technology and the the systems involved, 
general conclusions may still be drawn from these observations 
and applied to other cases and circumstances. And even if some 
conclusions are area specific, the importance of computers in 
the life of a modern industrial society is such as to have
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warranted the examination. Finally, if the mere act of bringing 
these issues to light generates further discussion and 
examination, then the ultimate goal of expanding knowledge in 
this area will have been achieved.
In drawing conclusions from what has been seen in the case of 
technology transfer and the Soviet computer industry, it first 
seems appropriate to restate the findings, so as to be sure that 
what is proposed, in fact, follows from that which has been 
observed. As a subset of the general competition between East 
and West, computing has been an area of particular importance, 
both in and of itself and in terms of what computers can 
contribute to the industrial and economic development of a 
nation. Early computer development (through second generation) 
in the West and the East reflected relatively equal emphasis on 
this area and fairly equal accomplishments. However, since that 
time the gap between the two sides has widened to the point that, 
from the 1960s onward, the leadership of the Soviet Union has 
been forced to admit the disparities that exist in this area and to 
take active measures to try to overcome their country's 
deficiencies, including an all out campaign to take advantage of 
western computer technology. In spite of resolute efforts, 
however, the Soviet Union has been unable to catch up with the
C-2
West. The reasons for this failure are many, ranging from the 
inherent weaknesses of the Soviet economic system in general, to 
western efforts at limiting such transfers, primarily through the 
export control regime administered by CoCom. While no one 
reason can account entirely for the Soviet failure, this study has 
argued that a central reason, which has largely been overlooked, 
is that the ways by which the Soviet Union tried to transfer and 
incorporate western technology were themselves inherently 
inefficient. Therefore, this effort, if not doomed from the start, 
was severely handicapped by conditions of the Soviets' own 
making, and not through western efforts as is commonly 
supposed.
The significance of these findings might be far less if the 
situation described above still existed today. However with the 
coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, and his program of 
restructuring the Soviet economy to overcome the problems 
endemic to that system, came a change in the Soviet approach to 
obtaining and incorporating western technology. Further, the 
significance of this change has not been fully appreciated by 
decision makers in the West because of the failure to be 
cognizant of the ways in which technologies are most effectively 
transferred. While Soviet acquisition initiatives, besides
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increasing in number, have taken new and wholly unprecedented 
forms, western responses to these initiatives have been slow 
and/or inappropriate. Not only has the amount of computer 
hardware being imported by the Soviet Union increased 
significantly in the past five years, encouraged by a loosening of 
export restrictions in the West, but the number of Soviet 
scientists and businessmen traveling in the West has seen a 
dramatic rise. At the same time as well, the Soviet Union has 
launched a major program emphasizing Joint Ventures and other 
forms of mutual cooperation, which will help to bring both 
western technical know-how and managerial expertise into the 
country. The extent of this emphasis can be seen in the comment 
of one western observer, who noted that "Joint Venture is as 
common an English phrase to Soviet business leaders as blue 
jeans is to their teenage children." 1
The reason these changes are so significant in the area of 
computers is that, in addition to addressing the short term 
problems of a lack of hardware and software, these measures 
address what may be the key element as to why Soviet attempts 
to incorporate western technology have failed in the past; the 
failure to recognize the importance of human interaction in the
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successful transfer of technology. As a result of these changes, 
the combination of increased numbers of computers, increased 
access to western computer know-how, and the growth of a 
'computer culture' similar to that in the West may eventually give 
the Soviet Union something it has never had before, a strong 
computing infrastructure, one able to generate computer related 
technologies on its own. The reasons for the lack of western 
response to these changes are just as numerous as the reasons 
for the previous Soviet failures at successfully assimilating 
technology, and include everything from bureaucratic inertia, to 
political optimism over the changes taking place in the East, to 
pressures from the business community to allow businesses to 
take advantage of the new opportunities presenting themselves in 
terms of trade with the Soviet Union. Whatever the reasons 
though, the result may be that the West, by its actions or lack 
thereof, could be sacrificing the technological advantage that it 
has enjoyed over the past forty years, and which it has claimed 
has been one of the cornerstones of its security.
The Western Debate
Critics of this view, who support either an end to export 
controls altogether or at least their radical reduction, argue along
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two separate, though related tracks. The first group maintains 
that this situation is not as serious as it might at first appear, 
simply because no matter what new technologies the Soviet Union 
receives, it has proved incapable of effectively using them in the 
past, and will continue to do so in the future. While the Soviet 
Union's record for successful integration of western technology 
has certainly been less than spectacular, this type of argument 
contains an element of complacency about the West’s 
technological superiority, as if the Soviets are incapable of 
creating and working with advanced technology in any field. Such, 
however, is not the case, as Soviet achievements in certain areas 
where they have chosen to focus their efforts have shown. 2 The 
fact that they have not been able to do this in all areas speaks of 
the failings of their system to support such efforts in a number of 
sectors simultaneously, and not the inability of Soviet scientists 
to master any given technology. Indeed, the economic reforms 
were created to address these failings and are designed to change 
the very mechanisms that lie at the basis of these problems. 
Further, the record of the development of several of the countries 
in the Far East should serve to banish such western complacency 
about the ability of countries that, while economically not as 
developed as the West, still possess a basic industrial foundation 
which can support rapid advances given the proper conditions.
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Starting from a position far less advantageous than that of the 
Soviet Union, countries such as Taiwan and South Korea in the past 
thirty years have managed achievements that have astounded the 
rest of the world. They were able to accomplish these feats 
through a combination of foreign technology and investment, 
government policies that on one hand encouraged human 
integration, while on the other protected fledgling domestic 
industries until they could compete with those abroad, and market 
economies that gave incentives for development, expansion and 
efficiency. 3 it would be unreasonable to assume that given the 
same types of conditions and incentives, the Soviet Union could 
not be able to emulate this type of development, especially given 
support from the West.
This leads to the second argument that is heard with regard to 
the current situation, that even if all of the above is true and the 
Soviet Union can reap a major benefit from the reforms, this 
situation is not to be feared, as the Soviet Union that is emerging 
under Gorbachev is not the same one that has traditionally been an 
adversary of the West, and that there is no longer the need to fear 
Soviet intentions as the cold war is truly over. Heard especially 
from business concerns who stand to profit from the new
C-7
relations, as well as certain sectors of western governments who 
see the current situation as an opportunity to end the hostile 
atmosphere that has governed East-West relations for the past 
forty years, these elements would abandon or greatly reduce 
export controls on the assumption that the current process is 
irreversible and therefore there is no longer a need to fear the 
results if the Soviet Union should begin to close the technology 
gap, since by the time this occurs it will be a different type of 
Soviet Union. While this assessment is appealing, as a minimum it 
may be overly optimistic, if for no other reason than it seems to 
count on five years of less than successful political and economic 
reform overcoming more than seventy (and some might even argue 
more than 300) years of authoritarian rule, combined with a deep 
rooted distrust of the West. The resurgence of conservative 
elements in the Soviet Union's body politic serves as a sobering 
reminder that many in the Soviet Union are dissatisfied not only 
with the conditions that the reforms have brought about, but with 
the general philosophical beliefs on which the reforms are based. 4 
Only time will tell the effect that these elements will have on the 
eventual shape and nature of the Soviet Union, however it would 
seem more than a remote possibility that the cooperative future 
that many predict as the result of the Gorbachev reforms may, in 
fact, revert to one of strained relations between the Soviet Union
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and the West. Until a clearer picture of the future begins to 
unfold, at least some degree of caution on the part of western 
policies towards the Soviet Union would seem to be prudent.
Unfortunately, there are just as many elements in the West 
who are ready to ignore the events that have taken place in East 
and would prefer to maintain pre-1985 policies, including strong 
export controls, in the belief that if the reforms succeed, then 
policies can be changed, and if they do not and the Soviet Union 
returns to some variant of its past policies, nothing will have 
been lost in the process. Such reasoning is dangerous on two 
accounts. First, the refusal to acknowledge the changing 
situation in the relations between East and West flies in the face 
of reality, and only bolsters the arguments of those who say that 
the old export control policies are out of date and do not reflect 
the current situation. 5 Second, failing to respond to Soviet 
initiatives may well condemn the reforms to failure. In this 
instance, the argument that nothing should be changed because 
the reforms may fail becomes something of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, since almost everyone concedes that the reforms can 
only succeed with large scale intervention and assistance from 
the West. What is missing from this debate is a middle ground, 
one that recognizes both the need to respond positively to the
C-9
current situation, but in such a way that should events take such 
a turn that the two sides again become adversaries, the West will 
have no need to regret that which has been given to the Soviet 
Union in the interim.
The Need for a New Approach to Export Control
All this points to the need for a new approach to the 
employment of export controls; one that seeks to limit the 
transfer of key technological skills as opposed to individual 
pieces of equipment. This approach would incorporate an 
appreciation for the ways that technologies are most effectively 
transferred with a realistic appraisal of what export controls can 
be expected to achieve, and what they cannot, given the current 
circumstances. Based on this knowledge, reasonable goals could 
be set for such a regime along with measures to achieve these 
goals, ones likely to be complied with out of the mutual interests 
of the participants rather than any enforcement mechanism.
While this may seem like the basis on which any rational export 
control regime should be founded, it can be argued that, in fact, 
the current system no longer conforms to these criteria. The 
present system has sought to limit technology transfers by
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controlling items that were thought to have a military
significance, but which, in reality, did little in raising the overall
level of the Soviet Union's technological skill. In the area of 
computing, this led to the current regimes being directed against 
transfers of individual items of hardware (an inefficient means 
of transferring technology) and software (which is almost 
impossible to monitor and control), while virtually ignoring 
personal contacts and information transfer systems. That these 
approaches were, in fact, appropriate as long as the Soviet Union 
concentrated on obtaining technology through hardware and 
software is readily conceded. However, as has been shown, the 
Soviet approach since 1985 has changed; thus, the export regime
must change as well, if it is to remain a viable entity.
As a first step in considering any change in export controls, 
the question must be asked, what exactly is it that export 
controls hope to accomplish? The goal of prohibiting the transfer 
of technologies that might have military application, which has 
been an underlying tenant of the current export control regime, 
has always been difficult to quantify especially in terms of dual 
use technologies, 6 appears anachronistic given the changing 
relations between the East and the West, and is probably 
unrealistic given both the political and economic pressures
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involved. The goal of maintaining a given lead time, that is to 
insure that the West maintains a technological advantage in 
certain areas, is less definable but may be more realistic. By 
recognizing the western strength in the development of new 
technologies, such an approach would not be afraid to let older 
technologies be transferred as a way of encouraging general 
Soviet economic development. The focus of such a regime would 
be an economic strategy designed to limit the ability of the 
Soviet Union to make rapid leaps in technical capabilities that 
could pose a potential threat either to the security of the West. 
The way to avoid such a situation would be to control and 
influence the development of the element that could provide the 
ability to achieve such accomplishments, the industrial-technical 
in frastruc ture .
This is not to argue that export controls should attempt to 
limit the economic development of the Soviet Union overall. At 
the same time, however, it recognizes the fact that left 
unchecked, Soviet initiatives in the area of technology transfer 
will eventually result in a greatly expanded capability for this 
infrastructure first, to make use of western technology and 
second, to generate technologies of its own. Politically, there 
are valid reasons for responding to the initiatives and requests
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for technical assistance that have come from the Soviet Union; 
already, cases have been seen where the Soviet Union has broken 
with past policies and behaviors in the international arena, as 
part of the process of 'New Thinking'. 7 Economically, the 
opportunities for expanded trade and markets presented by the 
opening of the Soviet Union to the West provides possibilities not 
only for western industries, but for western scientists and other 
professionals as well. Both give the opportunity for integration 
on a wider scale and with this integration a more stable base for 
continued peaceful relations between nations. This integration in 
itself becomes a security measure of sorts, since countries that 
have strong economic and social ties are less likely to wish each 
other harm. Integration would also allow a more accurate 
understanding and evaluation of each others capabilities and 
intentions. Revisionist historians have long maintained that the 
cold war was the result of mutual misunderstandings between the 
blocs, reinforced by the aura of secrecy surrounding the Soviet 
Union. 8 This secrecy and the surprises that it brought, as with 
the launching of sputnik, contributed to western fears and the 
tension that existed between East and West, fears that might 
have been reduced had the West been privy to a more accurate 
assessment of the Soviet Union's true capabilities at the time.
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Thus the key to the new approach to export control would be to 
focus on the development of the Soviet infrastructure in various 
key sectors, such as computers, monitor this development, and 
through export controls and other measures attempt to influence 
this development so that it does not present a threat to western 
security.
Summarizing the underlying premises of this type of approach, 
the overriding concern would be the maintenance of a 
technological edge over the Soviet Union. This would not 
necessarily mean stopping Soviet scientific-technical 
development, but channeling that development and taking steps to 
insure that the rate of development did not outstrip that of the 
West. While this may seem a fairly straight forward matter, 
given the terrible state of the Soviet economy, it must be 
remembered that it is not the overall state of economic 
development that is of concern to the West in terms of security, 
as much as the developments in certain key areas that might 
prove militarily threatening under a given set of circumstances. 
To avoid this, such a regime should concentrate on influencing the 
development of the infrastructure that could create such a 
situation. 9 This, in turn, could be done through a combination of 
controls on technologies critical to such an infrastructure, such
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as manufacturing, and economic incentives to participate in the 
world division of labor. Integration, here, plays a critical role. 
Through failure to integrate earlier in its history, the Soviet 
Union has found itself in the position that it occupies today. 
Through integration, it hopes to extract itself from that position. 
Because integration is essential, the West should be able to set 
the terms of that integration so that it does not present a threat 
to the West and may, in fact, increase the security of all.
Certain elements of this approach can be found in the 
discussions taking place with regard to the revisions of the 
current CoCom lists. The problem is that these revisions still 
focus on hardware, and ignore the other areas that, as have been 
shown, are essential for successful technology transfer. Further, 
the CoCom reforms are concerned with individual items or 
technologies rather than an overall objective. What is called for 
is a 'holistic approach’, one that combines a package of measures 
that work together to achieve the desired result. It does the 
West little good to continue to restrict the transfer of individual 
items, while in the longer term allowing the Soviet Union to 
increase its technical skills to the point that the Soviets can 
create equivalent items without turning to the West. Lebedev and 
his supporters fully understood the nature of dependence when
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they argued for an independent infrastructure that did not depend 
upon western inputs for its advances. On the other hand, if 
guarantees of access to a reasonable level of related technologies 
can be combined with security guarantees that would cause the 
Soviet Union to voluntarily curb its efforts at creating such a 
domestic infrastructure, the West will have achieved its goal of 
securing its technological advantage, at least until such time as 
the need for such an advantage is no longer felt.
A Model Regime for Computing
While the purpose of this study is not to propose new policies 
but to show their need, and through demonstrating this need spur 
further examination of these issues, it might be worthwhile to 
put forward the elements of such a regime in the case of Soviet 
computing as a starting point for future discussion. The goal of 
the regime, as indicated above, would be to preserve the 
technological advantage enjoyed by the West, not necessarily by 
hindering the general level of computer development and use in 
the Soviet Union, but by monitoring that development, and through 
controls on certain key elements ensuring that development does 
not pose a risk to western security. 10 To achieve this goal, based
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on what has been observed in the course of this examination, the 
following elements might be considered:
Encourage Integration with the W est-W h ile  this might at first 
appear to be at odds with the traditional purposes of export 
controls, given that such integration effectively transfers 
technology, it should be remembered that the ultimate objective 
of this effort is to maintain ones security; if this can be 
achieved through integration, then the purpose of the regime will 
be accomplished. Integration, in terms of hardware and software, 
would tie the Soviet Union to western systems and make it less 
likely to pursue designs of its own. Integration, in terms of 
personnel, would foster professional ties as well as allow the 
West a means of informally monitoring Soviet developments.
Identify and Maintain Control of 'Critical Nodes' 11-C ritical 
nodes, as used here, apply to critical elements without which a 
system rapidly looses its ability to function. Supplies of certain 
materials (such as high grade silicon), capabilities (such a 
microprocessor manufacture), 12 or access to certain facilities 
all could be key elements in developing an independent computing 
capability. CoCom already monitors several of these areas, 
however they would have to be re-examined in terms of their
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importance to the overall development of a computer 
infrastructure. At the same time, guaranteeing the supply of 
finished products at a cost comparable to the cost of domestic 
production, would offer the Soviet Union incentives to forgo such 
developments as well as encourage integration.
Temporarily Embargo 'State of the Art* Technologies 13 -A s  has 
been noted, earlier regimes prohibited the transfer of specific 
pieces of equipment that were thought to have military 
significance. An alternative approach might be to prohibit the 
transfer of any piece of equipment during a specified time period 
after it is first made commercially available, but then release all 
controls after that time period has passed. Along with 
guaranteeing a lead time for security reasons, commercially such 
an approach would be appealing since all manufacturers would be 
treated the same, and would have the chance to compete for sales 
on an equal footing after the embargo period. From the Soviet 
perspective, the knowledge that any given piece of hardware 
would be available to them after the embargo period might 
dissuade them from attempting to develop or acquire such 
technologies on their own.
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Insist on Observance of International Laws Governing Copyrights
and Intellectual Propertv-Restrictions on software would be 
removed in return for guarantees that software developers would 
receive due compensation for their work. The royalties received 
would be used to support further development, thus maintaining 
western strengths in this area. Soviet compliance would be 
encouraged by the desire for mutual respect and protection for 
their own products.
Closely Monitor Human and Other Information Exchanges-T h is  
should not be construed as limiting such interchanges, which 
would go against the goal of integration, however better 
monitoring of the people coming to the West and what they are 
doing would give a better idea of what technologies are being 
transferred by such means, and could be used to identify efforts 
at obtaining information or capabilities with direct bearing on 
security issues.
How this regime would apply to the various aspects of 
computer technology would depend to a degree on the technologies 
themselves. In terms of hardware, restrictions would be lifted 
on most computers, with all but the most powerful and most
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advanced being allowed for export. This would not only provide 
the Soviet Union with the machines needed to make up for their 
current shortages, but it would answer the calls for an end to 
restrictions on western firms doing business in this area. At the 
same time, a blanket embargo might be placed on all newly 
manufactured technologies for a period of time, after which all 
restrictions on the transfer of this equipment would be lifted. 14 
Firm controls would also be placed on any transfers of elements 
involved in the manufacturing of computers or computer 
components, especially microprocessors. As has already been 
seen, these types of technologies are high on the 'wish list' of 
Joint Ventures, and could eventually give the Soviet Union a 
degree of independence in the computer field. While certain 
elements in the Soviet Union might chafe at what they see as an 
overt attempt to foster dependence, as long as the Soviet Union 
was guaranteed access to finished computers at reasonable cost, 
in contrast to the cost of developing an independent 
manufacturing capability, this might prove to be a more than 
acceptable trade off.
In terms of software, restrictions on all but special purpose 
software would be lifted, giving the Soviet Union access to the 
software that they need to take advantage of the influx of
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western computers, with strict adherence to international patent 
and copyright laws required as a condition for the lifting of other 
restrictions. Compliance would come about again, because the 
Soviet Union would have more to gain than it would be willing to 
lose through non-compliance. From the western perspective, 
controls on the transfer of software are almost impossible to 
enforce; therefore, it stands to reason to cease futile efforts at 
control as long as legal rights are observed. Those areas where 
software controls would remain might include CAD/CAM and 
software programs relating to the design and manufacture of 
computers and other high technology equipment, reinforcing the 
effort to limit the development of an independent manufacturing 
capability in this area. The royalties from user fees should, in 
turn, go back to spur further software development. Integration 
of Soviet and western programmers would be encouraged, both for 
its inherent benefits to all concerned and as a way of monitoring 
Soviet software development. While increasing access to 
western software and programming may result in the transfer of 
the latest software technology to the Soviet Union, at the same 
time, Soviet programmers have skills that could be of value in the 
West. The trade-off of lifting controls in return for greater 
access and integration in the software field may well be as 
beneficial for the West as for the Soviet Union.
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Finally, as has been emphasized, possibly the greatest change 
in the area of technology transfer to come about as a result of 
Soviet reforms has not had anything to do with the economic 
restructuring directly, but is a result of the change in attitude 
towards human contacts with the West. A basic tenet of this 
paper has been that such contacts are the most efficient means of 
transferring technology, and therefore the increase in contacts 
between East and West represents a tremendous potential 
increase in the effectiveness that can be gotten from western 
technology. At the same time, however, if there is a hope for 
improving the relations between the West and the Soviet Union, it 
is that through such increased contacts, mutual understandings 
will be reached between the peoples of both sides, forming the 
basis for cooperation and better relations in the future. While 
the line between benefit and cost is difficult to draw, it can be 
argued that efforts to monitor the contacts taking place could be 
reinforced without necessarily restricting the number of these 
contacts. At present, the efforts being made to keep track of 
Soviet visitors are minimal at best, aside from screening of visa 
applications and the monitoring of known or suspected 
intelligence agents. Yet these people may represent the greatest
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flow of technology leaving the West. By more closely monitoring 
the nature of these growing contacts between the two, agencies 
charged with regulating export controls could evaluate the impact 
of such transfers as well as identify attempts to obtain those 
technologies and capabilities that the West feels there is still a 
need to control, specifically in the areas of manufacturing and 
production. The same type of care should be taken with access to 
computer networks, data bases and other types of information 
exchange. The goal here would not necessarily be to restrict the 
flow of all technology, but to identify the sources and content of 
the technology being transferred, so as to be able to better judge 
its significance and whether further restrictions in a given area 
need be applied. ..'15
The Implications of this Type of Approach
The results of this type of policy would first be to limit the 
development of a computing infrastructure within the Soviet 
Union by restraining certain key elements in this infrastructure. 
As has been shown, the lack of such an infrastructure is at the 
heart of most of the problems that the Soviet Union faces with 
regard to computers. The difference now would be that 
recognition of this fact would be used by the West as a control
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mechanism. Development in other areas, including the widening 
use of computers within society, would still be encouraged 
through liberal export policies that would provide all of the lower 
end computers and peripherals the country could absorb, without 
losing the ability to restrict the import of extremely powerful 
machines with military applications or the general import of 
machines, should a change in political conditions warrant such an 
action. Controls on manufacturing capabilities would also 
continue, as least in the immediate future. As has been seen, 
such capabilities are a key element in any infrastructure and 
their absence in the past has severely limited Soviet 
development. However, by guaranteeing that computers will be 
available at a cost comparable to that of domestic manufacture, 
restrictions on the transfer of manufacturing technology might be 
accepted. Integration would also be encouraged through the use 
of common machines as well as common sources of supply.
Finally, identifying and more closely monitoring the growing 
number of human contacts, as well as other sources of 
information provided by computer networks and data links, while 
not overtly interfering with the process of exchange would give 
the West the ability to close or restrict such access if the need 
should ever be felt. Thus, by policies designed to control the 
development of a computer infrastructure, as opposed to
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controlling individual pieces of equipment, western dominance in 
this area would be preserved.
It can be argued that such a policy is designed to place the 
Soviet Union in a permanent state of dependence on the West, a 
dependence that the Soviets have always feared and would be 
loathe to accept. The counter to this argument is that, in fact, 
this policy is designed to foster integration between East and 
West to the benefit of the former, while answering the security 
concerns that are still held by the latter. From the Soviet 
perspective, the cost involved in trying to achieve an independent 
capability in computing, especially given their past record, might 
more than ameliorate the conditions imposed by the West.
Further, if in fact one of the goals of the current Soviet regime is 
to improve relations, so that all can live together in one 'common 
world home', then the fear of dependence on the West for certain 
elements in this area should also be lessened. Finally, it should 
be recognized that even following such a policy, eventually the 
Soviet Union may be able to achieve an independent capability in 
the area of computers. As exposure both to western computing 
techniques and to computing in general within Soviet society 
grows, the type of computer culture that has fostered the
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information revolution in the West will come into being in the 
Soviet Union as well. If there is one lesson that history teaches, 
it is that man, no matter what conditions he finds himself in, 
will continue to strive to progress. However, by modifying the 
course of this development to lengthen the time involved, the 
West also gives time for other reforms to take effect, reforms 
that may lessen the concern for the day when the Soviets do 
achieve an independent capability in this area.
The implications of this type of approach, both for the Soviet 
Union in particular and the world in general, are many and varied. 
For the Soviet Union, this type of approach should not be seen as a 
further attempt to limit its development by an adversary as has 
been the case in the past, but as a way to aid Soviet development 
by allowing, to the widest possible degree, the transfer of 
technology. By providing a viable means of monitoring and 
controlling those transfers that pose a security concern for the 
West, restrictions in other areas would no longer be needed. From 
a western perspective, not only would security concerns be 
addressed, but also political and business concerns as well, 
concerns that see the welfare of both the West and the East aided 
by improved political and economic relations, without the burden 
of a series of cumbersome export regulations whose
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appropriateness and effectiveness have come into question.
There are lessons to be learned, as well, which can be applied to 
the transfer of technology from North to South. The rise of the 
third world as a new center of industrial and political importance 
has brought with it concerns among the industrial nations about 
the transfer of sensitive technologies to these regions, regions 
where these technologies may fall into the hands of those whose 
intention is to bring harm to others. The recent cases of western 
industrialists aiding the development of manufacturing 
capabilities for chemical weapons in Libya, as well as being the 
source of Iraq's nuclear potential, point to the need to re-look 
export control policies in these areas as well. At the same time, 
it should be remembered that what have been identified as the 
efficient ways of transferring technology need not necessarily be 
viewed solely with an eye toward restricting these means. In 
cases where the goal is to aid in the development of an area, 
these lessons can be used to identify the most effective ways of 
transferring technology, so that these methods and means can be 
targeted to ensure the greatest success possible.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that any examination of 
export controls and the policies that implement these controls 
must be based on the ways that technologies are most efficiently
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transferred, if they are to be effective. While this may seem 
obvious, as has been seen this has not always been the case in the 
past, nor unless there is recognition of this fact, is there any 
guarantee that this will be the case in the future. The rapid and 
radical changes taking place in the Soviet Union, however, present 
an excellent opportunity not only to revise past practices in the 
light of these changes, but to respond positively to a process that 
may ultimately benefit the world overall. Re-looking export 
controls is but one element of this process, but it is an element of 
tremendous significance, and cannot be ignored. The questions 
involved are difficult ones and the implementation of any policy 
will be far from easy, however the potential benefits to be gained, 
make it well worth the effort involved.
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ENDNOTES
1 Harvet S. Caras, “Sizing Up the Soviet System,” PJ-Personnei 
Journal, vol. 69, no. 12 (1990), p. 40.
2 As cited in the report to the American National Academy of 
Sciences, "Some areas where Soviet research may be ahead of the 
West are in frost-resistent fiber cables, radiation-hard fibers, and 
laser sources for fiber-optic transmissions." With the attention 
being given to the current economic problems in the Soviet Union,
it is all too easy to forget that the USSR still maintains the third 
largest economy in the world (behind the United States and Japan), 
and has devoted tremendous amounts of resources to its research 
and development sector, which can be very good. Global Trends in 
Computer Technology and Their Impact on Export Control. 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988) p. 181.
3 In his opening remarks to the Tech Transfer Society conference 
held at Dayton Ohio on 26 June 1990, Dr. Philip Roberts commented, 
"I have bad news and good news to report today. The bad news is 
that forty percent of the graduate students in the sciences and 
engineering in the United States are citizens of Asian countries. 
The good news is, that upon completion of their studies, fifty 
percent of those decide to remain in the United States." While an 
approximation designed for shock value, the figures that he states 
are not very much different from those of other sources, and point 
to the tremendous number of students from the Far East who attend 
western universities for their training, and then return home, 
carrying with them the skills that have helped to propel this region 
of the world to a meteoric climb in terms of high technology.
4 While the current political spectrum in the Soviet Union runs the 
gambit from radical reformers to radical reactionaries, the 
conservative faction in late 1990 and early 1991 has shown a 
resurgence of strength as well as the ability to influence policy. 
While not all conservatives decry all the reforms, there are at 
least some elements whose beliefs parallel those of the 
Slavophiles, that is, they show a severe distrust of the West and 
have been quick to condemn any policy that is seen as fostering 
better relations for any reason. To this must be added the fact 
that seventy plus years of viewing the West as an enemy by the
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whole of Soviet Society cannot be totally forgotten in a matter of 
half a decade.
5 The Soviets themselves are quick to join this debate on their 
own behalf. "Soviet specialists hold the view that today when 
obvious positive changes are taking place on the world arena and 
confrontation is giving way to the policy of talks on the most 
complicated problems, the very existence of CoCom is becoming 
an anachronism." Aleksandr Baraulin, “Prospects of Technology 
Exchange in Soviet Cooperation with Asian Countries," Foreign 
Trade. June 1990, p. 19.
6 Dual use technologies are defined as those technologies that can 
be used for either peaceful or military purposes, with most 
computer equipment falling into this category. Not surprisingly, 
decisions on such items normally are a matter of interpretation, 
with interpretations, in turn, normally coinciding with the interests 
of those doing the interpreting. With the decrease in the perceived 
threat posed by the Soviet Union has come an increase in the calls 
for more liberal policies with regard to these technologies.
7 'New Thinking' as originally formulated by President Gorbachev, 
was to be the new and realistic approach taken by the Soviet 
Union in its relations with the rest of the world. In practice, it 
has resulted in a modification of what have been traditional 
patterns of behavior by the Soviet Union in the world arena, in 
return for pledges of support and aid from western governments 
for Soviet reform policies. The Soviet withdrawal form 
Afghanistan, restraint shown in the Middle East, and support for 
agreements such as in Angola, all have been positive results of 
the 'New Thinking' process.
8 Stephen Cohn's, Rethinking the Soviet Experience. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1985, is an excellent example of this 
type of argument. Known as revisionist historians (not to be 
mistaken for the revisionists condemned by Lenin), this group 
argues that the cold war was the result of mutual 
misunderstandings between the Blocs as much as through any ill 
intent on the part of either side. While this line of reasoning has 
more than its share of detractors, there are enough examples 
where each side has overreacted to what it perceived to be the 
intentions of the other, to support the idea that a better
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understanding of the other side's views, as well as an accurate 
assessment of its capabilities and intentions, can only help in 
such situations.
9 The concept here would be to encourage evolutionary, rather 
than revolutionary change in the Soviet computing field. Those 
familiar Soviet scientific development will verify that in the 
past the Soviet Union has been known for its ability to make rapid 
leaps or 'Skachoks' in certain fields, primarily because of its 
emphasis on theoretical rather than experimental development.
It is exactly this type of leap in capability that is of particular 
concern in security related matters, where sudden surprises are 
seldom welcome. Rather than trying to stop all development, the 
goal here would be to allow evolutionary development through 
selective release of materials and equipment that would satisfy 
the Soviet Union's needs and not force them into pursuing 
independent efforts, where a skachok might occur.
10 Monitoring, as envisioned here, would be informal in nature, 
based on reports brought back from western academics and 
businessmen during the course of their normal dealings with the 
Soviets. One of the biggest changes that has come about as a 
result of the new openness in the Soviet Union is that western 
observers are gaining access to areas and information that were 
never available before. While a concerted effort might be made to 
hide a particular project, in general, integration would probably 
allow a fairly accurate picture of Soviet capabilities and 
interests to be developed.
11 The concept of critical nodes is not a new one to either 
management or social science theory. By identifying certain key 
elements in a process or system, an element of control is 
established, for by restricting this element, the system or 
process itself is either restricted, or in extreme cases can be 
brought to a halt.
12 An example in the case of computers might be the 88383 
microprocessor currently used in the latest generation of MS-DOS  
machines that make up a substantial portion of the world's 
computing capability. Only one company in the world, Intel, 
makes this particular chip, and while it is probable that it could 
be duplicated in time, the short term restriction of the 
availability of this microprocessor would have serious
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consequences for any nation with a computing population. Thus 
control over distribution of this particular item becomes a 
'critical node' that could be used as a potential means controlling 
development.
13 While similar in terms of the theory behind its employment, 
such an embargo should not be confused with the use of sanctions, 
as recently seen in the case of Iraq. In this case, the restrictions 
of goods was designed to force a given action or concession; the 
embargo would not be punitive in nature. Instead, it should be 
viewed as a safeguard in this process, that in the short term 
provides security without necessarily disrupting or otherwise 
adversely affecting the system overall, and in the long run allows 
a greater amount of technology to be transferred.
14 Delayed release of given technologies offers some interesting 
possibilities in terms of export control. Rather than focusing on 
certain items, as in the case of critical nodes, entire categories 
of technologies or their related products would be prohibited 
from release for export for a specified period of time, after 
which all controls would be lifted. The benefits of this type of 
approach include a built in lead time (that period during which the 
product is not available for export), simplified policing (no trade 
is allowed on a given product for the given period of time), and 
preservation of economic equity (after the designated period, 
anyone is allowed to compete for sales on an equal footing). At 
the same time, because availability is guaranteed after the 
specified period, there is less incentive on the part of those to 
whom these restrictions apply to take the steps necessary to 
develop a domestic source.
15 Monitoring could serve several functions. First, having a better 
idea of exactly what visiting scholars are working on, could not only 
serve to identify possible violations to western guidelines, but 
might serve to identify those people and areas where western 
researchers and scientists could benefit from the nature of this 
work. Second, the mere fact that more attention is being paid to 
this area might serve to limit those actions that go against existing 
restrictions and guidelines. Finally, an accurate idea of the work 
being conducted in the Soviet Union would help to identify the 
existing level of its capabilities, and thus serve as a guide to future 
actions designed to modify the export regime, should they be needed.
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APPENDIX A
EFFECTIVENESS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY 
AND TRANSFER MECHANISM
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Source: "AN ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CONTROL OF U.S. Technology -
A DOD PERSPECTIVE" p. 6.
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APPENDIX B
QUARTERLY NUMBER OF NEW JOINT VENTURES 
IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE VALUE OF 
INVESTMENT BY FOREIGN PARTNERS
NUMBER MILLION RUBLES
140 
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TABLE 3 - -  REGISTRATION OF SOVIET JOINT VENTURES AS OF Ml0 - JANUARY 1989, BY QUARTER
Frequency Capitalization Ave. share 
of foreign 
partner in
Value of foreign investment
Share In Share Average In Share Average
Registration in m illion in size in capital mi 11i on in size in
Period Nunber percent rubles percent m il. R. in percent rubles percent m il. R.
Total 205 100.00 873.052 100.00 4.259 38.37 335.003 100.00 1.634
1987-Q2 5 2.44 6.150 .70 1.230 47.02 2.892 .86 .578
1987-Q3 3 1.46 59.089 6.77 19.696 34.50 20.387 6.09 6.796
1987-Q4 15 7.32 94.031 10.77 6.269 34.34 32.293 9.64 2.153
1988-Q1 13 6.34 67.548 7.74 5.196 37.35 25.228 7.53 1.941
1988-Q2 27 13.17 118.951 13.62 4.406 40.54 48.220 14.39 1.786
1988-Q3 42 20.49 151.765 17.38 3.613 40.17 60.963 18.20 1.452
1988-Q4 86 41.95 307.389 35.21 3.574 38.63 118.737 35.44 1.381
January 1989 14 6.83 68.130 7.80 4.866 38.58 26.283 7.85 1.877
Source: PlanEcon Report, vol. V, nos 10-11-12, 24 March 1989,
p. 6.
#  OF JOINT VENTURES INV. BY FOR. PARTNER
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APPENDIX D
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Tejie(paKc 9430072
SOVIET-BULGARIAN-FINNISH 
JOINT VENTURE 
NEW INFORM ATION  
TECHNOLOGIES
13, Nezhinskaya St., Moscow, 119517 
tel. 442-57-92 
telex 411080 STYLE 
telefax 9430072
______________ N_
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m u tu a lly  advantageous co o p era tio n  in  the f ie ld  o f in fo rm a tio n
technologies
Letterhead from the Computer Joint Venture "Novintech" 
Source: New Information Technologies
APPENDIX E
US-USSR Trade: 1978-1989 
(Millions of Dollars)
US Exports (F.a.s)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Total 2,252 3,607 1,513 2,340 2,593 2,003 3,284 2,423 1,248 1,480 2,768 4,271
Agric 1,687 2,855 1,047 1,665 1,855 1,457 2,817 1,864 648 923 2,162 3,437
Non Agric 565 742 466 675 737 546 467 559 600 557 606 835
US Imports for Consumption (c.f.f.)*
Total 530 873 463 387 248 367 602 443 605 470 649 703
Agric 13 15 10 12 11 11 11 9 16 22 20 21
Non-Agric 517 858 452 375 237 356 591 434 589 448 269 682
‘ Customs value for 1978-1979
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce
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